Ramon Pacheco Pardo

Normal Power Europe: Non-Proliferation and the Normalization of EU's Foreign Policy

Abstract The European Union (EU) has alternately been described as a civilian, normative and ethical power. Even though these conceptualizations differ among themselves, they share a positive view of the EU as a foreign policy actor guided by the common good and disinclined to use military power. This article argues that these conceptualizations do not accurately capture the foreign policy behaviour of the EU. Similarly to other powers, the EU is a self-interested actor seeking to maximize its own security. To this end, it mixes the use of military and non-military means as necessary. Hence, the EU is a normal power, no different from other polities striving to minimize external threats to their security. Its ‘non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ policy will serve as case study to show that the EU is a normal power.Abstract The European Union (EU) has alternately been described as a civilian, normative and ethical power. Even though these conceptualizations differ among themselves, they share a positive view of the EU as a foreign policy actor guided by the common good and disinclined to use military power. This article argues that these conceptualizations do not accurately capture the foreign policy behaviour of the EU. Similarly to other powers, the EU is a self-interested actor seeking to maximize its own security. To this end, it mixes the use of military and non-military means as necessary. Hence, the EU is a normal power, no different from other polities striving to minimize external threats to their security. Its ‘non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ policy will serve as case study to show that the EU is a normal power.

The political weakness of the EU in East Asia: a constructivist approach

This paper provides a constructivist explanation of the political weakness of the EU in East Asia. By examining the corporate identity of the EU as well as its social identities towards ASEM, China and Japan, I argue that the identities which the EU has constructed towards the outside world and in relation to the region, based on self recognitions of its superpower status and the defence of certain political values, is disliked by both China and Japan for different reasons. Without the support of the two regional superpowers, the EU is not capable of getting involved in the resolution of East Asian hard political affairs.

EU–China relations in financial governance: cooperation, convergence or competition?

The global financial crisis (GFC) and subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (ESDC) have made reform of the global financial governance regime a priority for governments around the world. Prior to the crisis, neoliberal policies agreed between the European Union and the USA created a financial governance regime based on the principle of free operation of the market through the norms of market self-regulation, equal access to the market, and stability via institutional supervision. How will global financial governance look like after these crises? And what role can the EU and China play in shaping this regime? This article argues that as a result of the GFC and the ESDC, stability is becoming a second principle of global financial governance, along with the free operation of the market. Meanwhile, European and Chinese views regarding the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures designed to implement those principles do not differ as much as they used to. Thanks to interactions at the bilateral and multilateral levels, the EU and China now have knowledge regarding how the other understands the role and characteristics that financial governance should have. This is leading to convergence in some areas and cooperation in others. Concurrently, there are also areas of competition. Analysing all of these is essential to understand how global financial governance might evolve, given the central role that the EU and China now play in this regime.

Leadership, decision-making and governance in the EU and East Asia: crisis and post-crisis

The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has affected the EU and East Asia differently. The EU has seen its economic, political and social structures undermined by the problems derived from the global crisis and subsequent eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In contrast, East Asia has gone through the global crisis relatively unscathed and has seen its standing at the global level reinforced. As a result, there has been a reconfiguration of leadership, decision-making and governance structures in both regions. In the case of the EU, Germany has emerged as the clear leader of European efforts to solve regional economic problems. Meanwhile, intergovernmentalism has replaced supranationalism as the decision-making and even implementation procedure of choice. Differently, there is no single leader in East Asia. China has become one of the most important powers at the global level, but at the regional level, different countries have shaped East Asia’s response to the crisis. Concurrently, there has been some move towards increasing integration, even though intergovernmentalism still defines governance structures in the region. Thus, the global financial crisis of the late 2000s has helped to shape new leadership, decision-making and governance structures in both regions.

Rise of Complementarity between Global and Regional Financial Institutions: Perspectives from Asia

Global economic governance is in flux. The institutions and norms set up by the US and other Western powers decades ago are being eroded. Regional organisations and emerging powers are challenging them. This is especially the case in East Asia and China. Or are they? In this article we argue that East Asian countries in general and China in particular are not challenging existing global institutions and norms. Instead, they are setting up and developing institutions that complement – rather than compete against – existing institutions. Even though there is a degree of ‘healthy’ competition between regional institutions and their global counterparts, the former are essentially complementary to the latter. Global institutions can offer knowledge and capacity building to regional institutions, which in turn can provide access to a larger pool of resources. To prove our argument, we analyse the cases of liquidity provision – in the form of the IMF and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation – and development financing – with the World Bank on the one hand and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank on the other. Our findings suggest that the multi†layering of international governance need not lead to competition between layers.

China and Northeast Asia's Regional Security Architecture: The Six-Party Talks as a Case of Chinese Regime-Building?

China, as host of the six-party talks first convened in August 2003, has been one of the major players in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. China’s role in the talks has helped to start shaping a stable regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Beijing’s leadership in building a new security regime in the region suggests a change on Chinese perspectives regarding its role within the broader East Asia’s regional security architecture. After years of passiveness with regards to involvement in security regime building in the region, China has evolved into an active leader seeking to shape a more institutionalized security. Despite the obstacles to building a functioning regime in Northeast Asia, China seems poised to continue working towards creation of a more stable and institutionalized security architecture.

The Role of London and Frankfurt in Supporting the Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi

ABSTRACT Why do foreign countries support the internationalisation of the renminbi (RMB) by establishing offshore RMB centres? The Chinese government has openly stated that internationalisation of the country’s currency is one of its top priorities. International use of the RMB has already significantly increased in recent years. Yet, existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the structure of the Chinese economy and China’s domestic politics to explain RMB internationalisation. With this article, we seek to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the reasons why foreign countries support RMB internationalisation. Using the cases of Germany and the UK, we show that a combination of economic and political factors, partly in response to inducements from Beijing, best explain why foreign countries support Chinese efforts to internationalise the RMB. Some of these factors are similar to both countries, but there are also differences regarding the reasons why they support this key Chinese goal. We use the case of the establishment of offshore RMB centres to conduct our analysis, given the clear political nature of foreign countries allowing China to open them in their own territory. We thus also show that the Chinese currency is starting to display the characteristics of negotiated currencies.

Europe’s financial security and Chinese economic statecraft: the case of the Belt and Road Initiative

The core of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) involves trillions of US

Weak Power Bargaining with China: Mongolia and North Korea in comparative perspective

in investment to increase and improve connectivity between China and different parts of the world. This includes tens of billions of US

Dandong and Sinuiju: The Sino-North Korean Border Shadow Economy

to build or upgrade roads, rail lines, ports, pipelines and other infrastructure to connect China with Europe. With the European continent still feeling the effects of the Global Financial and Eurozone Sovereign Debt crises, this is an opportunity to strengthen its financial security by gaining access to a new source of financing. This new source, however, is linked to Chinese economic statecraft. Thus, cash-starved Europe can tap on the recently launched Silk Road Fund, Maritime Silk Road Fund and other initiatives from the Chinese government. Concurrently, however, political divisions within Europe derived from Chinese investment, as well as normative differences in terms of standards and practices present a challenge to the continent. This article thus analyses the effects of BRI, presented as a tool of Chinese economic statecraft, on Europe’s financial security. It argues that in spite of the latent challenges to said security, the potential benefits have already led many European countries to seek to tap on BRI’s investment as a means to strengthen their financing position.