James E. Stott

Launch vehicle attitude control using sliding mode control and observation techniques

In determining flight controls for launch vehicle systems, several uncertain factors must be taken into account, including a variety of payloads, a wide range of flight conditions and different mission profiles, wind disturbances and plant uncertainties. Crewed vehicles must adhere to human rating requirements, which limit the angular rates. Sliding mode control algorithms that are inherently robust to external disturbances and plant uncertainties are very good candidates for improving the robustness and accuracy of the flight control systems. Recently emerging Higher Order Sliding Mode (HOSM) control is even more powerful than the classical Sliding Mode Controls (SMC), including the capability to handle systems with arbitrary relative degree. This paper proposes sliding mode launch vehicle flight controls using classical SMC driven by the sliding mode disturbance observer (SMDO) and higher-order multiple and single loop designs. A case study on the SLV-X Launch Vehicle studied under a joint DARPA/Air Force program called the Force Application and Launch from CONtinental United States (FALCON) program is shown. The intensive simulations demonstrate efficacy of the proposed HOSM and SMC-SMDO control algorithms for launch vehicle attitude control.

Application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) During Conceptual Design for the NASA Orbital Space Plane (OSP)

In order to meet the space transportation needs for a new century, America’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has implemented an Integrated Space Transportation Plan to produce safe, economical, and reliable access to space. One near term objective of this initiative is the design and development of a next-generation vehicle and launch system that will transport crew and cargo to and from the International Space Station (ISS), the Orbital Space Plane (OSP). The OSP system is composed of a manned launch vehicle by an existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). The OSP will provide emergency crew rescue from the ISS by 2008, and provide crew and limited cargo transfer to and from the ISS by 2012. A key requirement is for the OSP to be safer and more reliable than the Soyuz and Space Shuttle, which currently provide these capabilities.

Factors which Limit the Value of Additional Redundancy in Human Rated Launch Vehicle Systems

Abstract The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has embarked on an ambitious program to return humans to the moon and beyond. As NASA moves forward in the development and design of new launch vehicles for future space exploration, it must fully consider the implications that rule-based requirements for redundancy or fault tolerance have on system reliability/risk. These considerations include common cause failure, increased system complexity, combined serial and parallel configurations, and the impact of design features implemented to control premature activation. These factors and others must be considered in trade studies to support design decisions that balance safety, reliability, performance and system complexity to achieve a relatively simple, operable system that provides the safest and most reliable system within the specified performance requirements. This paper describes conditions under which additional functional redundancy can impede improved system reliability. Examples from current NASA programs including the Ares I Upper Stage will be shown.