Iskander De Bruycker

Pressure and Expertise: Explaining the Information Supply of Interest Groups in EU Legislative Lobbying

EU politics has long been portrayed as an elite affair in which technocratic deliberation prevails. As a consequence, information supply by interest groups has typically been viewed as part of an expertise�?based exchange with policy�?makers. Less attention has been devoted to whether the supply of information is also used to exert political pressure. In addition to expertise�?based exchanges between interest groups and policy�?makers, can we identify the prevalence of information supply that aims to put pressure on EU policy�?makers? And under what conditions are different modes of information supply likely to occur? My analysis relies on interviews with 143 lobbyists who were active on a set of 78 legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The results demonstrate that expertise�?based exchanges are dominant in interactions with civil servants, while political information is predominantly communicated to political officials and often the key substance in outside lobbying tactics.

Balancing Inside and Outside Lobbying: The Political Strategies of Lobbyists at Global Diplomatic Conferences

This article seeks to explain the use of inside and outside lobbying by organised interests at global diplomatic conferences. At first sight, the lobbying at these venues is puzzling as it does not seem to be a very fruitful way to acquire influence. The use of outside strategies especially is perplexing because most aspects of international negotiations fall outside of the purview of national constituencies. It is argued in this article, however, that the presence of outside lobbying is not so puzzling if lobbying is seen both as a way to attain influence and as a way to pursue organisational maintenance goals. Empirically, the article draws on interview data with 232 interest group representatives that participated at either the 2012 session of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva, or the 2011 (Durban) and 2012 (Doha) United Nations Climate Conferences. The analysis demonstrates that organisational needs, and especially the competition actors face in obtaining resources, significantly affects the relative focus of organised interests on inside and outside lobbying.

Framing and advocacy: a research agenda for interest group studies

ABSTRACTThis research agenda contribution starts from the observation that an increasing number of interest group studies have been addressing questions about framing. Although this emerging literature has made great progress towards being able to study interest group framing in large-n designs owing to advances in data-gathering techniques, many analytical and conceptual challenges still lie ahead. One important question that remains is how framing can serve as a political strategy and, more precisely, which frames are most effective. This article gives an overview of the recent work on interest group framing. It highlights some key issues that interest group scholars face when they undertake research on framing. Various studies on interest group framing are contrasted in terms of the types of frames studied, the level of analysis employed and how influence is determined. I conclude by developing an agenda with some concrete recommendations for interest group scholars that deal with questions about framing.ABSTRACT This research agenda contribution starts from the observation that an increasing number of interest group studies have been addressing questions about framing. Although this emerging literature has made great progress towards being able to study interest group framing in large-n designs owing to advances in data-gathering techniques, many analytical and conceptual challenges still lie ahead. One important question that remains is how framing can serve as a political strategy and, more precisely, which frames are most effective. This article gives an overview of the recent work on interest group framing. It highlights some key issues that interest group scholars face when they undertake research on framing. Various studies on interest group framing are contrasted in terms of the types of frames studied, the level of analysis employed and how influence is determined. I conclude by developing an agenda with some concrete recommendations for interest group scholars that deal with questions about framing.

Power and position Which EU party groups do lobbyists prioritize and why

Due to the politicization of much policymaking in the European Union (EU) and the growing competences of the European Parliament (EP), party groups in the EP have become key targets for organized interests. This article investigates which party groups in the EP are prioritized by EU lobbyists and why. The focus is on two presumed key components of this prioritization process, namely power and position. It is expected that lobbyists take into account both the extent to which parties align with their views and their legislative power. The empirical analysis draws on interviews with 143 interest group officials and their lobbying expenditures on 78 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The analysis suggests that the media prominence of party groups in relation to specific issues as well as the extent to which interest organizations and party groups adopt opposing policy positions considerably shape how party groups in the EP are targeted by lobbyists.Due to the politicization of much policymaking in the European Union (EU) and the growing competences of the European Parliament (EP), party groups in the EP have become key targets for organized interests. This article investigates which party groups in the EP are prioritized by EU lobbyists and why. The focus is on two presumed key components of this prioritization process, namely power and position. It is expected that lobbyists take into account both the extent to which parties align with their views and their legislative power. The empirical analysis draws on interviews with 143 interest group officials and their lobbying expenditures on 78 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The analysis suggests that the media prominence of party groups in relation to specific issues as well as the extent to which interest organizations and party groups adopt opposing policy positions considerably shape how party groups in the EP are targeted by lobbyists.

Politicization and the public interest: When do the elites in Brussels address public interests in EU policy debates?

Contemporary European studies concur that public pressure and responsiveness have become key ingredients of the EU policy arena. Nonetheless, there is little known about when and how the elites in Brussels articulate public interests in EU policy debates. This article bridges this gap by examining the conditions under which political elites involved in EU legislative procedures address public interests in the news. It is expected that the politicization of EU policy processes stimulates elites to articulate public interests. The dataset consists of 2164 media statements in six European media outlets on a sample of 125 legislative proposals (2008–2010). The results demonstrate that elites address public interests in the media predominantly when issues are publicly salient and attract intensive mobilization by civil society groups. Elites stay silent about public interests when policy processes are crowded with business lobbyists and are of low salience to European citizens.Contemporary European studies concur that public pressure and responsiveness have become key ingredients of the EU policy arena. Nonetheless, there is little known about when and how the elites in Brussels articulate public interests in EU policy debates. This article bridges this gap by examining the conditions under which political elites involved in EU legislative procedures address public interests in the news. It is expected that the politicization of EU policy processes stimulates elites to articulate public interests. The dataset consists of 2164 media statements in six European media outlets on a sample of 125 legislative proposals (2008–2010). The results demonstrate that elites address public interests in the media predominantly when issues are publicly salient and attract intensive mobilization by civil society groups. Elites stay silent about public interests when policy processes are crowded with business lobbyists and are of low salience to European citizens.

Lobbying Makes (Strange) Bedfellows: Explaining the Formation and Composition of Lobbying Coalitions in EU Legislative Politics:

This article analyzes the formation of lobbying coalitions in European Union legislative politics. Specifically, we investigate whether interest organizations establish coalitions and under which conditions business interests and non-business interests join a coalition. Our explanatory framework emphasizes three factors that drive coalition formation: the influence-seeking needs of interest groups, the need to ensure organizational maintenance, and policy-related contextual factors. To test our hypotheses, we analyze 72 policies initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010 and 143 semi-structured interviews with representatives of European interest organizations. Our results demonstrate that non-governmental organizations that depend relatively less on membership support are strongly inclined to engage in coalitions. Moreover, the heterogeneous coalitions we identified—consisting of both business and non-business interests—are usually situated in policy areas that enjoy considerable salience among the broader public and emerge on issues that receive substantial media visibility.

Representing the Public Interest: When Do Elites in Brussels Address Public Interest in EU Policy Debates?

Modern-day EU policy processes have the potential for being politicized and becoming salient among the media and broad segments of society. EU policy elites no longer act under the radar of public scrutiny, and are expected to act according the interests of European citizens. Although most studies concur that public pressure and responsiveness have become important ingredients of the contemporary EU policy arena, there is still little known about when and how elites appeal to public interests in justifying their actions. This paper analyzes under which conditions and how political elites involved in EU legislative procedures appeal to public interests in European news media. The empirical analysis is based on a large scale content analysis that was conducted in the context of the INTEREURO project. The dataset consists of 3,259 media statements in six European media outlets on a random sample of 125 legislative proposals adopted by the European Commission between 2008–2010. The results demonstrate that public interests are articulated in the media, predominantly when the issue-context is politicized, and then primarily by the Members of the European Parliament. Moreover, elites that address public interests in the media are usually more supportive rather than opposed to the Commission’s legislative initiatives.

Constructing a Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the EU

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.