James Igoe Walsh

Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism

Does respect for human rights check or promote terrorism? This question is hotly debated within policy circles. Some hold that restricting human rights is a necessary if unfortunate cost of preventing terrorism. Others conclude that such abuses aggravate political grievances that contribute to terror. The authors demonstrate that theory and data support the latter position. They hypothesize that abuse of the subset of rights known as physical integrity rights fuels terrorism by making it more difficult for government authorities to collect intelligence on terrorists and by undermining domestic and international support for their counterterrorism efforts. They test this hypothesis using a data set that includes measures of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks and find that respect for physical integrity rights is consistently associated with fewer terrorist attacks. This suggests that those interested in curtailing terrorism should press governments to more carefully respect physical integrity rights.

WHEN DO IDEAS MATTER? Explaining the Successes and Failures of Thatcherite Ideas

The field of comparative politics has begun to take seriously the role of ideas in politics, but to date this interest has not clearly specified the conditions under which ideas influence public policy. The author develops an integrated framework that shows ideas about policy goals and instruments are most influential when they do not attract substantial opposition from voters and interest groups and when political institutions concentrate decision-making authority. The author tests this framework by examining the fates of three ideas, facing different degrees of societal opposition and concentrated authority, adopted by the first Thatcher government in Britain.

Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions are Not Enough

The European Union (EU) has developed three institutions to facilitate intelligence-sharing between its Member States: the Berne Group, Europol and the European Union Military Staff. These institutions serve the useful function of creating technical mechanisms for the diffusion of intelligence among national authorities. But they do not tackle the problem of mistrust, which is the key barrier to fully effective intelligence-sharing. This article shows that mistrust of the interests of other Member States inhibits intelligence-sharing, that existing institutions fail to overcome this mistrust and suggests changes that could lead to more effective sharing.

Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda Output

The United States has used unmanned, aerial vehicles—drones—to launch attacks on militants associated with Al Qaeda and other violent groups based in Pakistan. The goal is to degrade the targets capacity to undertake political and violent action. We assess the effectiveness of drone strikes in achieving this goal, measuring degradation as the capacity of Al Qaeda to generate and disseminate propaganda. Propaganda is a key output of many terrorist organizations and a long-standing priority for Al Qaeda. Unlike other potential measures of terrorist group activity and capacity, propaganda output can be observed and measured. If drone strikes have degraded Al Qaeda, their occurrence should be correlated with a reduction in the organizations propaganda output. The analysis presented here finds little evidence that this is the case. Drone strikes have not impaired Al Qaedas ability to generate propaganda.

Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism

Can states afford to protect human rights when facing a terrorist threat? Contemporary academic literature suggests that the answer to this question is no, concluding that states that afford their citizens basic political rights and civil liberties leave themselves more exposed to terrorist attacks (Piazza 2008 ; Wade and Reiter 2007 ; Pape 2003 ; Eubank and Weinberg 1994 ). American policymakers seem to agree. Both the Bush and Obama administrations regard the curtailment of physical integrity rights as a necessary element of effective counterterrorism policy. The Bush administration responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with policies permitting indefinite detention, extraordinary rendition, use of physically abusive interrogation practices, and increased and largely unchecked surveillance and wiretapping of suspected terrorists. Although it banned abusive interrogation and announced plans to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has maintained the practice of wiretapping, reserved the option of rendition, and dramatically increased unmanned drone attacks against suspected terrorists in Pakistan, which often results in civilian casualties. Both presidents have claimed that these policies are necessary to keep Americans safe from terrorism (Hosenball 2009; “Bush Defends Policy on Terror Detainees” 2005).

Political Exclusion, Oil, and Ethnic Armed Conflict

Why do members of some ethnic groups rebel against the state? One approach holds that groups subject to exclusion from national politics engage in armed conflict. We theorize that the presence of resource wealth moderates the effect of political exclusion. Ethnic groups subject to exclusion whose settlement area includes oil wealth are more likely to experience the onset of armed conflict than groups experiencing exclusion alone. We depart from the convention of cross-national analysis to examine subnational, geocoded units of analysis—ethnic group settlement areas—to better capture the impact of natural resource distribution. Using data on ethnic group political exclusion derived from the Ethnic Power Relations database and geo-coded indicators, we conduct a series of logistic regression analyses for the years 1946 to 2005. We find that exclusion alone increase the likelihood of conflict, while the presence of oil wealth further raises the risk of war.

The international politics of intelligence sharing

Acknowledgments1. Understanding Intelligence Sharing: Curveball and KSM2. Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing During the Cold War3. Intelligence Sharing for Counterinsurgency: Vietnam and Colombia4. Intelligence Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough5. Intelligence Sharing and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy6. Findings and ImplicationsNotesIndex

Do States Play Signaling Games

The study of international conflict and cooperation has long drawn on game theory for insights. Recent developments have made the assumptions of game theory more realistic. Particularly important is the development of signaling games, which analyze situations when decision-makers lack complete information about their environment. Signaling game logic has been applied to many areas of international politics in the past decade, including decisions to go to war, crisis bargaining, international economic negotiations, regional integration, and the foreign policies of democratic states. The signaling games approach assumes that states are unitary actors with a single preference ordering and set of beliefs. I relax this assumption by developing an informal model in which decision-makers can hold different prior beliefs and preferences, and investigate this models usefulness by analyzing how the United States responded to the more cooperative foreign policy signals initiated by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. This step further deepens the realism of game-theoretic applications to foreign policy by explaining how political conflict among domestic actors influences foreign policy choices.The study of international conflict and cooperation has long drawn on game theory for insights. Recent developments have made the assumptions of game theory more realistic. Particularly important is the development of signaling games, which analyze situations when decision-makers lack complete information about their environment. Signaling game logic has been applied to many areas of international politics in the past decade, including decisions to go to war, crisis bargaining, international economic negotiations, regional integration, and the foreign policies of democratic states. The signaling games approach assumes that states are unitary actors with a single preference ordering and set of beliefs. I relax this assumption by developing an informal model in which decision-makers can hold different prior beliefs and preferences, and investigate this models usefulness by analyzing how the United States responded to the more cooperative foreign policy signals initiated by the Soviet Union under Gorbachev....

Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence sharing among countries with different technical capabilities and local knowledge is particularly valuable for countering terrorism, transnational organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. States participating in intelligence-sharing arrangements must balance the benefits of more and better intelligence against the possibility that their partners will withhold or distort the information they share or will pass along to others the information they receive. Participants can balance these benefits and risks by introducing elements of hierarchy into their sharing agreements. Hierarchical arrangements allow a state to monitor more effectively for defection and to reassure others of its own commitments to the terms of their sharing arrangement. I evaluate this argument by analyzing intelligence sharing between the United States and Britain and West Germany during the early cold war, and conclude with some insights the approach sheds on contemporary sharing arrangements and problems.

How and why Britain might join the single currency: The role of policy failure

ABSTRACT Why has Britain declined to adopt the single currency? The conventional view holds that there are multiple political and economic barriers to British entry into monetary union–large fractions of public opinion, business leaders, and the Conservative party oppose entry; Britains economic cycle is not synchronized with that of the euro-zone; adoption of the single currency would harm foreign trade and investment; British political institutions make it difficult to muster support for such a move, and so on. I argue that policy failure is a more important influence on British economic policy. Major changes occur when extant policy fails and there exists an alternative policy idea that both explains this failure persuasively and prescribes a new and more effective way forward. A British government might advocate euro membership if the current framework for policy in Britain—central bank independence with a floating exchange rate—fails, and policies pursued by the European Central Bank address the source of this failure. This combination would also lead many politicians, business leaders, and voters to see the advantages of euro membership.