James Larry Taulbee

Reflections on the mercenary option

Throughout recorded history mercenary soldiers have appeared as central players in organised warfare in the Western world. Contemporary discussions and analysis tend to be coloured either by assumptions about mercenary character and performance which stem from an idealised picture of the relationship between citizenship and military obligation in the twentieth century or by the romantic illusions created by popular culture. These assumptions along with the ‘politics of definition’ often form the backdrop for analyses of the use and performance of mercenary troops in other eras as well. A clear evaluation of mercenary performance requires avoiding a priori presumptions that automatically relegate all employment of mercenaries to the status of a second best option.

The privatization of security: Modern conflict, globalization and weak states

Privatized Defense Service Providers (PDSPs) have emerged as a firmly entrenched feature of contemporary international politics. Placing blame on PDSPs for the woes associated with state disintegration in Africa mistakes symptoms for causes. Failure to establish strong institutional foundations and professional armies when foreign aid resources were more plentiful has undermined the ability of states to respond to the challenges posed by guerrilla insurgencies that proliferated in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Caught between the old anti‐intervention norm, the new permeability of their borders, demands for reform and disinterest on the part of former sponsors, regimes under stress have limited options. PDSPs do not necessarily provide the answer to the problems generated. Assertions of possibilities tend to outpace capabilities and ignore political limitations. In terms of regulation, national legislation,not a new international convention is the appropriate response.

Contributions and Challenges

In the previous chapters, we have maintained that traditional theories cannot account for Norway’s sustained and active involvement in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Using a Constructivist conceptual framework, the first three chapters analyzed Norway’s peace policy priority by identifying the assumptions that underpin its approach and by providing a multifaceted explanation for its existence. Geostrategic position, wealth from North Sea oil production, and a sea change in the structure of the international system after the Cold War afforded myriad opportunities for a broad Nor wegian commitment to peacemaking and peacebuilding based upon important elements that underlie Norwegian perceptions of their identity (self-image). The essential question addressed is why Norway chose to become actively and deeply engaged in sustained peacemaking and peacebuilding endeavors when it clearly had other options.

Mercenaries and citizens: A comparison of the armies of Carthage and Rome

Analysts of the Punic Wars often implicitly contrast the citizen forces of Rome with the mercenary forces of Carthage as if the difference had an impact on the eventual outcome. A systematic comparison of the two armies will show that presumptions of strengths and weaknesses conveyed by the labels had little to do with the situation on the battlefield when the armies met. In the end, Carthage lost the first two wars because of bad policy choices, not because she relied on mercenaries.

Sri Lanka: A Bridge Too Far?

We have argued that Norway’s distinctive approach to peacemaking and peacebuilding rests on five basic factors: a domestic consensus that permits long-term sustained commitments to peace building and peacemaking efforts, multilateralism, a reputation for impartiality and discretion, “ground truth”/local knowledge provided by local nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners, and parallel peace processes (see chapter 3). Of major initiatives undertaken by Norway over the last 20 years, Sri Lanka stands as an outlier with respect to several factors that comprise what has become known as the Norwegian “policy of engagement.”1 The mission did fit well with the idea of Norway as the “humanitarian great power.”2 Unlike earlier engagements where Norway worked behind the scenes, leaving the public diplomacy to other engaged countries and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), Norway publicly took the lead as principal sponsor of the negotiation process. This placed Norway and the process directly in the spotlight. Rather than secrecy, activities were subjected to constant media coverage. Active facilitation became the principal mode rather than serving as a backdrop—that is, as a more private exercise in support of a broader public process.

The Peace Engagement of a Peace Culture: Observations on the National Identity Foundations of Norwegian Foreign Policy

Situated on the geographical periphery as Europe’s northernmost country, Norway is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy, and a wealthy oil exporter, with a population of five million. In many ways, it is an unlikely candidate to be a worldwide peace promoter. Nonetheless, in the early post-Cold War period, Norway assumed a famously central role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and has subsequently engaged in peace facilitation in Colombia, Guatemala, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, as well as peacebuilding efforts elsewhere, notably, in Sudan, East Timor, Haiti, Ethiopia, and Nepal.

Successful Local Peacebuilding in Macedonia

Norway has a comprehensive approach in carrying out its peace policy. Norwegians not only engage in peacemaking, as documented in the previous two chapters, but they also continue their commitment by supporting post-agreement peacebuilding. Often, this takes the form of local development projects that engage people from polarized groups in deeply divided societies. Two schools in Macedonia provide an example of Norway’s support for intercommunity peacebuilding. The Nansen Primary and Secondary Schools are located in Macedonia’s Jegunovce Municipality—an area involved in the 2001 civil war. The schools enable local Macedonian and Albanian children to experience an integrated education—highly noteworthy because it flourishes amid segregated schooling for Macedonian- and Albanian-speaking children.

Parallel Peace Processes in Achieving Sudan’s CPA

Norway contributed significantly to the process that culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005 by representatives of Sudan’s government (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement aimed to end the North-South civil war that began when Sudan become independent from Great Britain in 1956 and had continued, with only a few years’ hiatus, from 1972 to 1983.1 The first serious attempt to achieve a peace agreement occurred in the 1980s, ending in 1989 when a military coup established the fundamentalist National Islamic Front government under General Bashir. Having continued to the present, this government signed the CPA only after changed circumstances and a long, concerted, coordinated effort by all relevant international actors including the United States. This chapter describes the process.

Lesser States and Niche Diplomacy

For many good reasons, international relations theory (and diplomatic history) has primarily focused upon the largest and most powerful states. Theorists have concisely stated the rationale: The great powers have utility for the system—they define it and uphold it by their very existence. On the other hand, in functional terms the system has no particular use for the smaller units. Their survival is theoretically and perhaps ethically justifiable—but the international system has no function for them; it is indifferent to their presence or absence.2

Norway’s Approach to Achieving Peace: Structure and Agency

As one of the globally engaged middle rank states, Norway has attracted increasing attention due to its effective engagement in particular peace processes. Speeches by successive policy makers have consistently, throughout decades and changes in government,1 declared that peace is an important Norwegian foreign policy priority. Both center-left and center-right governments in Norway have determined that they can bring focused and, thus, significant value-added support to addressing violent international conflicts in deeply divided states. In spite of Norway’s remoteness and small population—perhaps, because of these factors—Norwegians have become deeply embedded in multiple peace efforts, often with noteworthy results. Therefore, a focus on attributes of Norway’s approach can provide a useful model for analyzing responses to one of the world community’s intractable issues.