James H. Moor

Why We Need Better Ethics for Emerging Technologies

Technological revolutions are dissected into three stages: the introduction stage, the permeation stage, and the power stage. The information revolution is a primary example of this tripartite model. A hypothesis about ethics is proposed, namely, ethical problems increase as technological revolutions progress toward and into the power stage. Genetic technology, nanotechnology, and neurotechnology are good candidates for impending technological revolutions. Two reasons favoring their candidacy as revolutionary are their high degree of malleability and their convergence. Assuming the emerging technologies develop into mutually enabling revolutionary technologies, we will need better ethical responses to cope with them. Some suggestions are offered about how our approach to ethics might be improved.

Privacy protection, control of information, and privacy-enhancing technologies

The present study is organized into two main parts. In Part I, we respond to a recent criticism that the restricted access theoryofprivacydoes not adequately explain the role that control of personal information plays in protecting ones priva~ In defending a version of the restricted access theory, we put forth a tripartite model that differentiates the concq~tofprivacyfrom both the justification and the management of privacy. This-distinction is important, we argue, because it enables us to avoid conflafing the concept of privacy which we define in terms of protection from intrusion and information gathering [Moor 1990; 1997], from the concept of control, which (a) is used to justifi/ the flaming of polities that provide privacy prrotection and (b) is essential to the management ofptivac~ Separating privacy from control is necessa~ we further argue, to preserve the identityofboth notions. After showingwhy the notion of individual control, as expressed in three different ways-choice, consent, and correction--plays an important role in the management ofpriva~ we conclude Part I with an account of why individual controls alone are not sufficient to guarantee the protection nfpersonal privacy and why certain external controls, such as those provided by privacy polities, are also needed. To illustrate some of the key points made in the first part of this essay we consider examples ofptivacy-enhancing technologies (or PETs) in Part II. We argue that even if PETs provide individuals with a means of controlling their personal information, these tools do not necessarily ensure privacy protection. Became PETs do not provide online users with a zone of privacy protection that incorporates external controls, i.e., controls beyond those at the individual level, we condude that the use of PETs can actually blur the need for privacy protection, rather than provide it.

Three Myths of Computer Science

In this paper I will discuss a basic concept of computer science-the concept of a computer program-and three related distinctions of computer science-software vs. hardware, digital vs. analogue, and model vs. theory. I believe all of these notions are important, and if properly understood, provide an important part of the conceptual framework of computer science. But, when these notions are misunderstood, certain myths tend to evolve. With regard to artificial intelligence work these myths perpetuate sloppy research, and with regard to philosophy these myths promote misconceptions related to the mind-body problem and scientific methodology.

Reason, relativity, and responsibility in computer ethics

I heartily concur with the concern that Bynum and Rogerson express about the global impact of computing. The number and kinds of applications of computing increase dramatically each year and the impact of computing is felt around the planet. The ubiquitous use of electronic mail, electronic funds transfer, reservation systems, the world wide web, etc. places millions of the inhabitants of the planet in a global electronic village. Communication and actions at distance have never been easier. We are definitely in a computer revolution. We are beyond the introduction stage of the revolution in which computers are curiosities of limited power used only by a few. Now entire populations of developed countries are in the permeation stage of the revolution in which computers are rapidly moving to every aspect of

Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions & Answers

This paper presents the principal findings from a three-year research project funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) on ethics of human enhancement technologies. To help untangle this ongoing debate, we have organized the discussion as a list of questions and answers, starting with background issues and moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity. Each question-and-answer pair is largely self-contained, allowing the reader to skip to those issues of interest without affecting continuity.

Just consequentialism and computing

Computer and information ethics, as well as other fields of applied ethics, need ethical theories which coherently unify deontological and consequentialist aspects of ethical analysis. The proposed theory of just consequentialism emphasizes consequences of policies within the constraints of justice. This makes just consequentialism a practical and theoretically sound approach to ethical problems of computer and information ethics.

The internet and Japanese conception of privacy

It is sometimes suggested thatthere is no conception of privacy in Japan orthat, if there is, it is completely differentfrom Western conceptions of privacy. If thiswere so, finding common ground between Japanand the West on which to establish privacypolicies for the internet would be extremelydifficult if not impossible. In this paper wedelineate some of the distinctive differencesin privacy practices in Japan, but we maintainthat these differences do not prevent theestablishment of sound, shared, ethicalinformation privacy policies. We distinguishbetween a minimal conception of privacy that webelieve is shared by Japan and other societiesand richer conceptions of privacy that oftenreflect patterns of behavior distinctive ofparticular cultures. Although Japan and othersocieties share at least a minimal sense ofprivacy, a base on which to build, robustprivacy protection will not exist on theinternet until an internationally accepted richsense of privacy is developed.

Briefly noted: the turing test: The elusive standard of artificial intelligence

Origins of the Articles. Preface. 1: History. The Turing Test B. J. Copeland. Turing Test: 50 Years Later A.P. Saygin, I. Cicekli, V. Akman. 2: Interpretation. Turings Two Tests for Intelligence S.G. Sterrett. Making the Right Identification in the Turing Test S. Traiger. Turings Rules for the Imitation Game G. Piccinini. 3: Criticism. Passing Loebners Turing Test: A Case of Conflicting Discourse Functions S. Zdenek. The Constructibility of Artificial Intelligence (as Defined by the Turing Test) B. Edmonds. Intelligence is not Enough: On the Socialization of Talking Machines E.M.A. Ronald. 4: Defense. How to Pass a Turing Test W.J. Rapaport. Look Whos Moving the Goal Posts Now L. Hauser. The Status and Future of the Turing Test J.H. Moor. 5: Alternatives. Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test S. Bringsjord, P. Bello, D. Ferrucci. The Cartesian Test for Automatism G.J. Erion. Minds, Machines and Turing S. Harnad.

The Status and Future of the Turing Test

The standard interpretation of the imitation game is defended over the rival gender interpretation though it is noted that Turing himself proposed several variations of his imitation game. The Turing test is then justified as an inductive test not as an operational definition as commonly suggested. Turings famous prediction about his test being passed at the 70% level is disconfirmed by the results of the Loebner 2000 contest and the absence of any serious Turing test competitors from AI on the horizon. But, reports of the death of the Turing test and AI are premature. AI continues to flourish and the test continues to play an important philosophical role in AI. Intelligence attribution, methodological, and visionary arguments are given in defense of a continuing role for the Turing test. With regard to Turings predictions one is disconfirmed, one is confirmed, but another is still outstanding.

The future of computer ethics: You ain't seen nothin' yet!

The computer revolution can beusefully divided into three stages, two ofwhich have already occurred: the introductionstage and the permeation stage. We have onlyrecently entered the third and most importantstage – the power stage – in which many ofthe most serious social, political, legal, andethical questions involving informationtechnology will present themselves on a largescale. The present article discusses severalreasons to believe that future developments ininformation technology will make computerethics more vibrant and more important thanever. Computer ethics is here to stay!