Jan Woleński

Handbook of Epistemology

Foreword. Contributors. Introduction. The History of Epistemology J. Wolenski. I: Sources of Knowledge and Belief. 1. Perception and Consciousness R. Audi. 2. Testimony: Knowing through Being Told E. Fricker. 3. Reason and Rationality R. Samuels, S. Stich, L. Faucher. II: Knowledge Acquisition. 4. Learning Theory and Epistemology K. Kelly. 5. Scientific Discovery M. Sintonen, M. Kiikeri. 6. Belief Revision from an Epistemological Point of View S.O. Hanssen. III: Truth and Justification. 7. The Analysis of Knowing R. Shope. 8. Theories of Truth M. David. 9. Realism S. Haack. 10. Antirealism and the Role of Truth G. Sundholm. 11. Theories of Justification M. Lammenranta. 12. Belief and Acceptance P. Weirich. 13. Induction I. Niiniluoto. IV: Epistemology and Areas of Knowledge. 14. Scientific Knowledge P. Humphreys. 15. Mathematical Knowledge R. Murawski. 16. Knowledge in the Humanities and Social Sciences J. Margolis. 17. Self-Knowledge T. Stoneham. 18. The Epistemology of Religious Belief K. Yandell. 19. Knowledge and Semantic Competence K. Johnson. V: Special Topics. 20. Naturalism and Evolutionary Epistemologies M. Bradie. 21. Relativism H. Siegel. 22. Analytic vs. Synthetic and A Priori vs. A Posteriori J. Wolenski. 23. Epistemology and Cognitive Science F. Schmitt. 24. Sociology of Scientific Knowledge D. Bloor. 25. Epistemic Logic W. Lenzen. 26. Knowledge and Art D. Novitz. 27. Feminist Epistemology K. Lennon. Index of Names. Subject Index.

The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy

Preface. Introduction. The Reception of the Lvov-Warsaw School J. Wolenski. Part I: History and Comparisons. Twardowskis Distinction Between Actions and Products J. Brandl. On Ajdukiewiczs Empirical Meaning- Rule and Wittgensteins Defining Criterion T. Czarnecki. Inspirations and Controversies: From the Letters Between K. Twardowski and A. Meinong R. Jadczak. The Lvov-Warsaw School - the First School of Non-Positivist Scientific and Analytic Philosophy W. Krajewski. Womens Contributions to the Achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School: A Survey E. Pakszys. Truth-Bearers from Twardowski to Tarski A. Rojszczak. Twardowski and Husserl on Wholes and Parts M. Rosiak. The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski E.G. Vinogradov. Lukasiewiczs Interpretation of Aristotles Concept of Possibility U. Zeglen. Part II: Lesniewski. De Veritate: Another Chapter. The Bolzano-Lesniewski Connection A. Betti. Lesniewskis Conception of Logic R. Poli, M. Libardi. Non-Elementary Exegesis of Twardowskis Theory of Presentation V.L. Vasiukov. On Some Essential Subsystems of Lesniewskis Ontology and the Equivalence Between the Singular Barbara and the Law of Leibniz in Ontology T. Waragai. Part III: Philosophy of Language. The Paradox of Grelling and Nelson Presented as a Veridical Observation Concerning Naming A. Grzegorczyk. Dambska, Quine and the So-Called Empty Names M. Marsonet. Truth and Time K. Misiuna. The Postulate of Precision: Its Sense and Its Limits M. Przelecki. Polish Logic, Language and Philosophy of Language R. Zuber. Part IV: Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. The Ajdukiewicz Calculus, Polish Notationand Hilbert-Style Proofs W. Buszkowski. Jaskowski and Gentzen Approaches to Natural Deduction and Related Systems A. Indrzejczak. The Contribution of Polish Logicians to Recursion Theory R. Murawski. Studying Incompleteness of Information: A Class of Information Logics E. Orlowska. Part V: Ontology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. On Lukasiewiczs Theory of Probability T. Childers, O. Majer. On What There Is Not -- A Vindication of Reism J. Czerniawski. On the Concept of a Subject of Cognition in Ajdukiewiczs Philosophy A. Kanik. Induction and Probability in the Lvov-Warsaw School I. Niiniluoto. Lukasiewiczs Logical Probability and a Puzzle About Conditionalization T. Placek. Part VI: Logic and Philosophy. Truth as Consensus. A Logical Analysis K. Kijania-Placek. The Lvov-Warsaw School and the Problem of a Logical Formalism for General Systems Theory A.I. Uyemov. From Closure-Operatic Deductive Methodology to Non-Standard Alternatives S.J. Surma. Forgotten and Neglected Solutions of Problems in Philosophical Logic P. Weingartner. Index of Names.

Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory

I consider the question ‘do we philosophers (epistemologists, etc.) need a theory of truth?’ ridiculous. Questions like this are applicable to practically any other philosophical problem: do we philosophers need a theory of perception, value, mind, etc? In fact, it is very difficult to defend the view that we need this or that philosophical theory. I restrict myself to the following confession: the basic stock of philosophical problems arose in ancient Greece. These problems have been elaborated by philosophers, more or less successfully, until now. It happens that some problems disappear, but others reappear or even appear as new. Yet some problems are fairly constant over the course of history. The problem of truth certainly has belonged to philosophical invariants, at least since Aristotle. It was reinterpreted by almost every generation of philosophers, sometimes with new insights. We philosophers are obliged, in a sense, to look at old problems from our perspective. I do not claim that semantics is the only contemporary perspective for the theory of truth, but certainly it produces a way of speaking on language and its relation to the world. So much for the general explanation of the title of this paper.

On Tarski’s Background

Let me start with the following quotation from Mostowski: Tarski, in oral discussions, has often indicated his sympathies with nominalism. While he never accepted the ‘reism’ of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, he was certainly attracted to it in the early phase of his work. However, the set-theoretical methods that form the basis of his logical and mathematical studies compel him constantly to use the abstract and general notions that a nominalist seeks to avoid. In the absence of more extensive publications by Tarski on philosophical subjects, the conflict appears to have remained unresolved.2 My aim in this paper is to throw light on this cognitive conflict or dissonance of Tarski between his nominalistic and empiricistic sympathies and his “Platonic” mathematical practice as well as why he was so parsimonious in expressing his philosophical views.

Deontic logic and possible worlds semantics: A historical sketch

This paper describes and compares the first step in modern semantic theory for deontic logic which appeared in works of Stig Kanger, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Montague and Saul Kripke in late 50s and early 60s. Moreover, some further developments as well as systematizations are also noted.

Kotarbiński : logic, semantics, and ontology

Philosophical self-portrait.- Review-article: T Kotarbi?skis Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of the Sciences.- Psychologism and the principle of relevance in semantics.- Names in Kotarbi?skis Elementy.- Consistent reism.- A note about reism.- Puzzles of existence.- On the dramatic stage in the development of Kotarbi?skis pansomatism.- Semantic reasons for ontological statements: the argumentation of a reist.- Philosophical and methodological foundations of Kotarbi?skis praxiology.- Kotarbi?skis theory of genuine names.- Kotarbi?skis theory of pseudo-names.- On the phases of reism.- Philosophy of the concrete.- Kotarbi?ski, many-valued logic, and truth.- Concerning reism.- The voice of the past in Kotarbi?skis writings.- References.- Index of names.- Index of subjects.

The History of Epistemology

Although there are many different classifications of philosophical problems, the division of philosophy into ontology (or metaphysics), epistemology, and axiology (ethics and aesthetics) still seems the most efficient and general one. Thus, epistemology belongs to the main parts of philosophy. However, the terms which now denote this field, namely ‘epistemology’ and ‘theory of knowledge’, appeared not very long ago, later than terms indicating metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics or even ontology. As late as in the 17th century there was no single word referring to epistemology. At that time as well as in the 18th century, epistemological problems were considered in books like (I give the English titles) Rules for the Direction of Mind (Rene Descartes), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (John Locke), A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (George Berkeley), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (David Hume), New Essays on Human Understanding (Gottfried Leibniz) or Critique of Pure Reason (Immanuel Kant). Kant placed his central epistemological views under the label ‘transcendental aesthetic’, following the meaning of aisthesis as referring to cognition by senses. As a matter of fact, Kant also used (in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement) the term ‘aesthetics’, more precisely, its German counterpart Aesthetik, in a more contemporary fashion, i.e., to denote matters of beauty. Earlier, Alexander G. Baumgarten in his Sciagraphia encyclopaediae philosophicae (1769) proposed the word gnoseologia,which gained some popularity and is sometimes employed even now. The German word ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ (theory of knowledge) became popular after Eduard Zeiler’s influential paper “Bedeutung and Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie” (1862), but this name and its cognates were used earlier. Thomas Krug’s, Allgemeine Handworterbuch der philososophischen Wissenschaften (1827) proposed the label ‘Erkenntnislehre’. Ernst Reinhold (the son of Karl L. Reinhold, a leading post-Kantian philosopher) in Versuch einer neuen Theorie der menschlichen Vorstellung-svermogen and Metaphysik (1832) had the term “Theorie der Erkenntnis”. It was James E Ferrier who introduced the label ‘epistemology’ in his Institutes of Metaphysics (1854). Other words were also proposed to baptize our field: Wissenschaftslehre’ (Johann G. Fichte, Bernard Bolzano), Wissenschaftstheorie’ (Eugen Duhring), ‘criterology’ (Neo-Thomists), and ‘noetics’ (also NeoThomists). However, the words ‘epistemology’ and ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ (as well as their translations into other languages) are most popular nowadays.

Some Current Problems in Metamathematics1

In this article the author first described the developments which brought to focus the importance of consistency proofs for mathematics, and which led Hilbert to promote the science of metamathemat-ics. Further comments and remarks concern the (partly analogous) beginnings of the work on the decision problem, Godel’s theorems and related matters, and general metamathematics. An appendix summarizes a text by the author on completeness and categoricity

Two Squares of Oppositions and Their Applications in Pairwise Comparisons Analysis

This paper examines two main possibilities of pairwise comparisons analysis: first, pair- wise comparisons within a lattice, in this case these comparisons can be measurable by numbers; second, comparisons beyond any lattice, in this case these comparisons cannot be measurable in principle. We show that the first approach to pairwise comparisons analysis is based on the con- ventional square of opposition and its generalization, but the second approach is based on uncon- ventional squares of opposition. Furthermore, the first approach corresponds to lateral inhibition in transmission signals and the second approach corresponds to lateral activation in transmission signals.

Applications of Squares of Oppositions and Their Generalizations in Philosophical Analysis

Abstract.This papers examines formal properties of logical squares and their generalizations in the form of hexagons and octagons. Then, several applications of these constructions in philosophical analysis are elaborated. They concern contingency (accidentality), possibility, permission, axiological concepts (bonum and malum), the generalized Hume thesis (deontic and epistemic modalities), determinism, truth and consistency (in various senses. It is shown that relations between notions used in various branches of philosophy fall into the same formal scheme.