Javier Gracia Calandín

La interculturalidad en el quicio de la hermenéutica filosófica

This paper takes up Foucault’s theoretical legacy and looks for the hermeneutical keys which will enable its critical appropriation by the present day revolutionary left. It also aims to developping an idea previously set out by N. Poulantzas: not only are Foucault’s thesis compatible with marxism, they can only be fully understood from it.Although certain environmentalist liberals have fiercely defended Rawls’s theory of justice, their analysis has limited to distribution of environmental resources between generations in accordance with the principle of mutual benefit. In contrast, if this reflection is extended to intra-generational distributive cases while assuming the thesis of scarcity in natural resources, Rawls’s work is inadequate even to approach the environmental challenge.The main purpose of this article is to revise the question of whether or not philosophical truths exist and if so, what is their status, what makes them specific and sets them apart from other truths. Following an analysis of the two tendencies that appear as answers to this question, characterized by the thoughts of Hegel and Schopenhauer, the author argues that there are no philosophical truths and furthermore, claims that philosophy is an impure activity, which cannot be reconciled the empirical and formal disciplines. Thus, the paper concludes that philosophy should not be a servant of any other discipline or activity.Nowadays , the term solidarity is widespread. However, solidarity only beco- mes meaningful when it comes from a normative grounding. We refer to a post-conventional solidarity, which does rsot rule out the structures of a quotidian world. Consequently, solidarity must be distinguished from a type of ethnocentric solidarity — as in the thesis defended by Rorty — to be contemplated from a post-conventional viewpoint. The theory of Habermas appears to offer an alternative that meets the demands of a concept of solidarity interwoven with a normative commitment.This article aims to analyse the problem of a Basic Income within the framework of social justice. The analysis starts out from Van Parijs’ project for Welfare Stat e reform. Firstly, the various positions, which argue for such an income are considered, specifically that of J. M. Ferry, in order to find out the differences between them. Secondly, Universal Income is related to J. Rawls’ theory un justice, iii particular to his principle of difference; the contradiction with the problem of exploitation which rules the capitalist system is then analysed. Finally, a temptative conclusion is set out: there is a need to avoid the isolation of the Income problem from the ways out of the crisis through a massive reduction in employment and the potential development of a Third Sector.