James R. Holmes

China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean

Abstract This article argues that an increasingly sea-power-minded China will neither shelter passively in coastal waters, nor throw itself into competition with the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Rather, Beijing will direct its energies toward South and Southeast Asia, where supplies of oil, natural gas, and other commodities critical to Chinas economic development must pass. There China will encounter an equally sea-power-minded India that enjoys marked geostrategic advantages. Beijing will likely content itself with ‘soft power’ diplomacy in these regions until it can settle the dispute with Taiwan, freeing up resources for maritime endeavors farther from Chinas coasts.

Strongman, Constable, or Free-Rider? India's “Monroe Doctrine” and Indian Naval Strategy

Many scholars assume that the European model of realpolitik will prevail in Asia as the dual rise of China and India reorders regional politics. Others predict that Asias China-centric tradition of hierarchy will reassert itself. But Indians look as much to nineteenth-century U.S. history as to any European or Asian model. Indeed, successive prime ministers explicitly cited the Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in hotspots around the Indian periphery. But the Monroe Doctrine underwent several phases during Americas rise to world power. These phases can help South Asia analysts project possible futures for Indian maritime strategy.

China's Way of Naval War: Mahan's Logic, Mao's Grammar

This article posits that Alfred Thayer Mahan supplies the “logic” of Chinese maritime strategy, urging Beijing to amass commercial and naval fleets, international commerce, and forward naval stations—the trappings of sea power. Mao Zedong provides the “grammar” by which the Peoples Liberation Army will prosecute naval operations offshore. The article ranks Wayne Hughess three generic models of fleet tactics according to Chinese strategic preferences, concluding that Chinese commanders incline to dispersed attack, sequential attack, and massed attack, in that order. By acquainting themselves with Chinese preferences, U.S. naval commanders can glimpse how this prospective naval adversary will wage war.

Japan's Emerging Maritime Strategy: Out of Sync or Out of Reach?

Japanese political and military leaders are allowing a gap between policy and maritime strategy to open, endangering the operational effectiveness of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Tokyo has come to recognize the diplomatic value of nontraditional military missions such as disaster response and humanitarian relief—witness its robust response to the 2004 tsunami. Such missions now represent a core task of the JMSDF. At the same time, Tokyo has left the full range of traditional missions in place without supplying additional resources. Japanese maritime strategy urgently needs to be clarified, keeping ends in balance with means.

An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian Ocean

Abstract We take aim at “offshore balancing,” a foreign-policy concept that has come into vogue in a United States beset by war weariness, a stagnant economy, and skyrocketing defense procurement costs. Retiring from continental Eurasia is an appealing prospect, but returning in times of systemic conflict would be problematic – even in the relatively accessible rimlands of Western Europe and East Asia. It verges on impossible in the remote, inaccessible Indian Ocean. As it turns out, offshore balancing in the Indian Ocean is no balancing at all.

The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Global Prohibition Regime in the Making?

In October 2003, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic and military services from the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany collaborated to track and divert the merchant ship BBC China, which was carrying a shipment of uranium centrifuge parts to Libya for use in Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program. American and British politicians touted the interdiction as a triumph for the newly minted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), asserting that it had constituted a critical factor impelling Libya to give up its weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programs. While the operation clearly kept certain centrifuge parts out of Libyan hands, however, it is less clear whether the interdiction was really the driving force in Libya’s overall decision that Western pronouncements claimed. Indeed, considerable debate has ensued over which factors account for the Libyan government’s turnaround. Citing the BBC China affair, the US government has nonetheless hailed the PSI as an example of “effective multilateralism”. This one very public example and the attendant claim that the initiative is “effective” ought to provide some basis for analyzing this new, relatively unique, undertaking in multilateral diplomacy dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Drawing on the words of US spokesmen, we propose some indices of effectiveness for the PSI:

Is there an Asian way of maritime war

Abstract It would simplify matters for U.S. officials and sea-service officers enormously if there were an Asian way of maritime war. It would make Asian governments and navies more predictable. They would tend to view the strategic setting similarly, harness sea power for similar political and strategic aims, and design doctrines and forces that were roughly compatible. Unfortunately, however, disparities between Asian societies and civilizations work against any common Asian approach to sea power. There is no substitute for close study of individual societies and cultures when forging ties with seafaring Asian states.

Schelling Goes to Sea: Managing Perceptions in China’s ‘Contested Zone’

Taylor and Francis FDEF_A_392308.sgm 10.1080/14702430902921361 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9698 (online) Original Article 2 09 & F ancis 90 00June 0 9 Jam sHolmes j .h l @ wc.navy.mil China has geared its diplomatic and military endeavors since the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis primarily to discouraging the United States (US) from getting involved in a cross-strait war. By constructing combat systems able to hold US naval assets at risk in Asia, and by telegraphing the importance it attaches to resuming control of Taiwan, Beijing hopes to induce Washington to stand aside or, at a minimum, to hesitate long enough for the Chinese military to accomplish its goals on the island. If successful, the Chinese communist leadership will present the US and the world the fait accompli of national unification before US forces can step in. China’s coercive strategy toward Taiwan is a function in large part of its ability to influence how Washington reckons the value of de facto Taiwanese independence, including the likely costs and repercussions of defending the island. For China, then, coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are as much a matter of communication and diplomatic signaling as of putting to sea potent ships, aircraft, and missiles. Beijing’s prospects of recovering Taiwan vary directly with its ability to raise the perceived costs to the US of military action. Washington may simply tire of preserving the cross-strait status quo – letting Beijing win in the Strait without fighting.