Julian Bernauer

Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches

In a broad range of research in comparative politics, political parties are conceptualised as unitary actors with consistent preferences. We depart from this sometimes accurate, at other times overly strong assumption by studying patterns of intra-party heterogeneity of preferences within parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag from 2002–05. For this purpose, we use the Wordscores method, a form of computational text analysis, to estimate policy positions of 453 individual legislators based on plenary speeches. We then study the link between intra-party faction membership and expressed policy positions. We find that there is a limited, but consistent effect of intra-party factionalism in the German Bundestag. According to random effects ANOVA, faction membership determines about 3 per cent of the variance of positions on economic policy in the present study.

THE POOR POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Due to diverging levels of political influence of various income groups, political institutions likely reflect the policy preferences of certain groups of citizens better than others, independently of their numerical weight. This runs counter the egalitarian principle of ‘one citizen, one vote’. The present article documents a general trend of underrepresentation of the preferences of relatively poor citizens both by parties and by governments across Western democracies, although important cross-national differences exist.

More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

A Global Trend Toward Democratic Convergence? A Lijphartian Analysis of Advanced Democracies

The article offers a systematic analysis of the comparative trajectory of international democratic change. In particular, it focuses on the resulting convergence or divergence of political systems, borrowing from the literatures on institutional change and policy convergence. To this end, political-institutional data in line with Arend Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) empirical theory of democracy for 24 developed democracies between 1945 and 2010 are analyzed. Heteroscedastic multilevel models allow for directly modeling the development of the variance of types of democracy over time, revealing information about convergence, and adding substantial explanations. The findings indicate that there has been a trend away from extreme types of democracy in single cases, but no unconditional trend of convergence can be observed. However, there are conditional processes of convergence. In particular, economic globalization and the domestic veto structure interactively influence democratic convergence.

I the People? Self-interest and demand for government responsiveness

Whether elected representatives should be responsive to the wishes of the majority of citizens has been an issue often discussed from a normative perspective. This article shifts the focus by looking at the determinants of support for responsiveness among citizens. Its core argument is that attitudes toward responsiveness vary systematically depending on the policy gains an individual can expect from a government that is responsive to the preferences of the majority of citizens. The analysis of data from the European Social Survey and 21 countries confirms these expectations. Individuals whose ideological stances are reflected well by the incumbent government are less favorable to the idea that governments should be responsive to the preferences of the majority, while one’s proximity to the ideological location of the median citizen increases the odds of support for majority responsiveness. Our findings are stable across a large variety of European democracies.

Party unity in federal disunity: determinants of decentralised policy-seeking in Switzerland

Abstract Federalism and decentralisation offer political parties the opportunity to tailor their policy-seeking behaviour to different regional electorates. These electorates often possess different political preferences. However, the regional branches of nationwide parties must be careful not to dilute or even betray the core values of their party, for equally often they remain dependent on central support. This article studies the ensuing tension between regional deviations from national unity by analysing all vote recommendations of the four major Swiss parties on all 251 national referendums held between 1987 and 2015. Vote recommendations constitute an important guidance for voters. Analytically, the article focuses on the conditions of cantonal deviations from federal recommendations as a proxy for decentralised policy-seeking. It finds that ideological (socialism), temporal, vote-specific (distance to next election) as well as vote- and canton-specific factors (regional turnout and contestation) all influence party unity, with some effects varying by policy area and vote type.

LOYAL TO THE GAME? STRATEGIC POLICY REPRESENTATION IN MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

In Germanys compensatory mixed electoral system, alternative electoral routes lead into parliament. We study the relationship between candidates electoral situations across both tiers and policy representation, fully accounting for candidate, party and district preferences in a multi-actor constellation and the exact electoral incentives for candidates to represent either the party or the district. The results (2009 Bundestag election data) yield evidence of an interactive effect of closeness of the district race and list safety on candidates positioning between their party and constituency.

STRATEGIC INCENTIVES IN UNCONVENTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

The study of strategic behaviour and the impact of institutions on elections has mainly focused on simple and conventional electoral systems: list-proportional electoral systems (PR) and the plurality vote. Less conventional systems are not on the agenda of comparative studies, even though no less than 30% of countries use unconventional electoral systems for their national parliamentary elections, such as the Single Transferable Vote, PR with majority bonuses, or mixed electoral systems. Often, they provide for unusual combinations of different institutional incentives, and hence to particular actor strategies.

Book review: Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Theoretical and Methodological InvestigationPlesciaCarolina, Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Theoretical and Methodological Investigation, Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016; xii + 158 pp.: ISBN 978-1-785521-80-5, £50.00 (hbk), 978-1-785522-59-8, £30.00 (pbk)

tions staffers in House and Senate leadership offices has outpaced overall growth. Communications staffers have also gained influence, as evidenced by their increasing presence on Roll Call’s “Fabulous 50” list of staffers perceived to be most influential. Even a sizable share of committee staffers now work on communications. A content analysis by Lee reveals that the prodigious amount of public relations material emanating from leadership offices fits comfortably into the categories Mayhew used to conceptualize incumbent PR efforts: credit claiming, position taking, and advertising. Not surprisingly, Lee found that blame, a variant of credit claiming, is central to many party messages. A staple of partisan confrontation is the so-called message vote: A roll call vote on a proposal opposed by the opposition party with no chance of passing. The defeat of the measure communicates to voters that a shift in control is necessary to advance their priorities. Minority parties in the Senate make especially potent use of message votes, using floor rules that privilege political minorities. According to staffers Lee interviewed, Senate minority leaders now routinely demand such votes as the price of allowing majority party proposals to proceed. Determining whether a roll call vote is a message vote is tricky, making quantitative analysis challenging. But using the fact that message votes are designed to fail, Lee demonstrates that amendments offered by Senate minority party members were far less likely to pass in the post-1980 period (97th–112th Congresses) than in the pre-1980 period (86th–96th Congresses), even controlling for the ideology of the member offering the amendment. This is what we would expect if heightened competition for control of Congress has fueled more party confrontation. Votes to increase the debt ceiling, which occur regularly in American politics, offer another useful way to distinguish partisan conflict based on teamsmanship from that based on ideological disagreement. In Chapter 7, Lee makes use of all debt ceiling votes from 1953 to 2014 to demonstrate that, as the logic set out in Chapter 3 predicts, members of parties with more power are more likely to support debt ceiling increases than members of parties with less power. Importantly, the differences became more pronounced in the post-1980 period. Partisan conflict over the debt ceiling, Lee concludes, is structured as much by government-versus-opposition voting as by ideological disagreement, and there is little reason to believe this isn’t true of other issues. Lee uses the final substantive chapter of her book to test her claims in the context of state politics. Coauthored with Kelsey L Hinchliffe, the chapter presents robust quantitative evidence, across five different measures of partisan competition, that tight partisan margins fuel wider partisan division within legislatures. Scholars of state politics won’t be surprised by these findings, as Lee and Hinchliffe note. For those looking to Congress for serious lawmaking, Lee’s book offers little cause for optimism. The bipartisanship cooperation required to pass major legislation will be in short supply as long as partisan margins remain thin. Moreover, message politics lowers the quality of debate in Congress—“You can’t message nuance,” as one staffer interviewed by Lee stated—and members steeped in strategies of partisan confrontation may not have ever learned how to legislate (a concern voiced by another staffer). Finally, the politics Lee describes will give pause to those who see twoparty competition as key to responsible governance. One minor quibble is that the government-versusopposition perspective might have been more fully integrated throughout the book. Lee introduces the concept in Chapter 1, but it doesn’t appear again until Chapter 7. On the upside, this does little to detract from the book’s rich and convincing analysis. In the end, Lee has written an excellent book that gives the winning of office—the aim party scholars have traditionally viewed as animating political parties—a central place in explaining party conflict in Congress. It is a must-read for students of congressional party politics, and it will very likely generate an array of new research questions for years to come.