Charles Nolan

Inflation Targeting, Transparency and Interest Rate Volatility: Ditching 'Monetary Mystique' in the U.K.

Monetary authorities often seem reluctant to discuss the conduct of monetary policy. There is a concern that greater openness in monetary policy-making may lead to volatility in financial markets, and specifically in interest rates. To date there is very little direct empirical evidence; however, recent changes in the monetary policy framework in the UK provide an opportunity to gain some insight on this issue. First, the authors present a model of monetary policy showing that the volatility that would otherwise occur to aggregate prices is transmitted to the rate of interest in a tightly specified nominal regime. Under some circumstances, information flows may add to volatility; if volatility is harmful, then central bankers may be right to be reticent. However, the evidence suggests that even though volatility has risen in the recent past, there is no evidence that this volatility is directly attributable to increased information flows per se.

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agents inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.

On the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy

In this paper we review some fundamental issues that have been identified by macroeconomists in discussing the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy. As Sargent and Wallace (1981) graphically illustrated, the consolidated public sector present-value budget constraint means that monetary and fiscal policy are ultimately joint decisions. However, as we show in a quantitative general equilibrium model, even when fiscal solvency is not an issue, monetary and fiscal policy may still need to be co-ordinated.

Inflation and Price Level Targeting in a New Keynesian Model

In a New Keynesian macroeconomic model under credible commitment, price level targeting dominates inflation targeting. But with sufficient inflation aversion the inflation targeting central bank can produce quantitatively similar results to one targeting the price level. The current degree of inflation aversion demonstrated by the Bank of England may be sufficient to reap the benefits of price level targeting.

Monetary Stabilisation Policy in a Monetary Union: Some Simple Analytics

We do two things in this paper. First, we look at some simple models of monetary decision making in a monetary union and ask how much more variable a country’s output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. We answer this analytically and then go on to ‘calibrate’ the simple model. The model has few structural equations, but it is useful in allowing us to examine how the variability of output and inflation are likely to change as key parameters change. Our conclusions on this front are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, we also identify a second best issue concerning the optimal make–up of the monetary union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values (and shocks are perfectly correlated) will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.

RELATIVE PRICE DISTORTIONS AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE

Many sticky-price models suggest that relative price distortion is one of the major costs of inflation. We show that this resource misallocation is costly even at quite low rates of inflation. This is because inflation strongly affects price dispersion which in turn has an impact on the economy qualitatively similar to, and of the order of magnitude of, a negative shift in productivity. Similarly, the utility cost of price dispersion is large. We incorporate price dispersion in a linearized model. This radically affects how shocks are transmitted through the economy. Notably, a contractionary nominal shock has a persistent, negative hump-shaped impact on inflation, but may have a positive hump-shaped impact on output. Observed persistence in the policy rate is not due to the policy rule per se.

Output, Inflation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Explicit modelling of factor markets clarifies two fundamental aspects of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). First, we clarify the relationship between output and marginal cost. Second, for the NKPC in inflation–output space, we identify the key stochastic influences on inflation without recourse to ad hoc cost or excess demand shocks. The econometric implementation of this clarified NKPC, which evolves strictly according news on the stream of future marginal costs, allows us jointly to derive inflation as a forecast of future variables. Our approach clarifies the empirical successes and failures of the NKPC and allows us to provide new aggregate evidence on the degree of price rigidity in the UK economy.

Money, Debt and Prices in the United Kingdom, 1705-1996

This paper constructs a consistent series for the market value of UK government debt over almost 300 years, analysing how monetary and fiscal policy affect the path of the UK price level. Specifically, it examines the interactions between debts, deficits, the monetary base and the price level. Overall, the price level has been closely related to the evolution of the base money supply. Across different sample periods, there is little econometric evidence that fiscal policy has affected the course of the price level (or of the exchange rate under the Gold Standard). Government debt has not significantly affected the base money stock, either.

Independence Day for the 'Old Lady': A Natural Experiment on the Implications of Central Bank Independence

Central bank independence is widely thought be a sine qua non of a credible commitment to price stability. The surprise decision by the UK government to grant operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997 affords us a natural experiment with which to gauge the impact on the yield curve from the adoption of central bank independence. We document the extent to which the decision to grant independence was ‘news’ and illustrate that the reduction in medium- and long-term nominal interest rates was some 50 basis points, which we show to be consistent with a sharp increase in policy-makers aversion to inflation deviations from target. We therefore suggest that central bank independence represents one of the clearest signals available to elected politicians about their preferences on the control of inflation.

The Impact of Simple Fiscal Rules in Growth Models with Public Goods and Congestion

In this paper we examine the implication of a simple class of fiscal rules for long-run economic growth and welfare. The Golden Rule of Public Finance that we examine is motivated by institutional arrangements in countries such as Germany and the UK. We find that rules that seek to limit government borrowing to productive investment spending have a clear justification in terms of growth and welfare when government-provided goods are otherwise excessively provided. Even in the case where it is private consumption that is excessive, the Golden Rule of Public Finance is likely to be good from a growth perspective, but the welfare effects are more ambiguous.