J. Michael Miller

Classification, Identification, and Clinical Significance of Proteus, Providencia, and Morganella

This review presents the current taxonomy of the genera Proteus, Providencia, and Morganella, along with the current methods for the identification of each species within the three genera, incorporating both conventional biochemical and commercial methods. While all of these organisms are ubiquitous in the environment, individual case reports and nosocomial outbreak reports that demonstrate their ability to cause major infectious disease problems are presented. Lastly, anticipated antimicrobial susceptibility patterns are reviewed. Many of these organisms are easily controlled, but the advent of newer and more powerful antimicrobial agents has led to some problems of which laboratorians need to be aware.

A Guide to Utilization of the Microbiology Laboratory for Diagnosis of Infectious Diseases: 2013 Recommendations by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and the American Society for Microbiology (ASM)a

Abstract The critical role of the microbiology laboratory in infectious disease diagnosis calls for a close, positive working relationship between the physician and the microbiologists who provide enormous value to the health care team. This document, developed by both laboratory and clinical experts, provides information on which tests are valuable and in which contexts, and on tests that add little or no value for diagnostic decisions. Sections are divided into anatomic systems, including Bloodstream Infections and Infections of the Cardiovascular System, Central Nervous System Infections, Ocular Infections, Soft Tissue Infections of the Head and Neck, Upper Respiratory Infections, Lower Respiratory Tract infections, Infections of the Gastrointestinal Tract, Intraabdominal Infections, Bone and Joint Infections, Urinary Tract Infections, Genital Infections, and Skin and Soft Tissue Infections; or into etiologic agent groups, including Tickborne Infections, Viral Syndromes, and Blood and Tissue Parasite Infections. Each section contains introductory concepts, a summary of key points, and detailed tables that list suspected agents; the most reliable tests to order; the samples (and volumes) to collect in order of preference; specimen transport devices, procedures, times, and temperatures; and detailed notes on specific issues regarding the test methods, such as when tests are likely to require a specialized laboratory or have prolonged turnaround times. There is redundancy among the tables and sections, as many agents and assay choices overlap. The document is intended to serve as a reference to guide physicians in choosing tests that will aid them to diagnose infectious diseases in their patients.

Role of Clinical Microbiology Laboratories in the Management and Control of Infectious Diseases and the Delivery of Health Care

Modern medicine has led to dramatic changes in infectious diseases practice. Vaccination and antibiotic therapy have benefited millions of persons. However, constrained resources now threaten our ability to adequately manage threats of infectious diseases by placing clinical microbiology services and expertise distant from the patient and their infectious diseases physician. Continuing in such a direction threatens quality of laboratory results, timeliness of diagnosis, appropriateness of treatment, effective communication, reduction of health care-associated infections, advances in infectious diseases practice, and training of future practitioners. Microbiology laboratories are the first lines of defense for detection of new antibiotic resistance, outbreaks of foodborne infection, and a possible bioterrorism event. Maintaining high-quality clinical microbiology laboratories on the site of the institution that they serve is the current best approach for managing todays problems of emerging infectious diseases and antimicrobial agent resistance by providing good patient care outcomes that actually save money.

Acquisition of Pseudomonas cepacia at summer camps for patients with cystic fibrosis

To assess the risk of acquisition of Pseudomonas cepacia by person-to-person transmission at cystic fibrosis summer camps, we conducted in 1990 a study at three camps attended by patients with cystic fibrosis who had P. cepacia infection and patients without P. cepacia infection but who were considered susceptible to infection. We obtained sputum or throat cultures from campers on their arrival at, weekly during, at the end of, and 14 to 30 days after camp. We compared the incidence of sputum conversion of patients at camp with that of patients outside camp by culturing specimens from noncamper control subjects with cystic fibrosis who were known not to be infected < or = 2 weeks before and 4 to 6 weeks after camp. We also determined the risk factors for P. cepacia acquisition by determining the relative risk of acquisition between campers who were exposed versus campers who were not exposed to campers known to be infected or to potential environmental sources of P. cepacia at camp. The ribotype of P. cepacia isolates from campers with sputum conversion was compared with that of isolates from other campers and from an environmental source. The cumulative incidence of sputum conversion during the study period was 6.1% (11/181) among campers compared with no incidence (0/92) among noncampers (p = 0.02, Fisher Exact Test). The incidence of sputum conversion at camp varied according to the prevalence of campers with known infection (p < 0.001, chi-square test for trend). The rate of sputum conversion was higher in the camp with longer duration (relative risk = 12.0; 95% confidence interval = 2.7 to 53.5). Ribotyping showed that P. cepacia isolates from all 11 campers with sputum conversion were identical or similar (1 to 2 band difference) to isolates of other P. cepacia-infected campers including co-converters. These results suggest that P. cepacia can be acquired by patients with cystic fibrosis who are attending summer camp for such patients, possibly through person-to-person transmission, and that the risk increases with the prevalence of P. cepacia-infected campers and the duration of camp.

Determining the significance of coagulase-negative staphylococci isolated from blood cultures at a community hospital: a role for species and strain identification.

OBJECTIVES To determine the degree to which species identification or strain relatedness assessment of successive blood culture isolates of coagulase-negative staphylococci (CNS) may improve the clinical diagnosis of bloodstream infection (BSI). SETTING 400-bed community hospital. DESIGN Prospective laboratory survey during which all CNS blood culture isolates obtained between mid-August 1996 and mid-February 1997 (study period) were saved and later identified to the species level; selected isolates were genotyped using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Retrospective review of medical records of 37 patients with multiple cultures positive for CNS. RESULTS During the study period, 171 patients had blood cultures positive for CNS; 130 had single positive cultures and 41 had > or =2 positive cultures. Of these 41, 23 (62%) were from patients with signs and symptoms of BSI according to CDC surveillance definitions. Species identification and strain clonality of CNS isolates from patients with > or =2 positives revealed 3 (13%) of the 23 patients did not have a consistent CNS species, and another 3 (13%) did not have a consistent genotype in the > or =2 positive cultures, suggesting that CNS from these patients probably were contaminants. Thus, species identification and strain clonality assessment reduced by 27% the number of patients with BSI diagnosed based on the presence of symptoms and > or =2 positive blood cultures. CONCLUSIONS Routine species identification and selected strain genotyping of CNS may reduce the misinterpretation of probable contaminants among patients with > or =2 positive blood cultures.

Assessing the Risk of Laboratory-Acquired Meningococcal Disease

ABSTRACT Neisseria meningitidis is infrequently reported as a laboratory-acquired infection. Prompted by two cases in the United States in 2000, we assessed this risk among laboratorians. We identified cases of meningococcal disease that were possibly acquired or suspected of being acquired in a laboratory by placing an information request on e-mail discussion groups of infectious disease, microbiology, and infection control professional organizations. A probable case of laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease was defined as illness meeting the case definition for meningococcal disease in a laboratorian who had occupational exposure to an N. meningitidis isolate of the same serogroup within 14 days of illness onset. Sixteen cases of probable laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease occurring worldwide between 1985 and 2001 were identified, including six U.S. cases between 1996 and 2000. Nine cases (56%) were serogroup B; seven (44%) were serogroup C. Eight cases (50%) were fatal. All cases occurred among clinical microbiologists. In 15 cases (94%), isolate manipulation was performed without respiratory protection. We estimated that an average of three microbiologists are exposed to the 3,000 meningococcal isolates seen in U.S. laboratories yearly and calculated an attack rate of 13/100,000 microbiologists between 1996 and 2001, compared to 0.2/100,000 among U.S. adults in general. The rate and case/fatality ratio of meningococcal disease among microbiologists are higher than those in the general U.S. population. Specific risk factors for laboratory-acquired infection are likely associated with exposure to droplets or aerosols containing N. meningitidis. Prevention should focus on the implementation of class II biological safety cabinets or additional respiratory protection during manipulation of suspected meningococcal isolates.

Executive Summary: A Guide to Utilization of the Microbiology Laboratory for Diagnosis of Infectious Diseases: 2013 Recommendations by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and the American Society for Microbiology (ASM)a

The critical role of the microbiology laboratory in infectious disease diagnosis calls for a close, positive working relationship between the physician and the microbiologists who provide enormous value to the health care team. This document, developed by both laboratory and clinical experts, provides information on which tests are valuable and in which contexts, and on tests that add little or no value for diagnostic decisions. Sections are divided into anatomic systems, including Bloodstream Infections and Infections of the Cardiovascular System, Central Nervous System Infections, Ocular Infections, Soft Tissue Infections of the Head and Neck, Upper Respiratory Infections, Lower Respiratory Tract infections, Infections of the Gastrointestinal Tract, Intraabdominal Infections, Bone and Joint Infections, Urinary Tract Infections, Genital Infections, and Skin and Soft Tissue Infections; or into etiologic agent groups, including Tickborne Infections, Viral Syndromes, and Blood and Tissue Parasite Infections. Each section contains introductory concepts, a summary of key points, and detailed tables that list suspected agents; the most reliable tests to order; the samples (and volumes) to collect in order of preference; specimen transport devices, procedures, times, and temperatures; and detailed notes on specific issues regarding the test methods, such as when tests are likely to require a specialized laboratory or have prolonged turnaround times. There is redundancy among the tables and sections, as many agents and assay choices overlap. The document is intended to serve as a reference to guide physicians in choosing tests that will aid them to diagnose infectious diseases in their patients.

Gram-negative bacteremia in open-heart-surgery patients traced to probable tap-water contamination of pressure-monitoring equipment.

OBJECTIVE To determine the cause(s) of an outbreak of gram-negative bacteremia (GNB) in open-heart-surgery (OHS) patients at hospital A. DESIGN Case-control and cohort studies and an environmental survey. RESULTS Nine patients developed GNB with Enterobacter cloacae (6), Pseudomonas aeruginosa (5), Klebsiella pneumoniae (3), Serratia marcescens (2), or Klebsiella oxytoca (1) following OHS; five of nine patients had polymicrobial bacteremia. When the GNB patients were compared with randomly selected OHS patients, having had the first procedure of the day (8 of 9 versus 12 of 27, P = .02), longer cardiopulmonary bypass (median, 122 versus 83 minutes, P = .01) or cross-clamp times (median, 75 versus 42 minutes, P = .008), intraoperative dopamine infusion (9 of 9 versus 15 of 27, P = .01), or exposure to scrub nurse 6 (6 of 9 versus 4 of 27, P = .001) were identified as risk factors. When stratified by length of the procedure, only being the first procedure of the day and exposure to scrub nurse 6 remained significant. First procedures used pressure-monitoring equipment that was assembled before surgery and left open and uncovered overnight in the operating room, whereas other procedures used pressure-monitoring equipment assembled immediately before the procedure. At night, operating rooms were cleaned by maintenance personnel who used a disinfectant-water solution sprayed through a hose connected to an automatic diluting system. Observation of the use of this hose documented that this solution could have contacted and entered uncovered pressure-monitoring equipment left in the operating room. Water samples from the hose revealed no disinfectant, but grew P aeruginosa. The outbreak was terminated by setting up pressure-monitoring equipment immediately before the procedure and discontinuing use of the hose-disinfectant system. CONCLUSIONS This outbreak most likely resulted from contamination of uncovered preassembled pressure-monitoring equipment by water from a malfunctioning spray disinfectant device. Pressure-monitoring equipment should be assembled immediately before use and protected from possible environmental contamination.

Epidemic gram-negative bacteremia in a neonatal intensive care unit in Guatemala.

BACKGROUND Nosocomial bloodstream infection is an important cause of morbidity and mortality among neonates. From September 1 through December 5, 1990 (epidemic period), gram-negative bacteremia developed in 26 neonates after their admission to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) of Hospital General, a 1000-bed public teaching hospital in Guatemala with a 16-bed NICU. Twenty-three of the 26 patients (88%) died. METHODS To determine risk factors for and modes of transmission of gram-negative bacteremia in the NICU, we conducted a cohort study of NICU patients who had at least one blood culture drawn at least 24 hours after admission to the NICU and performed a microbiologic investigation in the NICU. RESULTS The rate of gram-negative bacteremia was significantly higher among patients born at Hospital General, delivered by cesarian section, and exposed to selected intravenous medications and invasive procedures in the NICU during the 3 days before the referent blood culture was obtained. During the epidemic period, the hospitals chlorinated well-water system malfunctioned; chlorine levels were undetectable and tap water samples contained elevated microbial levels, including total and fecal coliform bacteria. Serratia marcescens was identified in 81% of case-patient blood cultures (13/16) available for testing and from 57% of NICU personnel handwashings (4/7). Most S. marcescens blood isolates were serotype O3:H12 (46%) or O14:H12 (31%) and were resistant to ampicillin (100%) and gentamicin (77%), the antimicrobials used routinely in the NICU. CONCLUSIONS We hypothesize that gram-negative bacteremia occurred after invasive procedures were performed on neonates whose skin became colonized through bathing or from hands of NICU personnel.

AGENTS OF BIOTERRORISM: Preparing for Bioterrorism at the Community Health Care Level

Bioterrorism preparedness is clearly a goal for the health care community, working in concert with city, county, state, and federal public health and emergency authorities and in collaboration with law enforcement at the local and federal levels. Opening the channels of communication between all groups involved, obtaining the necessary resources, and maintaining an understanding of the potential agents and the diseases they cause will foster a smooth transition to a rational program directed at patient, personnel, and community safety.