Immanuel Kant

Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals

Preface to the revised edition Introduction Chronology Further reading Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Preface 1. Transition from common to philosophical moral rational cognition 2. Transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals 3. Transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason Notes Selected glossary Index.

Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

ed concept, it is without doubt one which has been arrived at by a process of abstraction from the corporeal things which exist in the world. But it is not even necessary to call them substances. It is enough that one can, with the greatest certainty, infer from them that bodies consist of simple parts. The self-evident analysis of this proposition could easily be offered, but it would be too lengthy to present here. Now, employing [:] infallible proofs of geometry, I can demonstrate that space does not consist of simple parts; the arguments involved are sufficiently well known. It follows that there is a determinate number of parts in each body, and that they are all simple, and that there is an equal number of parts of space occupied by the body, and they are all compound. It follows from this that each simple part of the body (each element) occupies a space.

Toward Perpetual Peace

A condition of peace among men living near one another is not a state of nature (status naturalis), which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur. A condition of peace must therefore be established; for suspension of hostilities is not yet assurance of peace, and unless such assurance is afforded one neighbor by another (as can happen only in a lawful condition), the former, who has called upon the latter for it, can treat him as an enemy.1

Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Sciencewith Selections from theCritique of Pure Reason

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason: From the Transcendental Aesthetic From the Transcendental Logic, Introduction From the Transcendental Logic, First Division, Analytic From the Analytic of Principles From the Transcendental Logic, Second Division, Dialectic From the Transcendental Doctrine of Method Background source materials: The Gottingen (or Garve-Feder) Review The Gotha Review.

Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge2 may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least,3 in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters,4 relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

Transcendental Doctrine of Method

If we look upon the sum of all knowledge of pure speculative reason as an edifice for which we have at least the idea within ourselves, it can be said that in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements we have made an estimate of the materials, and have determined for what sort of edifice and for what height and strength of building they suffice. We have found, indeed, that although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it. The bold undertaking that we had designed is thus bound to fail through lack of material —not to mention the babel of tongues, which inevitably gives rise to disputes among the workers in regard to the plan to be followed, and which must end by scattering them over all the world, leaving each to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own design. At present, however, we are concerned not so much with the materials as with the plan; and inasmuch as we have been warned not to venture at random upon a blind project which may be altogether beyond our capacities, and yet cannot well abstain from building a secure home for ourselves, we must plan our building in conformity with the material which is given to us, and which is also at the same time appropriate to our needs.

On the Cognitive Powers

The fact that man can have the ideaa “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings living on earth. By this he is a person;2 and by virtue of his unity of consciousness through all the changes he may undergo, he is one and the same person — that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, which we can dispose of as we please. This holds even if he cannot yet say “I”; for he still has it in mind. So any language must think “I” when it speaks in the first person, even if it has no special word to express it. For this power (the ability to think) is understanding.

The Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure

Enjoyment is pleasure through the senses, and what delights the senses is called agreeable. Pain is displeasure through the senses, and what produces it is disagreeable. — Enjoyment and pain are opposed to each other not as profit and lack of profit (+ and o), but as profit and loss (+ and -): that is, one is opposed to the other not merely as its contradictory (contradictorie s. logice oppositum) but also as its contrary (contrarie s. realiter oppositum). — We should not use the terms what pleases or displeases to express enjoyment and pain, or the term the indifferent for what comes in between them: these terms are too wide, for they can also refer to intellectual pleasure and displeasure, in which case they would not coincide with enjoyment and pain.

Immanuel Kant : observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime and other writings

Introduction Chronology Further reading Note on the texts Thoughts on the Occasion of Mr Johann Friedrich von Funks Untimely Death (1760) Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764) Remarks in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764-5) Essay on the Maladies of the Head (1764) Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality (1764) M. Immanuel Kants announcement of the programme of his lectures for the winter semester, 1765-6 (1765) Herders notes from Kants Lectures on Ethics (1762-4) Selected notes and fragments from the 1760s Index.

Immanuel Kant: Contents

A u f k l ä r u n g i s t d e r A u s g a n g d e s M e n s c h e n a u s s e i n e r s e l b s t v e r s c h u l d e t e n U n m ü n d i g k e i t . U n m ü n d i g k e i t i s t d a s U n v e r m ö g e n , s i c h s e i n e s V e r s t a n d e s o h n e L e i t u n g e i n e s a n d e r e n z u b e d i e n e n . S e l b s t v e r s c h u l d e t i s t d i e s e U n m ü n d i g k e i t , w e n n d i e U r s a c h e d e r s e l b e n n i c h t a m M a n g e l d e s V e r s t a n d e s , s o n d e r n d e r E n t s c h l i e ß u n g u n d d e s M u t e s l i e g t , s i c h s e i n e r o h n e L e i t u n g e i n e s a n d e r n z u b e d i e n e n . S a p e r e a u d e ! H a b e M u t , d i c h d e i n e s e i g e n e n V e r s t a n d e s z u b e d i e n e n ! i s t a l s o d e r W a h l s p r u c h d e r A u f k l ä r u n g .