Jason E. Plaks

Person theories and attention allocation: preferences for stereotypic versus counterstereotypic information.

How do people respond to information that counters a stereotype? Do they approach it or avoid it? Four experiments showed that attention to stereotype-consistent vs. -inconsistent information depends on peoples implicit theories about human traits. Those holding an entity theory (the belief that traits are fixed) consistently displayed greater attention to (Experiments 1 and 4) and recognition of (Experiments 2 and 3) consistent information. whereas those holding an incremental (dynamic) theory tended to display greater attention to (Experiment 1) and recognition of (Experiment 3) inconsistent information. This was true whether implicit theories were measured as chronic structures (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or were experimentally manipulated (Experiment 3). Thus, different a priori assumptions about human traits and behavior lead to processing that supports versus limits stereotype maintenance.

Violations of Implicit Theories and the Sense of Prediction and Control: Implications for Motivated Person Perception

Beginning with the assumption that implicit theories of personality are crucial tools for understanding social behavior, the authors tested the hypothesis that perceivers would process person information that violated their predominant theory in a biased manner. Using an attentional probe paradigm (Experiment 1) and a recognition memory paradigm (Experiment 2), the authors presented entity theorists (who believe that human attributes are fixed) and incremental theorists (who believe that human attributes are malleable) with stereotype-relevant information about a target person that supported or violated their respective theory. Both groups of participants showed evidence of motivated, selective processing only with respect to theory-violating information. In Experiment 3, the authors found that after exposure to theory-violating information, participants felt greater anxiety and worked harder to reestablish their sense of prediction and control mastery. The authors discuss the epistemic functions of implicit theories of personality and the impact of violated assumptions.

Static Versus Dynamic Theories and the Perception of Groups: Different Routes to Different Destinations

Research on lay theories suggests that people who begin the task of social perception with different starting assumptions follow different cognitive paths and reach different social endpoints. In this article, we show how laypeoples fixed (entity) versus dynamic (incremental) theories of human nature foster different meaning systems for interpreting and respondingto the same group information. Using research with adults and children, in the United States and East Asia, and concerning familiar and novel groups, wedocument how these theories influence susceptibility to stereotyping, perceptions of group homogeneity, the ultimate attribution error, intergroup bias,and discriminatory behavior. Further, we discuss social-cultural factors that produce and perpetuate these theories as well as why and when these theories are maintained and changed. The implications of this work for reducing stereotyping and intergroup conflict are considered.

The Ecology of Automaticity: How Situational Contingencies Shape Action Semantics and Social Behavior

What is the role of ecology in automatic cognitive processes and social behavior? Our motivated-preparation account posits that priming a social category readies the individual for adaptive behavioral responses to that category—responses that take into account the physical environment. We present the first evidence showing that the cognitive responses (Study 1) and the behavioral responses (Studies 2a and 2b) automatically elicited by a social-category prime differ depending on a person’s physical surroundings. Specifically, after priming with pictures of Black men (a threatening out-group), participants responded with either aggressive behavior (fight) or distancing behavior (flight), depending on what action was allowed by the situation. For example, when participants were seated in an enclosed booth (no distancing behavior possible) during priming, they showed increased accessibility of fight-related action semantics; however, when seated in an open field (distancing behavior possible), they showed increased accessibility of flight-related action semantics. These findings suggest that an understanding of automaticity must consider its situated nature.

Unexpected Improvement, Decline, and Stasis: A Prediction Confidence Perspective on Achievement Success and Failure

The authors hypothesized that reactions to performance feedback depend on whether ones lay theory of intelligence is supported or violated. In Study 1, following improvement feedback, all participants generally exhibited positive affect, but entity theorists (who believe that intelligence is fixed) displayed more anxiety and more effort to restore prediction confidence than did incremental theorists (who believe that intelligence is malleable). Similarly, when performance declined, entity theorists displayed more anxiety and compensatory effort than incremental theorists. However, when performance remained rigidly static despite a learning opportunity, incremental theorists evinced more anxiety and compensatory effort than entity theorists. In Study 2, this pattern was replicated when the entity and incremental theories were experimentally manipulated. Study 3 demonstrated that for both groups, theory violation impairs subsequent task performance. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that lay theory violation and damaged prediction confidence have significant and measurable effects on emotion and motivation. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literature on achievement success and failure.

Thoughts Versus Deeds: Distal and Proximal Intent in Lay Judgments of Moral Responsibility

The authors propose that two central ingredients in lay models of intentionality are (a) “distal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused on a broader goal) and (b) “proximal intent” (the actor’s mind is focused narrowly on the act itself). Study 1 established that participants rate an actor with both forms of intent more responsible than an actor with only one form of intent or neither form of intent. In Study 2, when the actor had only distal intent, participants with a high-level construal rated the actor more responsible than did those with a low-level construal. In Study 3, when the actor had only distal intent, participants primed with psychodynamic concepts rated the actor more responsible than did those primed with cognitive-control concepts. However, when the actor had only proximal intent, the effect reversed. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on moral reasoning and law.

Romantic Relationships Conceptualized as a Judgment and Decision-Making Domain

We review the emerging evidence suggesting that the largely separate research areas of romantic relationships and judgment and decision making (JDM) can usefully inform each other. First, we present evidence that decisions in more traditional JDM domains (e.g., consumerism, economics) share important features with romantic-relationship decisions, including the use of formal decision strategies (e.g., the investment model), intuitive shortcuts (e.g., the availability heuristic), and anticipated emotions (e.g., affective forecasting). In turn, we present evidence suggesting that incorporating key concepts from the field of relationships (e.g., need to belong, attachment style) can enrich traditional JDM domains. These largely unrecognized overlaps between relationship decisions and decisions made in more traditional decision-making domains suggest that the fields of relationship science and JDM—each of which contains a wealth of existing theory, findings, and research tools—could be used to illuminate one another for mutual benefit.

Conservatives Anticipate and Experience Stronger Emotional Reactions to Negative Outcomes

The present work examined whether conservatives and liberals differ in their anticipation of their own emotional reactions to negative events. In two studies, participants imagined experiencing positive or negative outcomes in domains that do not directly concern politics. In Study 1, 190 American participants recruited online (64 male, Mage  = 32 years) anticipated their emotional responses to romantic relationship outcomes. In Study 2, 97 Canadian undergraduate students (26 male, Mage  = 21 years) reported on their anticipated and experienced emotional responses to academic outcomes. In both studies, more conservative participants predicted they would feel stronger negative emotions following negative outcomes than did more liberal participants. Furthermore, a longitudinal follow-up of Study 2 participants revealed that more conservative participants actually felt worse than more liberal participants after receiving a lower-than-desired exam grade. These effects remained even when controlling for the Big Five traits, prevention focus, and attachment style (Study 1), and optimism (Study 2). We discuss how the relationship between political orientation and anticipated affect likely contributes to differences between conservatives and liberals in styles of decision and policy choices.

Religion and Punishment Opposing Influences of Orthopraxy and Orthodoxy on Reactions to Unintentional Acts

We hypothesize that two distinct facets of religiosity—orthodoxy (an emphasis on belief) and orthopraxy (an emphasis on behavior)—predict differential sensitivity to an actor’s intent when making moral judgments. Participants judged actors who performed misdeeds intentionally or unintentionally. In Study 1, high orthopraxy predicted harsher judgments of the unintentional actor, while high orthodoxy predicted more lenient judgments. In Study 2, we investigated a potential explanation for these effects, priming participants with either an “action focus” or a “thought focus.” Action-focused participants judged the unintentional actor more harshly than did thought-focused participants. In Study 3, participants from an orthopraxic tradition (Hinduism) judged the unintentional actor more harshly than did those from an orthodox tradition (Protestantism). These findings contribute to a growing literature on the multifaceted nature of religion. They also carry broader implications for understanding people’s responses to actions as a function of the actor’s mental state.

Folk beliefs about genetic variation predict avoidance of biracial individuals.

People give widely varying estimates for the amount of genetic overlap that exists between humans. While some laypeople believe that humans are highly genetically similar to one another, others believe that humans share very little genetic overlap. These studies examine how beliefs about genetic overlap affect neural and evaluative reactions to racially-ambiguous and biracial targets. In Study 1, we found that lower genetic overlap estimates predicted a stronger neural avoidance response to biracial compared to monoracial targets. In Study 2, we found that lower genetic overlap estimates predicted longer response times to classify biracial (vs. monoracial) faces into racial categories. In Study 3, we manipulated genetic overlap beliefs and found that participants in the low overlap condition explicitly rated biracial targets more negatively than those in the high overlap condition. Taken together, these data suggest that genetic overlap beliefs influence perceivers’ processing fluency and evaluation of biracial and racially-ambiguous individuals.