James Justus

The principle of complementarity in the design of reserve networks to conserve biodiversity: a preliminary history

Explicit, quantitative procedures for identifying biodiversity priority areas are replacing the often ad hoc procedures used in the past to design networks of reserves to conserve biodiversity. This change facilitates more informed choices by policy makers, and thereby makes possible greater satisfaction of conservation goals with increased efficiency. A key feature of these procedures is the use of the principle of complementarity, which ensures that areas chosen for inclusion in a reserve network complement those already selected. This paper sketches the historical development of the principle of complementarity and its applications in practical policy decisions. In the first section a brief account is given of the circumstances out of which concerns for more explicit systematic methods for the assessment of the conservation value of different areas arose. The second section details the emergence of the principle of complementarity in four independent contexts. The third section consists of case studies of the use of the principle of complementarity to make practical policy decisions in Australasia, Africa, and America. In the last section, an assessment is made of the extent to which the principle of complementarity transformed the practice of conservation biology by introducing new standards of rigor and explicitness.

Buying into conservation: intrinsic versus instrumental value.

Many conservation biologists believe the best ethical basis for conserving natural entities is their claimed intrinsic value, not their instrumental value for humans. But there is significant confusion about what intrinsic value is and how it could govern conservation decision making. After examining what intrinsic value is supposed to be, we argue that it cannot guide the decision making conservation requires. An adequate ethical basis for conservation must do this, and instrumental value does it best.

Influence of Representation Targets on the Total Area of Conservation‐Area Networks

Systematic conservation planning typically requires specification of quantitative representation targets for biodiversity surrogates such as species, vegetation types, and environmental parameters. Targets are usually specified either as the minimum total area in a conservation-area network in which a surrogate must be present or as the proportion of a surrogates existing spatial distribution required to be in the network. Because the biological basis for setting targets is often unclear, a better understanding of how targets affect selection of conservation areas is needed. We studied how the total area of conservation-area networks depends on percentage targets ranging from 5% to 95%. We analyzed 12 data sets of different surrogate distributions from 5 regions: Korea, Mexico, Québec, Queensland, and West Virginia. To assess the effect of spatial resolution on the target-area relationship, we also analyzed each data set at 7 spatial resolutions ranging from 0.01 degrees x 0.01 degrees to 0.10 degrees x 0.10 degrees. Most of the data sets showed a linear relationship between representation targets and total area of conservation-area networks that was invariant across changes in spatial resolution. The slope of this relationship indicated how total area increased with target level, and our results suggest that greater surrogate representation requires significantly more area. One data set exhibited a highly nonlinear relationship. The results for this data set suggest a new method for setting targets on the basis of the functional form of target-area relationships. In particular, the method shows how the target-area relationship can provide a rationale for setting targets solely on the basis of distributional information about surrogates.

Ecological and Lyapunov Stability

Ecologists have proposed several incompatible definitions of ecological stability. Emulating physicists, mathematical ecologists commonly define it as Lyapunov stability. This formalizes the problematic concept by integrating it into a well‐developed mathematical theory. The formalization also seems to capture the intuition that ecological stability depends on how ecological systems respond to perturbation. Despite these advantages, this definition is flawed. Although Lyapunov stability adequately characterizes perturbation responses of many systems studied in physics, it does not for ecological systems. This failure reveals a limitation of its underlying mathematical theory, and an important difference between dynamic systems modeling in physics and ecology.

Qualitative Scientific Modeling and Loop Analysis

Loop analysis is a method of qualitative modeling anticipated by Sewall Wright (1921) and systematically developed by Richard Levins. In Levins’ (1966) distinctions between modeling strategies, loop analysis sacrifices precision for generality and realism. Besides criticizing the clarity of these distinctions, Orzack and Sober (1993) argued qualitative modeling is conceptually and methodologically problematic. Loop analysis of the stability of ecological communities shows this criticism is unjustified. It presupposes an overly narrow view of qualitative modeling and underestimates the broad role models play in scientific research, especially in helping scientists represent and understand complex systems.

X-Phi and Carnapian Explication

The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains.

The Elusive Basis of Inferential Robustness

Robustness concepts are often invoked to manage two obstacles confronting models of ecological systems: complexity and uncertainty. The intuitive idea is that any result derived from many idealized but credible models is thereby made more reliable or is better confirmed. An appropriate basis for this inference has proven elusive. Here, several representations of robustness analysis are vetted, paying particular attention to complex models of ecosystems and the global climate. The claim that robustness is itself confirmatory because robustness analysis employs a Bayesian variety-of-evidence argument is criticized, but recent overwhelming pessimism about robustness may have a silver lining.

Voting systems for environmental decisions.

Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality, among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the ground rules for operation of a group. Sistemas de Votación para Decisiones Ambientales Resumen Los sistemas de votación agregan preferencias eficientemente y muy seguido se usan para decidir prioridades de conservación. Las características deseables de un sistema de votación incluyen la transitividad, lo completo que sean y la optimalidad de Pareto, entre otras. Los sistemas de votación que son comunes y potencialmente útiles para la toma de decisiones ambientales incluyen simple mayoría, aprobación y votación preferencial. Desafortunadamente, ningún sistema de votación puede garantizar un resultado y a la vez satisfacer un rango de criterios de desempeño muy razonable. Además, los métodos de votación pueden manipularse por los que toman las decisiones y votantes estratégicos si tienen el conocimiento de los patrones de votación y de las alianzas entre miembros dentro de las poblaciones votantes. Las propiedades difíciles de los sistemas de votación sobresalen en las tomas de decisiones rutinarias cuando hay criterios múltiples y alternativas de manejo. Ya que ambos métodos tienen fallas, no apoyamos a uno sobre el otro. En lugar de esto le pedimos urgentemente a los organizadores ser transparentes con respecto a las propiedades de los sistemas de votación y ofrecer a los participantes la oportunidad de aprobar el sistema de votación como parte de las reglas básicas para la operación de un grupo.

Methodological Individualism in Ecology

Methodological individualism has a long, successful, and controversial track record in the social sciences. Its record in ecology is much shorter but proving as successful and controversial with so-called individual-based models. Distinctions and debates about methodological individualism in social sciences clarify the commitments of this general, individualistic approach to modeling ecological phenomena and show that there is a lot recommending it. In particular, a representational priority on individual organisms yields a cogent albeit deflationary account of ecological emergence and helps reveal how quite disparate models and theories in ecology might be unified.

The crucial but underrepresented role of philosophy in conservation science curricula: Conservation Philosophy

Article impact statement: Normative scientists must be trained in current thinking of the philosophy that underlies their fields, an issue not fully realized in conservation.