James M. Acheson

The Tragedy of the Commons: twenty-two years later

Hardins Tragedy of the Commons model predicts the eventual overexploitation or degradation of all resources used in common. Given this unambiguous prediction, a surprising number of cases exist in which users have been able to restrict access to the resource and establish rules among themselves for its sustainable use. To assess the evidence, we first define common-property resources and present a taxonomy of property-rights regimes in which such resources may be held. Evidence accumulated over the last twenty-two years indicates that private, state, andcommunal property are all potentially viable resource management options. A more complete theory than Hardins should incorporate institutional arrangements and cultural factors to provide for better analysis and prediction.

The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the maine lobster industry

Lobstermen from each community along the coast of central Maine claim inshore fishing rights in particular areas. Although their claims are unrecognized by the state, they are well established and backed by surreptitious violence. Two kinds of lobstering territories exist, here termed “nucleated” and “perimeterdefended,” which differ essentially in the extent to which exclusive fishing rights are maintained. These differences in territorial organization affect the fishing effort of lobstermen, which in turn has a strong biological and economic impact.

Chaos, complexity and community management of fisheries

For several decades, fisheries management has been based on stock recruitment models, leading to policies designed to control the amount of effort and the quantity of fish caught. This approach has not been notably successful. In this paper we take the view that this problem arises from the complex and likely chaotic nature of fisheries. This attribute of fisheries creates a very difficult and costly information problem, which renders attempts to control the long term numerical abundance of individual species virtually impossible. We argue that feasible management must address the relatively stable parameters of fisheries systems habitat and basic biological processes, and that this demands management attention to the fine as well as the broad scale attributes of the system. Attention to detail at these differing scales implies the need for a layered or hierarchical management structure. The need to minimize Information costs also suggests an emphasis on decentrallzed, community-based approaches to management. A review of the anthropological literature shows that such approaches are common in many societies.

Bust and Then Boom in the Maine Lobster Industry: Perspectives of Fishers and Biologists

Abstract The Maine industry for American lobster Homarus americanus has gone from a period of very low catches in the 1920s and 1930s (“the bust”) to a period of “boom” marked by record high catches in the 1990s. Fishers and biologists working for state and federal agencies emphasize different variables in explaining the bust and the boom. What they see as the facts have strong implications for the management of the fishery. Both fishers and biologists believe that a combination of fishing practices and environmental variables have caused the changes in lobster catches observed. However, biologists tend to emphasize the importance of fishing effort and water temperature. Fishers believe that lobster populations have been strongly affected by the way people fish (i.e., by the amount of illegal activity, by restrictions on size and taking of breeding females, etc.), and environmental factors, including predation on lobsters by groundfish, changes in habitat, and what they term “natural cycles.” As a result,...

The Politics of Managing the Maine Lobster Industry: 1860 to the Present

Marine fisheries are in a state of crisis. One of the few successfully managed fisheries is the Maine lobster industry where catches are at an all time high. An important factor in this success is the effectiveness of regulations which were developed during three periods over the course of the past 125 years. In all cases, the regulations are the result of heavy lobbying activity by various factions in the industry. Both strong commercial rivalry and genuine concern for the well-being of the lobster resource played a role in generating these regulations. However, history did not repeat itself. In each period, the players, circumstances, and goals were very different. The result, however, is a set of effective regulations which are largely self-enforcing.

Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry

Although territoriality of one kind or another is found in every society, our understanding of the way territorial systems come into being remains undeveloped. In this article, we use game theory to understand the evolution of institutional arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery. Nash equilibrium of models explains the three stages observed in the local-scale informal system of the past century. These stages are the result of decisions to invade or defend territorial lines that have changed over the course of time in response to a number of factors, including adoption of better technology, transportation costs, ecological changes, ability to organize defensive and offensive groups, and better law enforcement - all captured by crucial parameters of our model. We explore the broader implications of this industry study, especially the issues it raises for rational choice theory and the generation of institutions and norms.

Clearcutting Maine: Implications for the Theory of Common Property Resources

One of the basic tenets of the theory of common property resources is that private property rights work to conserve natural resources. There is growing evidence, however, that some large forest owners in Maine are cutting their forests heavily, using poor-quality silviculture techniques. This overexploitation is being done by paper companies, forest contractors, and some private land owners, who are being motivated by very different sets of factors. This article explores the reasons that private owners of forest resources are overexploiting their own lands and the implications of this for the theory of common property resources. Secure private property rights alone will not be enough to conserve resources and do away with externalities when the owners are operating in a system demanding constant short-term profits, where they are producing undifferentiated commodities in a highly competitive market, where the future value of slow-growing resources is very low, and where harvesting has so many ramifying biological and social effects.

The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch Practice: Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The Maine lobster industry is experiencing record high catches because, in all probability, of an effective management program. One of the most important conservation measures is the V-notch program that allows fishermen to conserve proven breeding females by notching the tails of egg-bearing lobsters. Such marked lobsters may never be taken. Although thousands of lobster fishermen participate, it is a voluntary practice. The genesis of this practice is not easily explained, because V-notching poses a prisoners dilemma problem that gives fishermen an incentive to avoid the practice. The most common explanations for ways to overcome prisoners dilemma problems will not work in the case of the V-notch. An unusual combination of factors explains the V-notch program: (1) a strong belief among those in the industry that the V-notch is effective in conserving the lobster stock; (2) a low discount rate because the long-term gains from V-notching are higher than the one-time gain from defection; (3) a gain in reputation for those who V-notch. At the start of the 20th century, fishermen did not V-notch; by the end of the century, V-notching was common. We explain the change in strategies using a three-parameter evolutionary model that emphasizes the importance of culture change.

Individual transferable quotas and conservation: a critical assessment

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have become a popular management tool for fisheries. They have been promoted in some quarters and seriously criticized in others because of their social and economic impacts. A more serious problem is that ITQs provide exclusive access to public resources presumably in return for some public benefit, namely conservation; however, in a high percentage of cases they do not conserve fish stocks. In this article, we focus on the reasons that ITQs do not conserve stocks. We point to a number of phenomena identified in the literature as affecting stocks of fish, including problems with total allowable catch (TAC), ecological hierarchy theory, r and K species, the Allee effect, scale and metapopulation structure, the need to have selective gear, and the continuation of roving bandit incentives. Despite their growing popularity with managers, ITQs do not solve any of these problems. We argue there may be better ways to manage. One possibility is what we call parametric management.

Confounding the Goals of Management: Response of the Maine Lobster Industry to a Trap Limit

Abstract The behavior of fishermen is often far more complicated than assumed by fisheries managers. Those concerned with the Maine lobster (i.e., American lobster Homarus americanus hereafter “lobster”) fishery have long favored a cap on the number of traps each license holder can use. Fishermen favor trap limits primarily to cut costs and limit congestion, and managers believe such limits will help reduce fishing effort. Yet when trap limits were imposed by the legislature and the lobster zone councils between 1995 and 1998, the number of traps fished in Maine waters increased greatly. A survey of half the lobster license holders carried out in the summer and fall of 1998 revealed that the response of fishermen to trap limits was highly differential. Some fishermen reduced, but more increased, the number of traps they fished. A complicated set of variables influenced those decisions concerning trap numbers, including the regulatory environment, age and characteristics of the fishermen, relative economic...