James Maw

General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high wages, only good workers are retained. This signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically important feature) enhances efficiency. Appropriate subsidies enhance it further.

Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth in Transition Economies

We investigate the impact of differences in privatisation method on national economic performance in transition economies. Our approach is to estimate, using dynamic panel data methods, a growth equation over 23 countries for the period 1990-2001. Among our results, we find that mass privatisation has significant positive effect on growth across a wide variety of definitions and specifications. This result holds with particular force after 1995, i.e., once the period of early transition and recession was over. Our analysis suggests that an advantage of mass privatisation was that it led spontaneously to development of the capital market, which is significantly correlated with economic growth.

Partial privatization in transition economies

Abstract Privatization in transition countries has often been partial, with the state retaining a non-controlling ownership share in privatized assets. This paper reviews briefly the empirical evidence and then analyzes the justifications that have been put forward for adopting partial privatization. These are related to the objectives of economic efficiency and the generation of government revenue, as well as to political motivations. The issues covered are the stock-flow problem, risk-sharing and restructuring, informational considerations, the role of market structure, bargaining, foreign investment and the irreversibility of reform. The paper ends with some suggestions for further research.

A dual-process approach to exploring the role of delay discounting in obesity

Delay discounting of financial rewards has been related to overeating and obesity. Neuropsychological evidence supports a dual-system account of both discounting and overeating behaviour where the degree of impulsive decision making is determined by the relative strength of reward desire and executive control. A dual-parameter model of discounting behaviour is consistent with this theory. In this study, the fit of the commonly used one-parameter model was compared to a new dual-parameter model for the first time in a sample of adults with wide ranging BMI. Delay discounting data from 79 males and females (males=26) across a wide age (M=28.44years (SD=8.81)) and BMI range (M=25.42 (SD=5.16)) was analysed. A dual-parameter model (saturating-hyperbolic; Doya, [Doya (2008) ]) was applied to the data and compared on model fit indices to the single-parameter model. Discounting was significantly greater in the overweight/obese participants using both models, however, the two parameter model showed a superior fit to data (p<0.0001). The two parameters were shown to be related yet distinct measures consistent with a dual-system account of inter-temporal choice behaviour. The dual-parameter model showed superior fit to data and the two parameters were shown to be related yet distinct indices sensitive to differences between weight groups. Findings are discussed in terms of the impulsive reward and executive control systems that contribute to unhealthy food choice and within the context of obesity related research.