Ilya Rahkovsky

Economic Costs and Benefits of Healthy Eating

Most Americans fail to meet federal dietary recommendations. This may be partly due to the costs of healthy eating. This article reviews the costs and benefits of healthy eating. On the cost side, we discuss food prices, food preparation and other time costs, transportation costs, psychological costs, costs of obtaining nutrition information, and costs of longer life expectancy. We do not summarize these costs with a single dollar value as the current literature does not provide estimates to support such quantification. In terms of benefits, we focus on five health conditions for which poor diet is a major risk factor: coronary heart disease, cancer, stroke, diabetes, and osteoporotic hip fractures. We estimate the benefits of healthy eating in the United States to be

Consumers’ Use of Nutrition Information When Eating Out

114.5 billion per year (in 2012 dollars) in medical savings, increased productivity, and the value of prolonged life that are associated with reductions in these five conditions.

Analyzing the Technical Efficiency of Russian Firms: 1992-1995

Until recently, many restaurants and fast-food places did not offer nutrition information at the point of purchase. This is expected to change because the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires that nutrition information be posted in many of these venues. Once the law is fully implemented, it will be important to understand how it has affected consumer behavior. To establish a baseline against which to measure changes in the use of onsite nutrition information about food away from home (FAFH), we examine the demographic characteristics and dietary behaviors of U.S. consumers of FAFH before passage of the law, based on responses to the 2007-08 and 2009-10 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). In particular, we examine the characteristics of consumers who use nutrition information and of those who express interest in using the information when they eat out in the future.

Exclusive Contract in Health Insurance

When Russia’s transition to a market-oriented economy began in 1992, detailed information about firm-level performance was not available, but there was widespread expectation that firm efficiency had to improve for the transition to succeed. Where were efficiency gains likely? Where were they needed? Did the Soviet development strategy of according high priority to firms in heavy industry give these firms an advantage during the first stage of Russia’s transition to a market-oriented economy? That is, were firms in heavy industry more likely to exhibit industry best-practice production methods? Using firm-level data collected in 1992 and 1995 from Goskomstat, the state statistical agency, we estimate a stochastic frontier production function for eleven industries with inefficiency effects related to ownership, export experience, and location in Moscow. We find that in 1992 firms in priority sectors exhibited higher inefficiency than firms in non-priority sectors; by 1995, differences diminish. Our results generally support the proposition that non-state ownership improves efficiency, but the ownership effect varies by industry and over time. We reject the hypothesis that export experience increases efficiency during the initial stage of Russia’s transition, and this result is especially strong in 1995. Location in Moscow proved to be an extremely positive factor, and the benefit grew over time.

What Drives Nutritional Disparities? Retail Access and Food Purchases Across the Socioeconomic Spectrum

Competition between insurance companies for employees of a firm often increases the prices and reduces the availability of high-quality health plans offered to employees. An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive contract, which guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether exclusive contracts can alleviate the negative consequences of competition. Using the nation-wide survey of employers, I find that exclusive insurers charged 39-42% less for a unit of insurance quality than non-exclusive insurers. Furthermore, I find that the pattern of insurance quality dispersion is consistent with the exclusive insurers offering more high quality plans.