Jack Nelson

Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science

Introduction. Part One: Historical Overview: Logical Empiricism and Feminist Empiricism. The Feminism Question in the Philosophy of Science R.N. Giere. Revaluing Science: Starting from the Practices of Women N. Tuana. Part Two: Feminist and Mainstream Philosophy of Science: Continuities and Tensions. Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy H.E. Longino. The Last Dogma of Empiricism? J. Nelson. Science as Social? - Yes and No S. Haack. Empiricism without Dogmas L. Hankinson Nelson. Underdetermination Undeterred E. Potter. The Relativism Question in Feminist Epistemology I. Niiniluoto. Part Three: Feminist Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, Social Constructivism, and the Debate over Science Studies. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism without Contradiction K. Barad. Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge J. Rouse. Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and its Real Enemies E.A. Lloyd. Part Four: Views from Multicultural and Global Feminisms, and from Feminist Phenomenology. Multicultural and Global Feminist Philosophies of Science: Resources and Challenges S. Harding. Woman - Nature, Product, Style? Rethinking the Foundations of Feminist Philosophy of Science S. Heinamaa. Contributors.

The Last Dogma of Empiricism

This is, in the jargon of 25 years ago, a paper about the fact/value distinction, or, better, the science/values distinction. The question mark in the title concerns whether the science/value distinction is a dogma or a defensible distinction to be drawn within holism. I begin from the position of a Quinean holist and argue that value claims should be seen as part of our holistic world theory that is, as a whole, supported by experience. However, I do conclude that there may still be a distinction, though perhaps one of degree, to be drawn between values and value laden claims and other parts of our world theory. The moral of this paper will be that whether there is a science/values distinction of some sort is far less important than is the recognition of two “facts” about “values”, that values frequently do influence the course of science and that we cannot, for this very reason, afford to treat values as matters of personal preference or as subjective or as in any other way wholly or even largely exempt from the standards of evidence and evaluation that apply to science itself.

Class Formation and the Professionalization of an African Clergy

There is a painting, reproduced by many artists, that enjoys a certain popularity in Zaire. It depicts a young man who, while cutting down a tree on a riverbank, is approached by a lion. He climbs the tree to escape, only to encounter in the branches above him a python. Turning to jump into the river he is confronted with a crocodile. In a precarious situation, up in a nearly severed tree with danger on all sides, there seems to be no escape for him. That the painting enjoys such popularity, hanging in homes, little roadside restaurants, and bars, is not surprising in that it captures the experience of so many people in Zaire. Even those with a fair amount of education, who could be expected to have benefited most from a system of rewards, generally experience the same thing. It is this class of people, those who have aspired toward professional positions as school teachers, medical assistants, clerical workers, and church pastors, who are most vocal in expressing their discontent. For most of them inflation has eroded the economic rewards

The diversity of perception

Over the past thirty to fifty years the influence of foundationalist theories of knowledge over theories of percept ion has greatly diminished. It is no longer taken as a requirement for an adequate theory of perception that it show how all empirical knowledge is founded on direct, un in fe r red , incorrigible, or certain perceptual knowledge (usually knowledge of sense-data). Traditional sense-data theories of perception have lost favor and alternative, nonfoundationalist, theories of percept ion have been developed and widely discussed and debated. Prominent among these have been various causal theories of perception. All of this is for the best, at least in the eyes of those of us who have strong Quinean leanings towards a naturalized epistemology. However , as yet relatively little attention has been paid to another pair of questions: what kinds of things can be perceived and what sorts of aids and instruments can we use in perceiving them? I am not suggesting that there is, or should be, any serious question as to whether we can perceive houses, explosions, symphonies, distant galaxies, and microbes, nor that in doing so we can legitimately use eyeglasses, telescopes, microscopes, and hearing aids. It is now generally taken for granted that we can and do perceive such things, using a wide variety of perceptual instruments, including those just mentioned. But when I see a microbe under a microscope, is it in the same direct or immediate sense as that in which I now see the letters on this page? When I watch the evening news and see Reagan signing a piece of legislation, via a videotape of an earlier event, is this really a case of seeing the President of the United States perform an official act? When 1 am presented with the results of a particularly well done piece of electron microscopy do I see the organic molecule being studied? Can I see Truman by watching an old newsreel, or witness the invasion of Normandy by viewing army films of that event? Can I see a sick friends heartbeat by watching an oscilloscope suitably connected to him? Can I see an approaching ship