J. Scott Holladay

Should cities go for the gold? The long-term impacts of hosting the Olympics.

The Summer Olympics bring hundreds of thousands of visitors and generate upward of

Exporters and the environment

10 billion in spending for the host city. This large influx of tourism dollars is only part of the overall impact of hosting the Olympic Games. In order to host the visitors and sporting events, cities must make sizable investments in infrastructure such as airports, arenas, and highways. Additionally, the publicity and international exposure of a host city may benefit international trade and capital flows. Proponents argue that this investment will pay off through increased economic growth, but research confirming these claims is lacking. This paper examines whether hosting an Olympiad improves a citys long‐term growth. In order to control for the self‐selection of cities that host Olympic Games, this paper matches Olympic host cities with cities that were finalists for the Olympic Games, but were not selected by the International Olympic Committee. A difference‐in‐difference estimator examines post‐Olympic impacts for host cities between 1950 and 2005. Regression results provide no long‐term impacts of hosting an Olympics on two measures of population, real Gross Domestic Product per capita and trade openness.

Opportunity Cost Pass-Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers: OPPORTUNITY COST PASS-THROUGH FROM FOSSIL FUEL PRICES

This paper documents a relationship between international trade and environmental performance at the plant level. Using a panel of establishment-level data from 1990-2006, I estimate the relationship be- tween export orientation, import competition and pollution emissions. I find a robust relationship between international trade and pollution levels. Exporters emit 9-13% less after controlling for output, but their is significant heterogeneity across industries. Import competition is associated with the exit of the smallest, most pollution intensive plants. There is no evidence that this result is caused by polluting firms relocating to countries with low levels of environmental regulation and importing back into the U.S.

Regional Variation, Holdouts, and Climate Treaty Negotiations

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.

Are Exporters Mother Nature's Best Friends?

Abstract We develop a model of international agreements to price a transboundry externality and provide a new heuristic to aid in interpreting negotiation behavior. Under conservative assumptions, a country’s net benefits will be positive under an efficient pollution price if its share of global damages is less than half its share of worldwide abatement costs. We solve for a permit allocation scheme consistent with that heuristic such that every region will have positive net benefits in an agreement to price the pollution externality at the globally efficient level. We then apply this framework to climate change using regional data from Integrated Assessment Models and test the feasibility of a global climate change treaty. The results indicate that several regions have positive net benefits from a globally efficient price on carbon, including Western Europe, South Asia (including India), and Latin America. We then solve for a permit allocation scheme that should produce worldwide agreement on a climate treaty. Using the same model, we show that differential carbon taxes aimed at producing universal agreement would produce tax rate differences of an order of magnitude. We also argue that shares of global GDP might be an appropriate proxy for exposure to climate damages and find that a global climate treaty would be cost-benefit justified for all countries without transfers when that assumption is used.