James G. Greeno

THE SITUATIVITY OF KNOWING, LEARNING, AND RESEARCH

The situative perspective shifts the focus of analysis from individual behavior and cognition to larger systems that include behaving cognitive agents interacting with each other and with other subsystems in the environment. The first section presents a version of the situative perspective that draws on studies of social interaction, philosophical situation theory, and ecological psychology. Framing assumptions and concepts are proposed for a synthesis of the situative and cognitive theoretical perspectives, and a further situative synthesis is suggested that would draw on dynamic-systems theory. The second section discusses relations between the situative, cognitive, and behaviorist theoretical perspectives and principles of educational practice. The third section discusses an approach to research and social practice called interactive research and design, which fits with the situative perspective and provides a productive, albeit syncretic, combination of theory-oriented and instrumental functions of research.

On Claims That Answer the Wrong Questions

Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996) contested four propositions that they incorrectly called “claims of situated learning.” This response argues that the important differences between situative and cognitive perspectives are not addressed by discussion of these imputed claims. Instead, there are significant differences in the framing assumptions of the two perspectives. I clarify these differences by inferring questions to which Anderson et al.s discussion provided answers, by identifying presuppositions of those questions made by Anderson et al., and by stating the different presuppositions and questions that I believe are consistent with the situative perspective. The evidence given by Anderson et al. is compatible with the framing assumptions of situativity; therefore, deciding between the perspectives will involve broader considerations than those presented in their article. These considerations include expectations about which framework offers the better prospect for developing a unified scientific account of activity considered from both social and individual points of view, and which framework supports research that will inform discussions of educational practice more productively. The cognitive perspective takes the theory of individual cognition as its basis and builds toward a broader theory by incrementally developing analyses of additional components that are considered as contexts. The situative perspective takes the theory of social and ecological interaction as its basis and builds toward a more comprehensive theory by developing increasingly detailed analyses of information structures in the contents of peoples interactions. While I believe that the situative framework is more promising, the best strategy for the field is for both perspectives to be developed energetically.

Perspectives on Learning, Thinking, and Activity

We continue the discussion of cognitive and situative perspectives by identifying several important points on which we judge the perspectives to be in agreement: (a) Individual and social perspectives on activity are both fundamentally important in education; (b) Learning can be general, and abstractions can be efficacious, but they sometimes aren’t; (c) Situative and cognitive approaches can cast light on different aspects of the educational process, and both should be pursued vigorously; (d) Educational innovations should be informed by the available scientific knowledge base and should be evaluated and analyzed with rigorous research methods.

Conceptual competence and children's counting☆☆☆

Abstract A framework is presented for characterizing competence for cognitive tasks, with a detailed hypothesis about competence for counting by typical 5-year-old children. It is proposed that competence has three main components that are called conceptual, procedural, and utilizational competence. Conceptual competence, which is discussed in greatest detail in this article, is the implicit understanding of general principles of the domain. Procedural competence is understanding of general principles of action and takes the form of planning heuristics. Utilizational competence is understanding of relations between features of a task setting and requirements of performance. A characterization of conceptual competence for counting is presented, in the form of action schemata that constitute understanding of counting principles such as cardinality, one-to-one correspondence, and order. This hypothesis about competence is connected explicitly to a detailed analysis of performance in counting tasks. The connection is provided by derivations of planning nets for procedures that are included in process models that simulate childrens performance.

Perspectival Understanding of Conceptions and Conceptual Growth in Interaction

Abstract We propose a bridge between cognitive and sociocultural approaches that is anchored on the sociocultural side by distributed cognition and participation, and on the cognitive side by information structures. We interpret information structures as the contents of distributed knowing and interaction in activity systems. Conceptual understanding is considered as achievement of discourse in activity systems, and conceptual growth is change in discourse practice that supports more effective conceptual understanding. We also introduce a concept of perspectival understanding, in which accounts of cognition, including conceptual understanding, include points of view. This concept generalizes the concept of schema by hypothesizing that a perspectival understanding can be constructed by constraint satisfaction when a sufficient schema is not known or recognized. We provide an example in which perspectival understanding was jointly constructed, illustrating an interactional process we call “constructive listening.”

Markovian processes with identifiable states: General considerations and application to all-or-none learning

It often happens that a theory specifies some variables or states which cannot be identified completely in an experiment. When this happens, there are important questions as to whether the experiment is relevant to certain assumptions of the theory. Some of these questions are taken up in the present article, where a method is developed for describing the implications of a theory for an experiment. The method consists of constructing a second theory with all of its states identifiable in the outcome-space of the experiment. The method can be applied (i.e., an equivalent identifiable theory exists) whenever a theory specifies a probability function on the sample-space of possible outcomes of the experiment. An interesting relationship between lumpability of states and recurrent events plays an important role in the development of the identifiable theory. An identifiable theory of an experiment can be used to investigate relationships among different theories of the experiment. As an example, an identifiable theory of all-or-none learning is developed, and it is shown that a large class of all-or-none theories are equivalent for experiments in which a task is learned to a strict criterion.

Similarity between stimuli: An experimental test of the Luce and Restle choice models☆

Abstract A set of choice alternatives was constructed to test Restles (1961) hypothesis about the role of similarity between alternatives in choice behavior. The set contained names of three political figures, three actresses, and three athletes, with the intention of producing considerable similarity within subsets and minimal similarity between subsets. Subjects were asked to select the individual with whom they would prefer to spend an hour of conversation. Paired-comparison choice data from 234 college subjects were consistent with expectations based on Restles model, and disconfirmed Luces (1959) stronger model which does not take similarity into account. Measurements of response strength for choosing the individual alternatives, and of perceived similarity between pairs of alternatives can be obtained using Restles model, and the present test provides evidence for the validity of such measurements. Finally, Restles model is shown to be indistinguishable from a modification of Thurstones (1927) Case V, where the assumption of zero correlation is relaxed to permit nonnegative correlations between pairs of discriminal dispersions.

Paired-associate learning with short-term retention: Mathematical analysis and data regarding identification of parameters ☆

Abstract An analysis is given of a simple theory of paired-associate learning in which items may be retained for short intervals before they are learned. Theoretical questions are discussed that involve parameters of the theory, and the problem of identifying these parameters is analyzed. Analyses of several experiments lead to the conclusion that either there is no learning on trials when the presented item is already in short-term memory, or an item usually is learned during the intervals between its presentations. Results of one experiment that permits a choice between these two possibilities favor the assumption that learning occurs mainly during the intervals between an items presentations. Finally, some statistical methods are presented for the general theory and for the special case that is supported best by the data.

Understanding and procedural knowledge in mathematics instruction 1

Abstract Using ideas developed recently in the theory of understanding language, an analysis is given of the process of understanding mathematical concepts. An analysis also is given of procedural knowledge in mathematics, based on recently developed theories of problem solving including production systems and automaton models. A suggestion is made as to how these theories might be synthesized to provide an analysis of performance of mathematical skills with understanding. Two examples of such performance are described, in the form of theories that are realized as computer programs, and there is discussion of ways in which these theories succeed and fail in representing procedural knowledge with understanding.

A cognitive interpretation of negative transfer and forgetting of paired associates

A new interpretation of negative transfer and forgetting is presented, using concepts of storage and retrieval from memory. According to the interpretation given, one process in negative transfer is interference with the stroage of new items, produced by carryover of the encodings of stimuli and responses from earlier pairings. The other process in transfer, and the main process in forgetting, is interference with the retrieval process, produced mainly by the inclusion of the same stimuli in two retrieval systems. These ideas are used to interpret three empirical results. The first came from measurements of difficulty in two stages of paired-associate memorizing that were obtained for four paradigms of negative transfer. A second finding is based on a series of different retention tests given after interpolated learning in the four paradigms. And the third result consists of evidence that recall of two responses paired with the same stimulus is independent.