James M. Dorsey

The politics of Indonesian and Turkish soccer: a comparative analysis

With soccer playing an increasingly important political role in both Turkey and Indonesia, this essay seeks to highlight similarities in the politics of soccer in two parts of the world that share cultural and political traits but are geographically distant from one another.

How Qatar is Its Own Worst Enemy

Qatar is proving to be its own worst enemy in achieving its soft power goals by embedding itself in the international community as a good citizen despite having put crucial blocks in place. Its failure to convincingly follow through on promises to reform its controversial migrant labour system could lead to world soccer body FIFA depriving it of the right to host the 2022 World Cup. Meanwhile, Qatar has been unable to convince even its allies that it is serious about its pledges to stop a flow of funds to jihadist organizations. Among Qatari nationals whom the US Treasury has categorized as specially designated terrorist is a historian religion and former head of the Qatar Football Association (QFA), who was awarded for his contribution to Qatari sports. Those allegations have allowed Qatars detractors to further question the Gulf states suitability as a World Cup host. Qatars problems are compounded by its lack of a robust communications strategy that would enable it to respond to legitimate criticism and counter attacks by its detractors, some of whom have invested significant amounts in causing Qatar significant reputational damage and diplomatic and political capital. That lack dates back to Qatars initial response to massive criticism and attacks almost immediately after it was awarded the World Cup in late 2010. Qatari officials argued at the time that they could not win the public relations battle and therefore would wait until the storm blew over (Multiple interviews with Qatari officials in the period from 2011 to 2014). They rejected the notion that failure to engage amounted to surrender of the battlefield, losing an opportunity to conquer the moral high ground, and allowing a wound to fester (Multiple interviews by the author with Qatari officials between 2011 and 2014). The problem was the storm did not subside. It got worse with Qatar currently battling public relations battles on numerous fronts: persistent challenges to the integrity of its World Cup bid; accusations of enforcing modern slavery on migrant workers employed on World Cup-related projects; doubts about its ability to host one of the worlds foremost mega sporting events; charges of funding and supporting militant Islamist groups; and adopting a foreign policy that puts it at odds with its neighbours and at times with its most important allies.

China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom

Abstract: China’s increasingly significant economic and security interests in the Middle East have several impacts. It affects not only its energy security but also its regional posture, relations with regional powers as well as the US, and efforts to pacify its north-western region of Xinjiang. Those interests are considerably enhanced by China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative” that seeks to patch together a Eurasian land mass through inter-linked infrastructure, investment and expanded trade relations. Protecting its mushrooming interests is forcing China to realign its policies and relationships in the region.Abstract:China’s increasingly significant economic and security interests in the Middle East have several impacts. It affects not only its energy security but also its regional posture, relations with regional powers as well as the US, and efforts to pacify its north-western region of Xinjiang. Those interests are considerably enhanced by China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative” that seeks to patch together a Eurasian land mass through inter-linked infrastructure, investment and expanded trade relations. Protecting its mushrooming interests is forcing China to realign its policies and relationships in the region.

Soccer Versus Jihad A Draw

Stadia have reemerged as a preferred jihadist target. The Islamic State (IS) targeted a friendly soccer match between France and Germany in its November 2015 attacks in Paris. (Martinez, 2015) German police said days later that they had foiled a plot against a stadium in the German city of Hannover barely an hour before the German national team was scheduled to play. Similarly, Belgium cancelled a friendly soccer match against Spain (Ryan, 2015). The list of targeted stadia is long. It dates back to an Al-Qaeda plan to strike against the 1998 World Cup and includes sporting grounds in among others Iraq and Nigeria. The targeting of stadia spotlights jihadists’ often convoluted relationship to soccer. Many jihadists see soccer as an infidel invention designed to distract the faithful from fulfilling their religious obligations. Yet others are soccer fans or former, failed or disaffected players who see the sport as an effective recruitment and bonding tool. Men like Osama Bin Laden, Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh, and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah base their advocacy of the utility of soccer on those Salafi and mainstream Islamic scholars who argue that the Prophet Mohammed advocated physical exercise to maintain a healthy body as opposed to more militant students of Islam who at best seek to rewrite the rules of the game to Islamicize it, if not outright ban the sport. Self-declared IS Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi embodies the jihadists’ double-edged attitude toward soccer. A passionate player in his pre-IS days (McCant, 2015) Al-Baghdadi’s IS and its affiliates take credit for scores of attacks on stadia. A successful attack on a major soccer match in Europe would go a long way to achieve IS’s goals of polarizing communities, exacerbating social tensions, and driving the marginalized further into the margins. In targeting the sport and stadia, jihadists focus on the world’s most popular form of popular culture and the one fixture that evokes the kind of deep-seated emotion capable of rivalling passions associated with religion and sectarianism. Yet the relationship between militant Islam and soccer is one that has barely been researched by scholars in multiple disciplines, including Islamic, Middle Eastern, and sports studies. This article constitutes a first stab at trying to fill the gap.

Towards a New World Order

The twenty-first century’s Great Game is about the creation of a new Eurasia-centred world. It locks China, Russia, India, Japan, and Europe into what is an epic battle. The United States under President Donald J. Trump is a joker in the game as its foreign policy evolves in fits and starts. Middle Eastern rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran locked into a bitter battle for regional hegemony, are key players too.

The United States and China: Seeking Complementary Approaches

The formulation of China’s emerging Middle East and North Africa strategy is shaped as much by US predicaments in the region as it is by the twenty-first century’s Great Game, the high-stakes battle for the future of Eurasia. Power, influence, geopolitics, and economics rather than ideology drive US-Chinese rivalry as well as the Great Game.

Pakistan: The Belt and Road’s Soft Underbelly

Straddling Pakistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan, Balochistan, a crown jewel in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative that links the Middle Kingdom’s restive Xinjiang region to the Gulf, has been sucked into the vortex of Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a launching pad for potential US-backed Saudi efforts to destabilize Iran. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran exploit long-standing regional grievances that are magnified by Chinese investment and employment policies in Balochistan.

The Middle East: Testing the Boundaries of Non-interference

Chinese denials notwithstanding, Beijing’s insistence on non-interference in the domestic affairs of others is a de facto policy akin to the United States’ emphasis on stability in the Middle East and North Africa at the expense of liberal American values. It is a policy for which the United States, Europe, and the international community have paid dearly given that it enabled the violent and often brutal undercurrents of change that are sweeping the Middle East and North Africa as well as the emergence of jihadism, forces that increasingly also threaten Chinese interests.

Long Live the Autocrat and Neo-Colonialism

China’s setbacks serve as evidence that One Belt, One Road’s success depends on popular buy-in from countries involved. Reinforcing authoritarian governance, including stepped-up surveillance and Chinese influence in national media, was ultimately likely to backfire. Stability as a pre-condition for the success of One Belt, One Road is likely to be best achieved by transparency and ensuring that everyone has a stake in the project rather than secrecy and increased authoritarianism.

Navigating Regional Rivalries and Sensitivities

China’s desire to avoid being bogged down and mired in the Middle East and North Africa’s numerous wars, conflicts, disputes, and animosities is proving to be a gargantuan, if not impossible, task. Complicating its efforts is the spread of Saudi-inspired Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism in China among both Uyghurs in Xinjiang and more mainstream Hui Muslims. Chinese concern that Saudi Arabia is supporting Salafism in China is one of several potential drivers that could push China to tilt towards Iran despite its declared neutrality in the power struggle between the two regional heavyweights.