Jan Knoerich

The Rise of Chinese OFDI in Europe

The year 2003 was a watershed for Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Since then, Chinese OFDI has reached record levels year by year, increasing from US

How Does Outward Foreign Direct Investment Contribute to Economic Development in Less Advanced Home Countries

33.22 billion of FDI stocks (US

The Role of London and Frankfurt in Supporting the Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi

2.85 billion FDI flows) in 2003 to US

The Role of High Technology in Mainland China’s Outward Investment into Taiwan: Economic, Security and Cultural Dimensions

245.75 billion of FDI stocks (US

Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations in an Era of Technological Change: Introduction

56.53 billion FDI flows) in 2009 (Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), 2009, 2010). As it took 25 years since China initiated its reforms to reach the level of OFDI stock achieved in 2003, these recent increases are particularly striking.

Gaining from the global ambitions of emerging economy enterprises: An analysis of the decision to sell a German firm to a Chinese acquirer

Abstract In view of the rapid increase of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging economies in recent years, this study examines how OFDI supports economic development in the world’s less advanced home countries. Drawing on theories of FDI, available literature of relevance and some recent evidence from emerging economies, this study finds that the objective of multinational enterprises to pursue assets and advantages abroad through OFDI can yield financial, intangible capability and tangible capacity returns. In the right circumstances, these returns generate important macroeconomic gains, mitigate some of the typical problems of economic development and provide broader benefits to societies. Despite some limitations, OFDI complements, sometimes in distinct ways, the development benefits many countries already realise through trade, migration and inward FDI. Emerging economies are best placed to benefit from the returns generated by OFDI.

Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration

ABSTRACT Why do foreign countries support the internationalisation of the renminbi (RMB) by establishing offshore RMB centres? The Chinese government has openly stated that internationalisation of the country’s currency is one of its top priorities. International use of the RMB has already significantly increased in recent years. Yet, existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the structure of the Chinese economy and China’s domestic politics to explain RMB internationalisation. With this article, we seek to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the reasons why foreign countries support RMB internationalisation. Using the cases of Germany and the UK, we show that a combination of economic and political factors, partly in response to inducements from Beijing, best explain why foreign countries support Chinese efforts to internationalise the RMB. Some of these factors are similar to both countries, but there are also differences regarding the reasons why they support this key Chinese goal. We use the case of the establishment of offshore RMB centres to conduct our analysis, given the clear political nature of foreign countries allowing China to open them in their own territory. We thus also show that the Chinese currency is starting to display the characteristics of negotiated currencies.

Don’t Cry for me “Argenchina”: Unraveling Political Views of China through Legislative Debates in Argentina

On 30 June 2009, under the general mood of improving cross-Strait relations, the government of Taiwan made a firm commitment to open the island’s borders to investments from mainland China, Before then, capital flows between mainland China and Taiwan had been largely a one-way street: thousands of Taiwanese firms and Taishang (Taiwan-based entrepreneurs) had invested millions in low-cost production activities on the mainland, as Chapter 4 discussed in great detail, while most companies from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were barred from entering Taiwan as a direct result of the cross-Strait political impasse and the potential threat to the island’s security.1 On 9 August 2012, this was to change for good — Taiwan’s commitment to the entry of mainland direct investment (MDI) was set firmly in stone by the signing of the Cross-Strait Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (Cross-Strait B1A). an investment treaty of similar format to the thousands concluded among countries worldwide. This agreement was one of the many agreements to follow the conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by both sides on 29 June 2010.

Why some advanced economy firms prefer to be taken over by Chinese acquirers

In the spring of 2014, Taiwanese students occupied the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament. They were protesting against a trade-in- services agreement with mainland China, which the Kuomintang (KMT)- led Taiwanese government was trying to conclude more speedily and secretly than the demonstrators would have liked. These protests came to be known as the Sunflower Student Movement (Taiyanghua xueyun). This Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) of 2014 wTas by no means the first economic agreement between mainland China and Taiwan. Over the previous years, however, scepticism about the implications of concluding more and more intrusive agreements with the mainland had been building up in Taiwan and found expression in the Sunflower protests. Among these fears was the worry that with increasing economic cooperation might come growing political influence by mainland China.2 For many Taiwanese this is a disconcerting prospect, since the mainland regards Taiwan as an apostate province and threatens to eventually use force should Taiwan not return to the mainland voluntarily. The mainland’s growing military prowess makes these threats increasingly convincing. Add to that an increasing cultural alienation between the two sides of the Strait. Not only are they governed by different political systems — Taiwan is a multi-party democracy and the mainland an authoritarian state under one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).