Jack W. Brehm

The attractiveness of an eliminated choice alternative

Abstract A recent theory by Brehm implies that the elimination of a choice alternative will tend to increase the attractiveness of that alternative to the person who is about to make the choice. Two experiments, in which college students rated the attractiveness of four recordings of music in order to be able to choose one for themselves, found that the third most attractive record increased in attractiveness when it became unavailable as one of the choice alternatives. In order to rule out alternative explanations of this finding, the second experiment included a condition in which some subjects were given no prior freedom to choose which record they would receive. The results of this second experiment indicated that the tendency to see the eliminated record as more attractive occurred only when subjects had prior freedom to choose which record they would take. Those subjects who had no prior freedom to choose tended to see the eliminated record as having decreased in attractiveness.

Attitude change as a function of felt competence and threat to attitudinal freedom

Abstract An experiment was performed with 141 male college students to test the effects of two variables on the generation of negative attitude change. About one half of the subjects were led to believe that they were competent to deal with a certain issue; the others were led to believe that they were relatively incompetent. The competence variable was cross-cut by a two-level manipulation of threat to attitudinal freedom. Among competent subjects the high threat communication produced a significant negative change, whereas the low threat communication produced a negligible positive change. For relatively incompetent subjects there was an average positive change, and the threat variable had no significant effect.

Internal states or external stimuli: Observers' attitude judgments and the dissonance-theory-self-persuasion controversy

Abstract Bem (1965, 1967a) has proposed a self-judgment model of attitude change in an attempt to account for a variety of hypotheses derived from dissonance theory. One derivation from Bems model is that observer-subjects should be able to discriminate the circumstances controlling the behavior of involved subjects and to estimate accurately the attitudes of involved subjects at the end of the experimental procedure. This derivation has been supported in serveral “interpersonal replications” conducted by Bem. It was hypothesized that these results were obtained because Bems descriptions of the experimental procedures allowed observer-subjects to perceive systematic differences between conditions in initial attitudes of involved subjects. A series of experiments was performed in an attempt to replicate Bems results and then to show that observer-subjects cannot accurately predict the results of experiments when perceptions of initial attitudes of the involved subjects are controlled. The results of these experiments indicated that attribution of differential initial attitudes had produced the earlier results and that observer-subjects cannot predict the outcomes of attitude-change experiments when perceptions of initial attitudes are controlled by design.

Persuasiveness of one- and two-sided communications as a function of awareness there are two sides ☆

Abstract It was hypothesized that the persuasiveness of a one-sided communication would be reduced more than that of a two-sided communication when the audience was made aware there were two plausible sides to the issue. Subjects were informed they would hear the prosecution summary for a court trial, and about half of the subjects were further informed that it was not an open-and-shut case. Cross-cutting this variation, about half of the subjects were exposed to a one-sided prosecution communication while the rest were exposed to a two-sided communication. The predicted interaction between awareness of there being two plausible sides and one- versus two-sided communications was supported. These effects did not seem to be accounted for by perceived bias in the communications and were explained in terms of reactions to pressure to adopt or reject a particular position on an issue.

The effect on dissonance of surprise consequences

Abstract The hypothesis that volition in commitment is a sufficient condition for later negative consequences to create dissonance has not been supported by recent evidence. The more specific hypothesis that the magnitude of dissonance aroused by a commitment will be reduced or increased by subsequent, unexpected, positive and negative consequences, respectively, was suggested and tested in the following way. Under the guise of consumer research, subjects were given a choice between two attractive LP records. Some of the subjects were forewarned that by selecting the right record they could also win two free movie tickets, while other subjects were not forewarned. After the choice, half of the forewarned and half of the unforewarned subjects learned that they had won two free movie tickets by their selection of a record, while the other half learned that they had not won the two free tickets by their selection. A control condition without mention of tickets established the amount of dissonance reduction from the choice per se. A measure of change in attractiveness of the records from before and after the choice indicated that the magnitude of dissonance was affected by winning or not winning the tickets only when subjects were forewarned. It was concluded that surprise consequences probably do not affect the magnitude of pre-existent dissonance and that “felt responsibility” for consequences may be an appropriate concept for understanding the relevant evidence.

Prechoice awareness of relative deprivation as a determinant of cognitive dissonance

Abstract Two experiments were conducted to clarify whether negative information presented after a person has committed himself to a course of action is capable of creating cognitive dissonance. Subjects were exposed to high or low relative deprivation either before they chose to participate in a tedious task, after they chose to participate, or without the option not to participate. The results indicated that there was greater satisfaction about participation under high relative deprivation than under low, but only when subjects were aware of the relative deprivation prior to their choice to participate. Information presented after decision was not effective in arousing dissonance. The implications of the experiments for modified views of dissonance theory were discussed.

Internalization of Multiple Perspectives or Dissonance Reduction

In numerous research programs based on the concept of cognitive dissonance, participants play a role that is ostensibly in conflict with their pre-existing values. A strict reading of dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) leads us to suppose that these role-playing, or ‘forced compliance’, procedures generally create results that are not implied by the theory. We spell out a theoretical position that comes to terms with these effects of role-playing, one that approaches role-playing procedures from the standpoint of the development of multiple value repertoires. From this viewpoint the outcomes of role-playing do not stem from contradictions— or cognitive dissonance—within the person’s sets of values.