Jan Rosset

THE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Due to diverging levels of political influence of various income groups, political institutions likely reflect the policy preferences of certain groups of citizens better than others, independently of their numerical weight. This runs counter the egalitarian principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’. The present article documents a general trend of underrepresentation of the preferences of relatively poor citizens both by parties and by governments across Western democracies, although important cross-national differences exist.

More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Unequal representation of age groups in Switzerland

The representation of age groups is becoming an increasingly discussed topic in Swiss politics. In this study, we explore inequalities in the descriptive and substantive representation of various age groups and find that despite important disparities in descriptive representation, the policy preferences of various age groups are relatively equally represented in the lower house of the Swiss parliament. Our analysis thus suggests that even if it is gaining visibility, the age cleavage is not central for parliamentary representation in Switzerland.

I the People? Self-interest and demand for government responsiveness

Whether elected representatives should be responsive to the wishes of the majority of citizens has been an issue often discussed from a normative perspective. This article shifts the focus by looking at the determinants of support for responsiveness among citizens. Its core argument is that attitudes toward responsiveness vary systematically depending on the policy gains an individual can expect from a government that is responsive to the preferences of the majority of citizens. The analysis of data from the European Social Survey and 21 countries confirms these expectations. Individuals whose ideological stances are reflected well by the incumbent government are less favorable to the idea that governments should be responsive to the preferences of the majority, while one’s proximity to the ideological location of the median citizen increases the odds of support for majority responsiveness. Our findings are stable across a large variety of European democracies.

Economic inequality and political representation in Switzerland

This book analyzes the link between economic and political inequalities and investigates the mechanisms that lead to economically rooted inequalities in the political representation of citizens’ policy preferences. Focusing on the case of Switzerland and evaluating data from the post-electoral survey, Selects 2007, the author demonstrates that the policy preferences of members of the Federal Assembly best reflect those of rich citizens. This pattern is explained by differential levels of political participation and knowledge across income groups, party finance, the fact that representatives tend to come from higher economic strata, and the failure of the party-system structure to reflect the complexity of policy preferences among citizens.

Economically based inequalities in political representation: Where do they come from?

There is a tension between the egalitarian principles governing democratic rule - the idea that every citizen weigh the same in the decision making process - and inequalities that characterise the world in which these egalitarian principles are to be met. This tension materialises itself for instance in the fact that representatives tend to come from privileged social groups: educated, rich men with a majority ethnic background populate the vast majority of public offices although they represent just a fraction of the population as a whole. One of the domains where this tension between the formal equality postulated in democracy and the existence of unequal social structures is particularly visible is the economy. Citizens in most democracies differ greatly – and perhaps increasingly over the last decades – in the amount of wealth they own and their incomes. This might be of political relevance because their economic background likely shapes both their interests and their ability to have these interests taken into account. As a result, specific preferences might not be channelled in the political arena because they come from less resourceful citizens.

Economic Context and Attitudes towards the Welfare State: The Relationship between (Perceived) Unemployment Risk and Demand for Social Policy

Welfare states provide individuals with an insurance against a variety of risks. Therefore, how much an individual is exposed to these risks is expected to influence their support for social spending. In this chapter, we focus on the evolution of perceived unemployment risk and its relationship with attitudes towards social policy in Switzerland over the 1999–2014 period. Aggregate analyses of data from the Swiss Household Panel reveal a slight increase in the share of Swiss residents who feel insecure. However, this trend coincides with a decrease in aggregate support for social spending, whereas the share of respondents supporting higher taxation for the rich has seen a marginal increase. At the individual-level, we do find some evidence for a link between objective unemployment risk, the perception of this risk, and support for unemployment benefits. But the relation between objective risk and policy preferences is mainly explained by structural factors such as education and income rather than the perception of risk. These findings can help explain the relative stability of public opinion despite changes in economic conditions.

The Structure of Party Competition and Electoral Choice: Explanations Based on the Electoral Behaviour of Citizens

Voters hold complex policy preferences whose configuration is not necessarily reflected in the party system. As a result, they need to make an electoral choice according to some issues and not others. This multidimensionality of electoral competition can result in a substantial gap between the preferences of voters and those of elected officials. Based on survey data on the positioning of citizens and parties, the analysis shows that a very large proportion of voters hold preferences that are closer to parties from the left on economic issues but are better represented by conservative parties on cultural issues. Furthermore, the analysis shows that in this particular case, the mismatch between the structure of preferences among citizens and the party system, advantages the election of parties that defend economically liberal policies as compared to the share of the population endorsing such policies.

Unequal Representation by Parties: Explanations Based on the Elites’ Side of the Representation Process

This chapter explores the link between the economic resources of candidates and their policy preferences, as well as their relative position within party structures. The analyses show that representatives’ own experience shape their political views, as candidates with higher incomes tend to be less favourable to redistribution than their party colleagues. As political parties tend to recruit their members and potential candidates from among the high income strata, this result indicates that descriptive representation of income groups might explain why the preferences of low income groups are not reflected well in the parliament. An analysis of ballot position and campaign spending shows, however, that personal wealth does not seem to matter much for advancing one’s interest within a party.