Thomas D. Lancaster

Toward a methodology for the comparative study of political corruption

Robust explanations of political corruption demand that research progresses beyond purely theoretical analyses and single case studies. In this article, we highlight problems of definition, operationalization and measurement of corruption that have restricted the number of truly comparative, empirical studies of the phenomenon. We suggest a few steps that might help researchers overcome methodological obstacles in their study of corruption. We introduce and evaluate one example of how the phenomenon might be comparatively operationalized and measured. While not beyond criticism, the corruption index we present will undoubtedly help light new avenues toward more comprehensive explanations of comparative political corruption.

Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics

Pork barrel politics is a particular type of constituency service through which a legislators geographic constituency benefits from the distribution of public works projects. The desire for reelection prompts a representative to use his influence to initiate local projects. A comparative model is presented, causally linking a countrys electoral system with the de gree of pork barrel activity. Most literature has focused disproportionately on the United States. This model suggests that the electoral accountability linkage is strongest in coun tries with single-member districts and weakest in those with at-large districts. The articles central argument is that a strong correlation exists between the number of representatives per district and the degree of pork barrel politics. Factors such as committee structure and party discipline are also considered.

Comparative Political Corruption: Issues of Operationalization and Measurement*

As with other areas of comparative political inquiry, analyses of political corruption must carefully negotiate around numerous methodological issues. In this article, we focus primarily on problems of operationalization and measurement of corruption. We evaluate the major examples of cross-country measures of corruption that have recently emerged and review research that has incorporated the new measures. We end with a discussion of an alternative method for the cross-national measurement and analysis of corruption, one that might also facilitate the goal of establishing universal principles and causal claims about political corruption.

Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952-1984

Except for bivariate analyses, previous research on the group basis of partisan strength in the United States has focused on party identification as the dependent variable. This essay examines the group basis of the presidential vote, 1952-1984, using a multivariate logit approach. Our multivariate analysis shows the persistence of group-based divisions between Republican and Democratic voters. Among other patterns, class-based divisions have noticeably increased.

The Spanish Voter: Tradition, Economics, Ideology

Not much is known about the fundamentals of electoral behavior in the new Spanish democracy. Therefore, we attempt to uncover the contours of two basic dimensions: political involvement and vote choice. Utilizing data from a special 1984 Euro-Barometer survey, we suggest that Spanish political involvement is low, both absolutely and relatively, primarily because of the recent socialization to democratic norms. With regard specifically to the national vote choice, we demonstrate that traditional social cleavage explanations perform poorly, in comparison to more current explanations stressing long-term ideological attachments or intermediate-term economic concerns. However, taken together, these three factors--cleavages, ideology, economics--manage a good accounting of national vote choice in contemporary Spain.

Regional Vote Support: The Spanish Case

Beyond simple description, not much is known about voting for regional parties in Western Europe, despite their importance in many political systems. Certainly, efforts to explain systematically a voters general preference for a regional rather than a national party are virtually nonexistent. This paper seeks to rectify that neglect, focusing on the Spanish case, where voting for regional parties is quite prominent. Following a brief description of the regional parties in Spain and some theoretical analysis from a comparative perspective, we propose and then test with recent survey data three different hypotheses about regional versus national party support. We find that certain sociocultural cleavages, plus economic issues, directly motivate regional vote intention in Spain. In addition, we conclude that political involvement in general and concern over the European Community in particular, indirectly influence regional-national party preferences. On the basis of these multivariate results, we formulate a two-equation model to account for regional party support.

The Spanish general elections of 2015 and 2016: a new stage in democratic politics?

The 11th (in 2015) and 12th (in 2016) general elections under the Constitution of 1978 ushered Spain into a new stage of democratic governance. The first stage included the transitional election of 1977, which facilitated constitutional development and ratification, and, in 1979, the first general election under the new constitution. Both elections produced governments led by Adolfo Suárez (Democratic Centre Union, UCD), and did so with little difficulty in government formation despite many transition-imposed hurdles. The dominance of left-of-centre governments under the Socialists’ (PSOE) Felipe González characterised the second stage, which included Spain’s general elections of 1982, 1986, 1989, and 1993 (Lancaster 1994). The third stage contained healthy alternations of power, with the right-of-centre Popular Party (PP) winning the general elections of 1996 and 2000 under José Mariá Azar, the PSOE returning to power in 2004 and 2008 with José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and the PP resuming power in 2011 under Mariano Rajoy’s leadership (Kennedy 2012). The general elections of December 2015 and June 2016 pushed Spain into a new electoral stage, a fourth phase in which government formation proved to be quite difficult over a long period of time but one ultimately producing an often seen outcome – a minority government led by one of Spain’s two larger political parties. Two common threads ran through Spain’s general elections prior to this new stage. First, democratic Spain essentially operated as a functional two-party system in its first 11 general elections despite the presence in the Congress of Deputies of many smaller parties, together reflecting the dual dimensionality of Spanish politics – a traditional left–right ideological cleavage and a central state–regional, ethnic, and national divide. This functional two-party system meant either a moderate right or a moderate left party formed the government (initially the UCD with the PSOE as the main party in opposition and later competition between the PSOE and the PP); these two parties were the only two at the centre of all government formations following the demise of the

Economics, democracy, and Spanish elections

The argument is advanced that economic conditions have played an important role in Spanish elections but, until recently, one secondary to the establishment of democracy itself. First, the Spanish economys development at the time of these elections and the Spanish publics response to it are considered. Next, Spains three national elections and significant economic policy activities and conditions are analyzed. Unemployment is then considered as the central economic influence on recent Spanish elections. Finally, Spains politics of consensus is presented as an explanation for the initial lack of influence of economic conditions on elections.

Independent Regulatory Authorities as Mechanisms of Political Monitoring

This article argues that the study of political monitoring can be used to help situate the study of independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). Building upon previous work on the management of common pool resources and other literature on monitoring as a component of governance in larger systems, it looks broadly at liberal democracies’ use of IRAs as monitoring mechanisms. Identifying fundamental concepts and theoretical components in the study of political monitoring, this article argues that they can be used as a lens through which policy analysts can observe and compare IRAs, and thus move beyond descriptive analysis. While focusing on monitoring, as one of the functions of IRAs, it highlights theoretical concerns about how to best institutionalise policy-implementation mechanisms, especially in the area of market interventions and the governance of public goods.

Book Review: Force & marriage: The criminalisation of forced marriage in Dutch, English, and international criminal law

pendent research project or whether the book presents the accumulation of experience and knowledge from the author’s almost 30 years of living and working in Lambeth. Generalizability being hard to assess also has to do with Harding’s approach to existing gang research. The author places himself firmly within one corner of the research field and offers harsh words on other parts of the field. This is a pity as some of the issues raised in the Eurogang research network are most relevant to Harding’s study. Especially, it seems that the study would have benefited from the Eurogang focus on acquiring a totality of data rather than focusing on the gangs that are the most in focus of practitioners and media. For instance, Harding states that White people are underrepresented in gangs in Lambeth. As the method of gathering data and of assessing gang membership are not presented, a reader familiar with U.S. self-report studies is left to wonder whether this is a result of the facts of the field or of the method used. The summary and analysis of previous gang research have had a somewhat acerbic taste and some surprising information. For instance, the author interprets Aldridge & Medina’s report from Research City (2008) as stating that gangs do not exist in general—rather than as stating results for the city in question. Harding also chooses to sidestep the issue of how to define a gang, referring to the revised Miller’s (1992) definition but without further operationalization, for instance, of membership, structure, or leadership. This becomes confusing, when the author later quotes ‘‘independent operators’’ as well as ‘‘gang members’’. Throughout the book, Black gang members are referred to as ‘‘West African’’ or ‘‘African Caribbean,’’ even if the author made it clear that respondents culturally identify with being British and that their parents’ origin does not seem to have much influence on gang life. The Street Casino has been awarded the 2014 Frederick Milton Thrasher award for Superior Gang Research. The prize was awarded by a nonprofit independent agency called the National Gang Crime Research Center, which should not be confused with the National Gang Center (United States). The Street Casino provides an interesting account of gang crime in Lambeth, which is useful for practitioners who would like to find words for their own experience. This reviewer may use excerpts for teaching purposes at the undergraduate level but also sees obstacles to using the book as a whole, especially due to the lack of transparency in the methodology used and the somewhat biased resume of previous gang research. The book could be useful at the graduate level to illustrate different areas of gang research and also provide inspiration for students and researchers when formulating research questions and hypotheses. Overall, The Street Casino presents itself as an initial theoretical framework based on extensive field experience, which still remains to be tested on a totality of data and with an open, inquisitive mind.