Ira A. Noveck

A Developmental Investigation of Processing Costs in Implicature Production

Much developmental work has been devoted to scalar implicatures. These are implicitly communicated propositions linked to relatively weak terms (consider how Some pragmatically implies Not all) that are more likely to be carried out by adults than by children. Children tend to retain the linguistically encoded meaning of these terms (wherein Some is compatible with All). In three experiments, we gauge childrens performance with scalars while investigating four factors that can have an effect on implicature production: (i) the role of (the presence or absence of) distractor items; (ii) the nature of the task (verbal judgments versus action-based judgments); (iii) the choice of scalar expression (the French quantifier quelques versus certains); and (iv) the type of scale that contextualizes the weak utterance (the affirmative All versus the negative None). Experiment 1 replicated earlier findings showing that 9-year-olds are more likely than adults to consider as true statements such as Some turtles are in the boxes (uttered when all turtles are in the boxes) while employing the quantifier certains in a truth evaluation task containing multiple distractor items. The task in Experiment 2 increased implicature production across all ages (4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds as well as adults) but maintained the developmental effect while using quelques in an action-based task containing no distractor items. Experiment 3 showed that 9-year-olds are more likely to produce implicatures with quelques than they are with certains in the action task while adults are not affected by the choice of term. Overall, these results identify seemingly harmless task features that can prevent even older children (9-year-olds) from carrying out implicatures (e.g., through the inclusion of distractors) while also showing how implicature production among even young children (4- to 5-year-olds) can be facilitated by task features (e.g., the use of an action task) and without the introduction of special training.

The Why and How of experimental pragmatics: The case of ‘Scalar Inferences’

Although a few pioneers in psycholinguistics had taken an experimental approach to various pragmatic issues for more than twenty years, it is only in the past few years that investigators have begun using experimental methods to test pragmatic hypotheses (see Noveck and Sperber 2004). We see this emergence of a proper experimental pragmatics as an important advance, with great potential for further development. In this chapter we want to illustrate what can be done with experimental approaches to pragmatic issues by considering one example, the case of so-called ‘scalar inferences’, where the experimental method has helped sharpen a theoretical debate and provided uniquely relevant evidence. We will focus on work done by the first author and his collaborators, or work closely related to theirs, but other authors have also made important contributions to the topic (e.g. Papafragou and Musolino 2003; Guasti, Chiercha, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini and Meroni 2005; De Neys and Schaeken 2007).

The neural basis of conditional reasoning with arbitrary content

Behavioral predictions about reasoning have usually contrasted two accounts, Mental Logic and Mental Models. Neuroimaging techniques have been providing new measures that transcend this debate. We tested a hypothesis from Goel and Dolan (2003) that predicts neural activity predominantly in a left parietal-frontal system when participants reason with arbitrary (non-meaningful) materials. In an event-related fMRI investigation, we employed propositional syllogisms, the majority of which involved conditional reasoning. While investigating conditional reasoning generally, we ultimately focused on the neural activity linked to the two valid conditional forms--Modus Ponens (If p then q; p//q) and Modus Tollens (If p then q; not-q//not-p). Consistent with Goel and Dolan (2003), we found a left lateralized parietal frontal network for both inference forms with increasing activation when reasoning becomes more challenging by way of Modus Tollens. These findings show that the previous findings with more complex Aristotlean syllogisms are robust and cast doubt upon accounts of reasoning that accord primary inferential processes uniquely to either the right hemisphere or to language areas.

Overcoming Perceptual Features in Logical Reasoning: A Parametric Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study

Participants experience difficulty detecting that an item depicting an H-in-a-square confirms the logical rule, If there is not a T then there is not a circle. Indeed, there is a perceptual conflict between the items mentioned in the rule (T and circle) and in the test item (H and square). Much evidence supports the claim that correct responding depends on detecting and resolving such conflicts. One aim of this study is to find more precise neurological evidence in support of this claim by using a parametric event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigm. We scanned 20 participants while they were required to judge whether or not a conditional rule was verified (or falsified) by a corresponding target item. We found that the right middorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC) was specifically engaged, together with the medial frontal (anterior cingulate and presupplementary motor area [pre-SMA]) and parietal cortices, when mismatching was present. Activity in these regions was also linearly correlated with the level of mismatch between the rule and the test item. Furthermore, a psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed that activation of the mid-DLPFC, which increases as mismatching does, was accompanied by a decrease in functional integration with the bilateral primary visual cortex and an increase in functional integration with the right parietal cortex. This indicates a need to break away from perceptual cues in order to select an appropriate logical response. These findings strongly indicate that the regions involved in inhibitory control (including the right mid-DLPFC and the medial frontal cortex) are engaged when participants have to overcome perceptual mismatches in order to provide a logical response. These findings are also consistent with neuroimaging studies investigating the belief bias, where prior beliefs similarly interfere with logical reasoning.

Making disjunctions exclusive

This work examines how people interpret the sentential connective “or”, which can be viewed either inclusively (A or B or both) or exclusively (A or B but not both). Following up on prior work concerning quantifiers (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003), which shows that the common pragmatic interpretation of “some”, some but not all, is conveyed as part of an effortful step, we investigate how extra effort applied to disjunctive statements leads to a pragmatic interpretation of “or”, or but not both. Experiment 1 compelled participants to wait for three seconds before answering, hence giving them the opportunity to process the utterance more deeply. Experiments 2 and 3 emphasized “or”, either by visual means (“OR”) or by prosodic means (contrastive stress) as another way to encourage participants to apply more effort. Following a relevance-theoretic line of argument, we hypothesized that conditions encouraging more processing effort would give rise to more pragmatic inferences and hence to more exclusive interpretations of the disjunction. This prediction was confirmed in the three experiments.

Scalar Inferences in Autism Spectrum Disorders.

On being told “John or Mary will come”, one might infer that not both of them will come. Yet the semantics of “or” is compatible with a situation where both John and Mary come. Inferences of this type, which enrich the semantics of “or” from an ‘inclusive’ to an ‘exclusive’ interpretation, have been extensively studied in linguistic pragmatics. However, the phenomenon has not been much explored in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs), where pragmatic deficits are commonly reported. Here, we present an experiment investigating these inferences. We predicted that, as a result of the reported pragmatic deficits, participants with ASD would produce fewer inferential enrichments of “or” than matched controls. However, contrary to expectations, but in line with recent findings by Pijnacker et al. (Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39, 607–618, 2009), performances did not differ across groups. This unexpected finding is discussed in light of the literature on pragmatic abilities in autism.

Recomposing a fragmented literature: How conditional and relational arguments engage different neural systems for deductive reasoning

Deductive reasoning is traditionally viewed as a unitary process involving either rule-based or visuo-spatial mechanisms. However, there is a disagreement in the neuroimaging literature on whether the data support one alternative over the other. Here we test the hypothesis that discrepancies in the literature result from the reasoning materials themselves. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measure brain activity of participants while they integrate the premises of conditional arguments (primarily Modus Tollens: If P then Q; not-Q) and Relational Syllogisms (i.e., linear arguments of the sort P is to the left of Q; Q is to the left of R). We find that reasoning with Modus Tollens activates the left inferior frontal gyrus to a greater extent than the Relational Syllogisms. In contrast, the Relational Syllogisms engage the right temporo-parieto-occipital junction more than conditional arguments. This suggests that conditional reasoning relies more on so-called syntactic processes than relational reasoning, while relational reasoning may rely on visuo-spatial processes and mental imagery more than conditional reasoning. This investigative approach, together with its results, clarifies some apparently inconsistent findings in this literature by showing that the nature of the logical argument, whether it is relational or conditional, determines which neural system is engaged.

What’s behind a P600? Integration Operations during Irony Processing

The combined knowledge of word meanings and grammatical rules does not allow a listener to grasp the intended meaning of a speaker’s utterance. Pragmatic inferences on the part of the listener are also required. The present work focuses on the processing of ironic utterances (imagine a slow day being described as “really productive”) because these clearly require the listener to go beyond the linguistic code. Such utterances are advantageous experimentally because they can serve as their own controls in the form of literal sentences (now imagine an active day being described as “really productive”) as we employ techniques from electrophysiology (EEG). Importantly, the results confirm previous ERP findings showing that irony processing elicits an enhancement of the P600 component (Regel et al., 2011). More original are the findings drawn from Time Frequency Analysis (TFA) and especially the increase of power in the gamma band in the 280–400 time-window, which points to an integration among different streams of information relatively early in the comprehension of an irony. This represents a departure from traditional accounts of language processing which generally view pragmatic inferences as late-arriving. We propose that these results indicate that unification operations between the linguistic code and contextual information play a critical role throughout the course of irony processing and earlier than previously thought.

Spatial associations in relational reasoning: Evidence for a SNARC-like effect

Relational reasoning (A > B, B > C, therefore A > C) shares a number of similarities with numerical cognition, including a common behavioural signature, the symbolic distance effect. Just as reaction times for evaluating relational conclusions decrease as the distance between two ordered objects increases, people need less time to compare two numbers when they are distant (e.g., 2 and 8) than when they are close (e.g., 3 and 4). Given that some remain doubtful about such analogical representations in relational reasoning, we determine whether numerical cognition and relational reasoning have other overlapping behavioural effects. Here, using relational reasoning problems that require the alignment of six items, we provide evidence showing that the subjects’ linear mental representation affects motor performance when evaluating conclusions. Items accessible from the left part of a linear representation are evaluated faster when the response is made by the left, rather than the right, hand and the reverse is observed for items accessible from the right part of the linear representation. This effect, observed with the prepositions to the left of and to the right of as well as with above and below, is analogous to the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect, which is characterized by an interaction between magnitude of numbers and side of response.

To What Extent Do Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas Affect Performance on Wason's Selection Task?

Cheng and Holyoaks (1985) most persuasive evidence for pragmatic reasoning schema theory has been the finding that an abstract permission version of Wasons selection task yields higher rates of solution than a nonpragmatic control. Experiment 1 presented two problem sets, one modelled after Cheng and Holyoaks abstract permission problem, which is relativley rich in extraneous features, and one after Wasons, relatively impoverished, standard problem. Each problem set varied type of rule (permission, obligation, or nonpragmatic) and task type (to reason from or about a rule). Results revealed that enriched problems were solved more often than impoverished ones, that reasoning-from problems were solved more often than reasoning-about problems, and that there was a beneficial interaction between enriching features and the permission rule. Experiment 2 demonstrated that although explicit negatives were crucial for solution of reasoning-from permission problems, they played no role in solution of enriched nonpragmatic-rule problems. Experiment 3 provided a replication of the enriched reasoning-from permission problem, again revealed no beneficial effect for obligation-rule problems, and further revealed no influence of instructions to provide brief written justifications. We argue that the results show that the scope of pragmatic reasoning schema theory needs to be narrowed, that although a permission rule does have an effect, an obligation rule does not, and that some beneficial task features are independent of anything explained by pragmatic reasoning schema theory.