Leonard C. Sebastian

Taking Stock of Military Reform in Indonesia

Can we assert that military reform in Indonesia has come to a standstill? Since the downfall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesian military is by no means in a weak position. The military may no longer be the leading actor in national politics, but has pragmatically incorporated a strategy enabling it to play a “behind the scenes” role (Sebastian, 2007). Having abolished the “dual-function” doctrine that legitimated military engagement in socio-political affairs, the armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) leadership has placed more emphasis on transforming its institutional profile and improving its human rights record. Civilian politicians have compromised the process of reform. Far from depoliticizing the military, President Abdurrahman Wahid sought to marshal military support against the Indonesian parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) moving to impeach him due to his involvement in high profile corruption cases. In early 2001, he proposed to TNI high-command that a state of emergency be declared to enable him to dissolve the DPR. The proposal, however, was rejected by a military leadership aware that any overt political involvement on their part would be counterproductive to their efforts to restore the TNI’s public image. Meanwhile, during Megawati’s presidency, the counterinsurgency operation in Aceh had given new impetus for TNI to take on a greater role in internal security in the guise of “military operations other than war” thereby signalling the end of attempts by post-Suharto military reformers to limit their function purely to external defense.

The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy

Introduction On 5 April 2004 Indonesia held its second democratic general election in the post-Soeharto era, inaugurating what will be the first leg of a series of elections utilizing a new system, which most Indonesians hope will breathe new life and stimulate change in a political structure deemed by many to be ineffectual as the promising advent of reformasi in 1998 gave way to the troubling reality of democratic consolidation, giving rise to prophecies of doom by security analysts speculating whether the Indonesian state could survive. (1) The proposition that democracy is an unattainable goal in multi-ethnic states, particularly in linguistically divided countries, is not new. (2) Similarly, there are those who point to the hypothesized link between the level of socio-economic development and stable democracy, making the case that democracy cannot thrive in an environment characterized by widespread poverty and illiteracy. (3) Likewise, many security analysts would be hard-pressed to explain the puzzling contradiction between Indonesias high level of political violence since 1998 and its success at sustaining a democratic political system. Indeed the Indonesian paradox is explained better using the assumption that democracy is possible in deeply divided societies if the type of democracy practiced is consociational, (4) defined by Lijphart to consist of the following characteristics: * grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups; * cultural autonomy for these groups; * proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments; and * a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy. (5) While the Indonesian case is by no means perfect, the practice of reformasi since the fall of the Soeharto regime has exhibited the above characteristics in varying forms through the power-sharing arrangements that constituted the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati governments respectively. Moreover, there has been significantly a plethora of legislation on decentralization in 2001, that have been moderating a unitary system of government that was asymmetrical in favour of Jakarta, consequently empowering local initiative at the district (kabupaten) level. Indeed in analysing the 2004 general elections and the coalition building process leading up to the presidential elections, the major premise in this article is that the consociational dimensions of post-Soeharto Indonesian politics have contributed significantly to the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. At the apex of the political structure is a national political elite committed to reconciling differences through bargaining between themselves. Through the combination and political dominance of the four socio-political forces that constitute Indonesian politics, namely Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah and the inclusive nature of their politics, grand coalition cabinets with ministers belonging to all main religious, linguistic, and regional groups have become the norm and such inter-aliran (6) power-sharing arrangements coupled with prudent constructive leadership will ensure a political system that provides for widespread diffusion of power, significantly enhancing stability. (7) Election System The management of the 2004 elections proved to be a daunting prospect for the General Election Commission (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum): two or even three elections will be held between 5 April and 20 September 2004. With less than a year since the passage of the election laws on 8-9 July 2003, voters, election administrators and political parties have had to grapple with immense changes relating to the new frameworks for representation coupled with new structures for election administration. (8) The election framework is governed by conditions mandated by the Indonesian Constitution amended in 2001 and supported through a plethora of laws relating to political parties, the general elections, the presidential elections and the Constitutional Court. …

The politics of Indonesian and Turkish soccer: a comparative analysis

With soccer playing an increasingly important political role in both Turkey and Indonesia, this essay seeks to highlight similarities in the politics of soccer in two parts of the world that share cultural and political traits but are geographically distant from one another.

Assessing military reform in Indonesia

This article seeks to assess the magnitude of military reform in Indonesia and its impact in establishing greater levels of professionalism within the armed forces. To this end, the authors will offer some reflections on the studies of civil-military relations and military transformation for inculcating a higher degree of military professionalism; analyse to what extent the process of military reform in Indonesia has reshaped the institutional role of the armed forces; and discern three major strategic gaps in Indonesias military reform, namely the “legal loopholes and regulation vacuum,” the “shortcomings of democratic civilian control,” and the “defence-economic gap.” This article asserts that military professionalism will grow more substantially depending on the ability of civilian elites to exercise effective control over the military and the capacity of the government to transform the military establishment keeping pace with strategic challenges and operational requirements.

‘Consensual’ Regional Hegemony, Pluralist-Solidarist Visions, and Emerging Power Aspirations

Why should we view Indonesia as an emerging power? There are a range of indicators supporting Indonesia’s status in international affairs. In the late 1990s analysts referred to Indonesia as a pivotal state.1 The McKinsey Report on Indonesia in 2012 predicted that by 2030, it will become the world’s seventh largest economy.2 In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, Indonesia even outperformed the BRIC countries, attracting investors searching for new emerging investment markets. A report released on 6 March 2013 by the Boston Consulting Group3 made a case for the archipelagic state of 242 million people as a prime investment destination. Memorable excerpts from the report noted that: 1) Indonesia’s middle income and affluent classes will double by 2020 from 74 million to 141 million people and more than half the population (53 per cent) will qualify as middle class or richer; 2) Indonesians feel more financially secure than people in other BRIC countries (Thirty-one per cent of Indonesians surveyed reported feeling secure, compared with only 14 per cent of Chinese, 19 per cent of Indians, 15 per cent of Russians and 13 per cent of Brazilians); and 3) Indonesia’s middle class will become more dispersed and consequently, new cities will emerge beyond Jakarta as centers of wealth. Here, the total number of cities with more than a million middle-income earners will roughly double, from 12 cities to 22 in seven years (see Chapter 3). A further expectation is that Indonesia will enjoy a demographic dividend during 2020–30 when its productive age group—people between 15 and 64 years of age—maximizes their economic productivity, and dependency ratios are at their lowest levels.4

Ascending Indonesia: Significance and Conceptual Foundations

As Indonesia’s economy grows, it is increasingly being referred to as a rising middle power, and there is mounting speculation that Indonesia might eventually join the ranks of Asia’s great powers. Regardless of just how far Indonesia will rise, its government and the will of its people will become increasingly influential in terms of its regional leadership and the values and the norms Jakarta espouses. Such speculation raises questions as to the domestic opportunities and constraints that inform Indonesia’s rise, and how various domestic contexts affect Indonesia’s foreign policy and the values it espouses. Meanwhile, the image of Indonesia as an increasingly stable and democratic nation has contributed to its significant deepening of security ties with other nations such as Australia and the United States. But how might these ties be perceived across East Asia, and how might East Asian perceptions affect relations with those countries? Within Southeast Asia, what will the rise of a more independent and potentially assertive Indonesia mean for the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Will it serve to strengthen this body as Indonesia strengthens what many regard as its natural leadership role within ASEAN, or will it threaten ASEAN’s continued viability and strategic centrality as a more assertive and independent Indonesia opts increasingly to forge its global path independent of other regional nations? And what will Indonesia’s rise mean for the Asian balance of power more generally? Will the Indonesian archipelago, with its vital sea lanes for instance, become a theater for great power competition? Will a rising Indonesia substantially influence the Asian balance by allying with either the United States or China?

Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, Maritime Security and the Great Powers

As the pivotal state1 in Southeast Asia, Indonesia seeks to use maritime diplomacy to establish cooperative regional relationships as a means of achieving two objectives: first, to ensure its security wellbeing, and second; by actively resolving its border disputes—demonstrating its leadership credentials to mediate in interstate boundary disputes in the region.