Jagjit S. Chadha

Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Exchange Rates

We examine empirically whether asset prices and exchange rates may be admitted into a standard interest rate rule, using data for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan since 1979. Asset prices and exchange rates can be employed as information variables for a standard “Taylor-type” rule or as arguments in an augmented interest rate rule. Our empirical evidence, based on measures of the output gap proxied by marginal cost calculations, suggests that monetary policy-makers may use asset prices and exchange rates not only as part of their information set for setting interest rates, but also to set interest rates to offset deviations of asset prices or exchange rates from their equilibrium levels. These results are open to several alternative interpretations.

Inflation Targeting, Transparency and Interest Rate Volatility: Ditching 'Monetary Mystique' in the U.K.

Monetary authorities often seem reluctant to discuss the conduct of monetary policy. There is a concern that greater openness in monetary policy-making may lead to volatility in financial markets, and specifically in interest rates. To date there is very little direct empirical evidence; however, recent changes in the monetary policy framework in the UK provide an opportunity to gain some insight on this issue. First, the authors present a model of monetary policy showing that the volatility that would otherwise occur to aggregate prices is transmitted to the rate of interest in a tightly specified nominal regime. Under some circumstances, information flows may add to volatility; if volatility is harmful, then central bankers may be right to be reticent. However, the evidence suggests that even though volatility has risen in the recent past, there is no evidence that this volatility is directly attributable to increased information flows per se.

The Information Content of the Inflation Term Structure

This paper examines the information content of inflation forecasts derived using index- linked and conventional bonds. The paper finds that the derived inflation term structure (ITS) gives a somewhat better indication of the bond markets inflation expectation than can be derived using either the nominal term structure or a variant employing strong assumptions about real interest rate behaviour. The inflation forecasts of the ITS also seem at least as good at forecasting future changes in inflation as forecasts derived from macroeconometric models. These characteristics of the ITS and its timeliness tend to make its inflation forecasts a useful addition to policy analysis. Because the real term structure tends to underpredict the level of future real interest rates, index-linked bonds have proved, ex post, to be cheap funding for the UK government. But we cannot be sure whether this underprediction results from an inflation risk premium or expectational error and also cannot know whether this overprediction will persist.

Monetary Policy Loss Functions: Two Cheers for the Quadratic

The implications for optimal monetary policy of relaxing the normal assumption of a quadratic loss function are examined. Several alternative specifications are considered, but the results suggest that the convenient assumption of quadratic losses may not be that drastic.

On the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy

In this paper we review some fundamental issues that have been identified by macroeconomists in discussing the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy. As Sargent and Wallace (1981) graphically illustrated, the consolidated public sector present-value budget constraint means that monetary and fiscal policy are ultimately joint decisions. However, as we show in a quantitative general equilibrium model, even when fiscal solvency is not an issue, monetary and fiscal policy may still need to be co-ordinated.

Inflation and Price Level Targeting in a New Keynesian Model

In a New Keynesian macroeconomic model under credible commitment, price level targeting dominates inflation targeting. But with sufficient inflation aversion the inflation targeting central bank can produce quantitatively similar results to one targeting the price level. The current degree of inflation aversion demonstrated by the Bank of England may be sufficient to reap the benefits of price level targeting.

Reserves, Liquidity and Money: An Assessment of Balance Sheet Policies

The financial crisis and its aftermath has stimulated a vigorous debate on the use of macro-prudential instruments for both regulating the banking system and for providing additional tools for monetary policy makers. The widespread adoption of non-conventional monetary policies has provided some evidence on the efficacy of liquidity and asset purchases for offsetting the lower zero bound. Central banks have thus been reminded as to the effectiveness of extended open market operations as a supplementary tool of monetary policy. These tools are essentially fiscal instruments, as they issue central bank liabilities backed by fiscal transfers. And so having written these tools into the fiscal budget constraint, we can examine the consequences of these operations within the context of a micro-founded macroeconomic model of banking and money. We can mimic the responses of the Federal Reserve balance sheet to the crisis. Specifically, we examine the role of reserves for bond and capital swaps in stabilising the economy and also the impact of changing the composition of the central bank balance sheet. We find that such policies can significantly enhance the ability of the central bank to stabilise the economy. This is because balance sheet operations supply (remove) liquidity to a financial market that is otherwise short (long) of liquidity and hence allows other .nancial spreads to move less violently over the cycle to compensate.

Output, Inflation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Explicit modelling of factor markets clarifies two fundamental aspects of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). First, we clarify the relationship between output and marginal cost. Second, for the NKPC in inflation–output space, we identify the key stochastic influences on inflation without recourse to ad hoc cost or excess demand shocks. The econometric implementation of this clarified NKPC, which evolves strictly according news on the stream of future marginal costs, allows us jointly to derive inflation as a forecast of future variables. Our approach clarifies the empirical successes and failures of the NKPC and allows us to provide new aggregate evidence on the degree of price rigidity in the UK economy.

Independence Day for the 'Old Lady': A Natural Experiment on the Implications of Central Bank Independence

Central bank independence is widely thought be a sine qua non of a credible commitment to price stability. The surprise decision by the UK government to grant operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997 affords us a natural experiment with which to gauge the impact on the yield curve from the adoption of central bank independence. We document the extent to which the decision to grant independence was ‘news’ and illustrate that the reduction in medium- and long-term nominal interest rates was some 50 basis points, which we show to be consistent with a sharp increase in policy-makers aversion to inflation deviations from target. We therefore suggest that central bank independence represents one of the clearest signals available to elected politicians about their preferences on the control of inflation.

Midas, Transmuting All, into Paper: The Bank of England and the Banque de France During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

This paper assesses Revolutionary and Napoleonic wartime economic policy. Suspension of gold convertibility in 1797 allowed the Bank of England to nurture British monetary orthodoxy. The Order of the Privy Council suspended gold payments on Bank of England notes and afforded simultaneous protection to the government and the Bank in pursuit of the conflicting goals of price stability and war finance. The government, the Bank of England and the commercial banks formed a loose alliance drawing on due political and legal processes and also paid close attention to public opinion. We suggest that the ongoing solvency of the Bank of England was facilitated by suspension and allowed the Bank to continue to make substantial profits throughout the Wars. It became acceptable for merchants to continue to trade with non-convertible Bank of England notes and for the government to finance the war effort, even with significant recourse to unfunded debt. These aspects combined to create a suspension of convertibility that did not undermine the currency. By contrast, the Assignats debacle had cost the French monetary system its reputation in the last decade of the 18th century and so Napoleonic finance had to evolve within a more rigid and limiting framework. JEL Classification: C61, E31, E4, E5, N13 Keywords: Monetary Orthodoxy, Suspension of Convertibility, War Finance