Isidoro Mazza

Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

Difficulties faced by the Economic and Monetary Union have strengthened the position of those who advocate a process of (further) political integration in the European Union (EU). A widespread fear is, though, that such a process would favor powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU policymakers. Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that political centralization will increase the size of the government through lobbying because of free-riding incentives created by federally funded programs with localized benefits. We extend their analysis by presenting a model where the budgeting process is divided into two stages, instead of one, which better captures the EU institutional framework. A federal legislator (the Council) chooses the size of the budget at one stage, while a federal agency (the Commission) chooses the allocation of the budget at the next stage. We show that separation of powers in the budgeting process restricts free riding and, therefore, reduces the incentives to lobby. The result is an unchanged budget under centralization. Moreover, it is shown that if the lobbying activity is directed to both policymakers, competitive lobbying may actually reduce the size of the public sector under centralized policymaking.

Efficiency assessment and convergence in teaching and research in Italian public universities

This paper investigates the pattern of teaching and research performances, the relationship between them, and the convergence for Italian public HEIs in the period 2000–2010, by comparing different bootstrap robust non-parametric frontier estimators. Overall we find an efficiency improvement, mainly driven by research, whereas teaching efficiency increases only in the very first years of the sample period. We also ascertain a slightly positive relationship between research and teaching performances. Furthermore, we find that Italian HEIs converge, in the observed period, although research and teaching do it at a different pace. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative estimators and bootstrapped bias correction.

Technology and Public Access to Cultural Heritage: The Italian Experience on ICT for Public Historical Archives

The introduction and diffusion of digital technologies have had a tremendous impact on the production, preservation and utilisation of cultural heritage. In Italy, the Ministry for Cultural Heritage and Activities and Tourism (MiBACT) has undertaken several programs involving the use of digital technology to promote a larger access to cultural heritage, through the collection of metadata on cultural products preserved in the country and the provision of digital cultural products. Digitisation techniques and web infrastructures affect most activities carried out by such institutions: the production of cultural goods, the use and valorisation of cultural heritage, as well as the costs of preservation. This study analyses the digital projects carried out by the MiBACT for the preservation and utilisation of cultural heritage that is managed by public historic archives so as to evaluate their impact on the access to cultural products.

On the Role of Lobbies in Policy Making

In the theory of endogenous policy making, government decisions may be influenced by self-interested agents or lobbies, mainly through the transfer of resources or information. Starting from the pioneering studies of Olson (1965), Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976), Tullock (1980) and Becker (1983, 1985), which investigated the influence of interest groups in regulatory policy making and rent dissipation for favour seeking, there has been an enormous diffusion of lobbying models in several areas of research, such as: electoral competition [Austen-Smith (1987), Baron (1989ab, 1994), Coughlin et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1996), Morton and Cameron (1992)], international trade [Magee et al. (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), Hillman (1989), Leidy (1994), Mayer (1984)], public procurement [Laffont and Tirole (1993), McLachlan (1985)], fiscal federalism [Hoyt and Toma (1989), Grossman (1989, 1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)], tax reform [van Velthoven and van Winden (1991), Winer and Hettich (1993)], economic transition [Gelb et al. (1997), Hillman (1994)], economic growth [Olson (1982), Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994), van Velthoven (1989)].

The efficiency change of Italian public universities in the new millennium: a non-parametric analysis

The paper assesses the evolution of efficiency of Italian public universities for the period 2000–2010. It aims at investigating whether their levels of efficiency showed signs of convergence, and if the well-known disparity between northern and southern regions decreased. For this purpose, we use a refinement of data envelopment analysis, namely window analysis, which allows for measuring efficiency in cross-sectional and time-varying data. We find that the efficiency of most universities registered only marginal changes in the period, although a notable re-ranking occurred. However, changes in the management of universities, consequential to the reform processes, did not affect the long-run tendencies, such as the persisting difference in performance between north and south.

Participation in the Arts and Social Inclusion in Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods

This study investigates the problem of cultural participation in economically and socially disadvantaged neighbourhoods. It aims at ascertaining if and how arts can contribute to reduce the problems of social inclusion and foster urban regeneration. The analysis provides a comparative overview of different types of private supply of cultural goods, which are investigated with respect to their effectiveness in accomplishing these goals. Past experiences in the disadvantaged areas of the city of Catania are then used as a case study to identify critical aspects of each investigated form of private supply and to derive general suggestions for the design of public policies.

Political Economic Analysis of Privatization

This chapter analyzes the effect of domestic lobbying on the optimal degree of privatization and social surplus in a closed mixed oligopoly model and an extended two-country model. We find that lobbying activity leads to overprivatization in a closed economy and may improve social welfare in a two-country economy. When each country’s benevolent government determines the optimal privatization level, the privatization level always leads to underprivatization. This means an open trade policy leads to underprivatization. However, our results show that overprivatization may also exist in an open economy.