James C. Klagge

Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive

I Supervenience has been heralded as a relationship between two realms that is weaker than reductionism but stronger than dualism. In the philosophy of mind the realms thought to stand in a supervenient relationship are the mental and the physical. In moral philosophy they are the moral and the natural. In the last decade much effort has been devoted to distinguishing, formulating, and scrutinising the various claims of supervenience. But these formulations tend to presuppose that the supervening realm should be construed as a set of properties or events to be understood realistically. In the face of this presupposition, it may be instructive to recall that the supervening realm need not be construed in this way. In this paper I wish to examine the varieties of supervenience and the interrelationships that result from construing the supervening realm in different ways. Along the way I will try to defend moral realism against the charge that it misappropriates supervenience.

Brentano and Intrinsic Value

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Marx's Realms of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Necessity’

In 1844 Marx held that labor alienation was wholly eliminable, primarily through the abolition of private property.1 Work in the context of private property was alienating because it was performed for wages and the production of exchangevalue. With such purposes, work was experienced as selfish and forced. With the abolition of private property, work would be performed for the production of use-value, to satisfy human needs. With this human purpose, work would be experienced as a free and fulfilling expression of life.2

The difficulty here is: to stop

Kripke’s publications launched a flurry of further publications on Wittgenstein and rule-following (which Bloor cites on p. 145) that produced a sea-change in Wittgenstein scholarship. Whereas once the ‘private language argument’ had seemed to be the central issue in thePhilosophical Investigations , now rule-following seemed to replace it. The new debates focused on the adequacy of a generally anti-realist and/or collectivist account of rule-following, and its legitimacy as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. The book here under review hopes to clinch the case for the former, collectivist account. As for the latter, Bloor finds Wittgenstein’s treatment to be ‘suggestive, but disconnected and in need of filling out’ (p. 48). Thus, it is where one is led if one tries to take Wittgenstein seriously. In any case, the book constitutes a sort of culmination of a fifteen-year set of debates. But in the course of those fifteen years, other things happened in Wittgenstein scholarship as well. The biographical work of Brian McGuinness finally came to partial fruition with the publication of the first volume of his biography of Wittgenstein in 1988; and Ray Monk’s comprehensive biography was published in 1990.