Isabel Thielmann

Willing to Give but Not to Forgive: Borderline Personality Features and Cooperative Behavior

Impaired cooperation has been proposed to contribute to social dysfunctioning in borderline personality disorder (BPD). However, prior research has not distinguished active from reactive cooperation (i.e., nonexploitation versus non-retaliation)--two aspects of cooperative behavior associated with different basic personality traits (viz. Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness). The authors hypothesized that, due to low levels of Agreeableness, but normal levels of Honesty-Humility, borderline personality (BP) features are related to impaired reactive cooperation, but unrelated to active cooperation. Participants (N = 559) hypothetically played both the allocator in the dictator game and the recipient in the ultimatum game. High levels of BP features predicted impaired reactive cooperation in the ultimatum game, which was mediated through low Agreeableness. In contrast, BP features did not predict active cooperation in the dictator game-mirroring the nonassociation between BP features and Honesty-Humility. The findings highlight the importance of focusing on aspects of forgiveness in interventions aiming to improve cooperativeness in BPD.

The Traits One Can Trust Dissecting Reciprocity and Kindness as Determinants of Trustworthy Behavior

Trustworthiness is a vital pillar of various social interactions hinging upon trust. However, the underlying determinants of trustworthiness—especially in terms of (basic) personality traits—are insufficiently understood. Specifically, three mechanisms underlying trustworthiness have been proposed: unconditional kindness, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity. The present research aims to disentangle these mechanisms using a trait-based approach, relying on the HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience) model of personality. In three studies, participants acted as the trustee in the trust game. All studies revealed consistent support for the unconditional kindness mechanism, showing an exclusive link between Honesty-Humility and trustworthiness, irrespective of the level of prior trust. In turn, positive and negative reciprocity could not account for the pattern of results. In addition, our results reconcile the inconsistent evidence on the relation between Big Five-Agreeableness and trustworthiness: Unconditional kindness only refers to one component of the broad Big Five-Agreeableness factor (which subsumes various cooperative tendencies).

On Measuring the Sixth Basic Personality Dimension A Comparison Between HEXACO Honesty-Humility and Big Six Honesty-Propriety

Recent developments in personality research led to the proposition of two alternative six-factor trait models, the HEXACO model and the Big Six model. However, given the lack of direct comparisons, it is unclear whether the HEXACO and Big Six factors are distinct or essentially equivalent, that is, whether corresponding inventories measure similar or distinct personality traits. Using Structural Equation Modeling (Study 1), we found substantial differences between the traits as measured via the HEXACO-60 and the 30-item Questionnaire Big Six (30QB6), particularly for Honesty-Humility and Honesty-Propriety (both model’s critical difference to the Big Five approach). This distinction was further supported by Study 2, showing differential capabilities of the HEXACO-60 and the 30QB6 to account for several criteria representing the theoretical core of Honesty-Humility and/or Honesty-Propriety. Specifically, unlike the indicator of Honesty-Humility, the indicator of Honesty-Propriety showed low predictive power for some conceptually relevant criteria, suggesting a limited validity of the 30QB6.

Who Does (Not) Participate in Intergroup Conflict

Prior research on the participation in intergroup conflict suggests that prosocial individuals are parochial cooperators who escalate intergroup conflict. However, evidence on this conjecture is currently inconclusive. We provide a critical empirical test of the link between individuals’ prosocial tendencies (operationalized via Social Value Orientation [SVO] and trait Honesty-Humility) and cooperative behavior in different intergroup conflict games (i.e., variants of the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma). Contradicting the view that prosocial individuals fuel intergroup conflict, both trait dimensions were positively associated with cooperative behavior toward others in general, irrespective of others’ group membership. That is, individuals with a prosocial SVO or high levels of Honesty-Humility, respectively, refrained from harming out-group members and, if possible, even benefited them. Overall, the results imply that the cooperativeness of prosocial individuals is universal in nature, thus exceeding the in-group boundary. Prosocial individuals are hence willing to foster intergroup cooperation rather than fueling intergroup conflict.

Different Games for Different Motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)

Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed–motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different game correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game–theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology. Copyright

Seeing is Knowing: On the Predictive Accuracy of Self- and Informant Reports for Prosocial and Moral Behaviours

Under certain circumstances, well–known others (so–called informants) may possess unique insights into targets’ personality traits beyond the targets’ self–views. Specifically, as proposed by the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, an incremental predictive ability of informants is most likely for traits and corresponding behaviours that are clearly visible to others and highly evaluative in nature. In two studies, we provide an empirical test of this proposition and extend prior research to one of the most important domains of interpersonal interaction: prosocial and moral behaviours. Specifically, we investigate the unique predictive power of informant reports in trait Honesty–Humility for fairness in the dictator game and dishonesty in a cheating paradigm. Importantly, while both these classes of behaviour are highly evaluative in nature, only fairness is clearly visible to others. Correspondingly, in line with the self–other knowledge asymmetry model, our results reveal unique predictive accuracy of informant reports for fairness. For dishonesty, by contrast, there was no conclusive evidence for incremental predictive power of informant reports. This implies that informants may indeed provide valuable information beyond targets’ self–reports on trait aspects driving fair behaviour, but that targets themselves are their own best experts when it comes to judging trait aspects driving dishonest behaviour. Copyright

Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty-Humility to Cooperation: Honesty-Humility and Temptation

Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay–offs in a symmetric two–person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoners dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright