Toshi Yoshihara

The Influence of Mahan upon China's Maritime Strategy

Abstract “Summer Pulse 1904,” an exercise designed to test the ability of the U.S. Navy to operate in multiple theaters simultaneously, excited lively commentary among Chinas official press. In many cases this commentary drew on the writings of an American naval theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahans writings on sea power and geopolitics spurred the United States to build up its navy at the turn of the 19 th century and to seek out a share of the Asia trade. This essay examines how Mahan is shaping Beijings geopolitical calculations today and, in particular, its maritime aspirations. Alarmed at the prospect of de jure Taiwanese independence, China is developing the military and naval forces necessary to keep U.S. naval forces at a distance while it prosecutes a Taiwan contingency. Western observers must not dismiss Chinas bid for Mahanian supremacy in the Taiwan Strait and other East Asian waters.

Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective

Abstract In recent years, Chinas strategic community has emerged as an increasingly vocal and influential constituent of Chinese policy debates. This article focuses on Chinese analysts steeped in the realpolitik tradition. These intellectuals and strategists discern a troubling trend towards intense competition and zero-sum interactions in the Indian Ocean. In their view, a progressively assertive India will set the pace of the impending maritime rivalries among the great powers. This article argues that if such a grim forecast takes hold in Beijing, power plays already underway in the Indian Ocean will likely become more pronounced and contentious.

India's ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and Asia's Maritime Future

Abstract Many scholars assume that the European model of Realpolitik will prevail in Asia as the dual rise of China and India reorders regional politics. Others predict that Asias China-centric tradition of hierarchy will reassert itself. But Indians look as much to 19th century US history as to any European or Asian model. Indeed, successive prime ministers have explicitly cited the Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in hotspots around the Indian periphery. The Monroe Doctrine, however, underwent several phases during the USAs rise to world power. Analysing these phases can help South Asia analysts project possible futures for Indian maritime strategy.

India and Pakistan at the Edge

Andrew C. Winner is a senior staff member at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Toshi Yoshihara is a research fellow at IFPA and a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. They are co-authors of Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2002). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.

Authors' Response: Varieties of Mahanian Experience

Bernard Cole laments our employing “Mahanian grammar” as a prism through which to examine Chinese sea power. This, he says, is “neither clear nor helpful” and even “misguided.” This would be damning—except that Cole has misconstrued our argument by inverting it. To review, our approach originates with Carl von Clausewitz, who penetratingly analyzes the relationship between statecraft and war. In On War, Clausewitz proclaims that war proceeds under a unique “grammar” of violent political intercourse that distinguishes it from peacetime diplomacy. At sea, this grammar governs fleet operations. Contrary to Cole’s interpretation, however, we consider and explicitly discard the possibility that China draws meaningful guidance from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s writings on operational and tactical matters (see pp. 7–11, 77–78, 84). Given that Mahan exhorts tacticians to clear vital waters of the enemy’s flag, thereby seizing “command of the sea,” Beijing must look elsewhere for specifics. Nevertheless, time spent consulting Mahan is not time wasted. Clausewitz vouchsafes that the same higher-order “logic” of political purpose impels both peacetime endeavors and war. Our basic premise is that the Mahanian logic of commercial, political, and military access to important regions endures. However perishable Mahan’s commentary on operations and tactics proved, his logic of sea power remains at once universal and inescapable. The Clausewitzian structure of our analysis is neither arcane nor especially complex. In essence, we maintain that seafaring states can pursue timeless Mahanian ends through non-Mahanian ways and means. The logic and