James W. Balkwell

Group Processes and the Diffusion of Status Beliefs

How are consensual beliefs about the status-value of individual characteristics created in a society? A recent theory posits that inequalities in the distribution of resources in a population are translated into greater or lesser levels of consensus via social interaction in small groups. According to this theory, a macrostructural correlation between resources and a distinguishable individual difference variable constrains who interacts with whom and governs the group dynamics of these encounters. It engenders certain belief-acquisition processes that create and spread status beliefs about the variable, eventually making them consensual. We constructed a formal model of this diffusion process that includes the group interaction effects posited by the theory, also the effects of group size and the unmediated impact of macrostructural conditions. Calculations based on this new integratedformulation support most of the original theoretical analysis. In addition, simulation results suggest the likelihood that two- to four-person groups are especially important as creators and spreaders of status beliefs, supporting in a slightly modified fashion the earlier claim that group processes have the power to translate macrostructural constraints on actors into macro-level outcomes. These simulations also clarify several contingencies and other implications of the theory not fully apparent in the original formulation.

Gender, status, and behavior in task situations

Gender is among the most extensively investigated constructs of the social sciences. It is a basis of macrosocial organization and an individual characteristic that shapes microsocial interaction. The social psychological literature contains at least four alternative conceptions of how gender operates in face-to-face interaction: the normative-influence, the informational-influence, the weighted-averaging, and the expectation-states hypotheses. Using a rich set of experimental data on mixed-sex problem-solving discussions entailing feminine, gender-neutral, and masculine tasks, we investigated the relative empirical adequacy of these four hypotheses. Dependent variables included amount of time speaking and frequencies of gesturing, speech initiations, looking while speaking, looking while listening, chin thrusts, smiling, laughing, and self-touching. Dovidio and his colleagues reported that for some measures, but not for others, statistical interactions exist between the actors gender and the gender linkage of the task. Using a more precise theoretical analysis, we found that the expectation-states hypothesis describes the first category of variables extremely well, while the normative-influence hypothesis describes the second category extremely well. The weighted-averaging hypothesis deviates systematically from the empirical data collected by Dovidio and his colleagues. We conjecture that gender effects in putatively task-oriented interaction emanate from gender-as-worth and from gender-as-personal-identity. Some implications for further research are discussed.

Density, transitivity, and diffuse status in task-oriented groups

Small-group researchers recently have been concerned with how diffuse status characteristics such as race and gender combine with verbal and nonverbal cues to structure relations in task groups. In this paper we investigate the structure of precedence relations in such groups, including whether these relations are dense, whether they are transitive, and whether they are structured in any obvious way by diffuse status characteristics. Using transcript data on six-person mixed-gender discussion groups, we found relational density in about 55 percent of the dyads, transitivity in about 75 percent of the completed triads, and no clear pattern by gender. Each of these findings is contrary to assumptions contained in a formal participation model by Fisek, Berger, and Norman for which these authors reported strong empirical support. To investigate this apparent contradiction, we designed and carried out Monte Carlo simulations, creating simulated data with a known underlying structure, and applying Fisek et al.s research methodology to our simulated evidence. Although the simulated data, by design, systematically violate Fisek et al.s density and diffuse status assumptions, their model actually fits these data better than it fits the empirical Smith-Lovin data. We discuss both theoretical and methodological implications of our empirical and Monte Carlo results.

Meaning and Behavior: An Empirical Study in Sociolinguistics*

meanings or concrete meanings change more readily in response to behavioral changes than do abstract meanings-or both.

How do actors in task-oriented situations process finely graded differences in ability?

Abstract Much work in status characteristics theory (SCT) rests on an “ordinal comparisons hypothesis” that implies that the actors in a situation cognitively simplify the status information they must process. Simplified distinctions link actors to task outcomes via chains of cognitive associations. Actors expectations for themselves and each other, the theory asserts, are functions of such chains with the property that longer chains have weaker effects on expectations than shorter chains. Many of the theorys predictions also rest on a “situational reference hypothesis” that says actors in a situation compare themselves with others in the immediate situation. Foddy and Smithson (1996, 1999) proposed alternatives that would partially or fully invalidate many derivations from the theory (e.g., Berger et al. 1998), which depend explicitly on these premises, especially the first. In this paper, I reanalyze Foddy and Smithsons data and report on some computer simulations designed to clarify their results. My analysis shows that the evidence from each of their studies is consistent with SCTs existing information-processing assumptions, a finding that is particularly noteworthy given the nature of the status information in, and the strong demand characteristics of, Foddy and Smithsons experiment.

Occupational Prestige Hierarchy: Methodological Artifact or Cultural Category System

Occupational prestige findings are among the most stable, replicable findings in all of sociology. Yet, the “cognitive reality” underlying these findings has never been clearly established. Based on the responses provided by students to three questionnaires and comparative data from the more recent NORC study of occupational prestige, the research described in this paper investigates two hypotheses: 1) the occupational rankings resulting from the five‐point scale used in the NORC studies reflect highly differentiated evaluations in the minds of respondents; and 2) occupational prestige rankings form a unidimensional scale. Both of these hypotheses were supported. Not only is the occupational prestige hierarchy highly differentiated in the minds of individuals, it is predominantly a single dimension about which there is substantial agreement. The implications of these findings are briefly discussed.

Chapter 8 – Commentary

Publisher Summary This chapter documents the written works by some of the most productive contributors to network exchange theory, provides sound examples for others who will be participating in what promises to be an exciting journey toward an increasingly adequate understanding of social structure and emotion. Network exchange theorists and researchers assume the possibility of cumulative theory development, in which a formulation increases in scope, rigor, precision, and empirical adequacy as work on the theory continues. Given this faith in theory growth, it seems a foregone conclusion that theorizing and research on network exchange processes and emotion will accelerate in the coming years, inspired in significant part by the papers that follow. Cognitive and emotional processes will be incorporated into the general NET framework. Perhaps the best strategy for insuring a cumulative development of knowledge about network exchange phenomena, including their cognitive and emotional components, is to develop falsifiable hypotheses about limited parts of the general model, test those limited hypotheses via careful research, and build incrementally upon the results of successive tests. Trying to do too much all at once, tempting as that might be, probably would not build the kind of solid foundation necessary for cumulative knowledge. This would require better measurements of emotion, otherwise statistical controls involving emotion are not going to be convincing. Even without major methodological improvements, however, if an area of theorizing and research has a sense of where it is headed, individual research studies have greater meaning than do research not guided by a meaningful framework.