Jean A. Garrison

Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda

This article examines strategic framing efforts within the presidents inner circle of foreign policy advisors. The comparative case study method is used to describe and explain the framing process involved in President Jimmy Carters arms control decisions with respect to the Soviet Union. Carters two central foreign policy advisors, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, portrayed the Soviets in very different terms. The premise underlying this study is that advisors attempt to frame their policy preferences favorably in order to influence the group process and the presidents policy choice. Advisors do so by playing up the positive aspects of an option and downplaying any negative aspects. Three components of the framing process are explored: historical/cultural symbolism, personal beliefs and values, and political cost assessments. Language: en

Managing Intragroup Relations in Foreign Policy Prescriptions, Assumptions and Consequences

There has been a large effort among scholars who study small group decision-making to find the means to ameliorate the negative aspects of group interaction. It is our contention that the specific content of the offered prescription is a logical outgrowth of the underlying assumptions that the author makes regarding the nature of group interaction. Thus, understanding whether the author sees the group as characterized by member consensus or dissensus and whether the group is perceived to be internally focused on group maintenance or externally focused on problem-solving is central to understanding the basis of the offered prescription. Based on this typology, we examine the prescriptions to group dysfunctions offered from three sets of literature, foreign policy analysis, social psychology, and business decision-making. The prescriptions offered are then classified as to the underlying view of group interaction which drives the proposed remedy. In doing so, we seek to understand the bases and implications of prescriptions already existing in the literature. Ironically, the effort to solve one set of decision-making troubles may lead the group to exhibit the problems associated with an alternative form of group interaction.

Energy Security Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Simulating a Comparative Bureaucratic Politics Approach

For those who must import oil to maintain their economies and quality of life, any disruption in the delivery of imported oil is a highly threatening prospect. How would U.S. policymakers react to such a threat in the contemporary era? We examine the potential policymaking roles and impacts of bureaucratic actors operating at the intersection of energy and security issues. To do so, we explore a comparative approach using an original simulation that envisions an energy supply “crisis” in the United States due to events in a hypothetical state somewhat inspired by Hugo Chavezs Venezuela. The simulation is run at three very different universities in three different courses, yet the results are surprisingly similar. Despite the obvious security implications of an oil shortage during a time of war, we find more engaged roles for those representing nonmilitary bureaucracies, a greater reliance on diplomatic and economic tools to respond to the crisis, less reliance on military policy instruments than might have been the case in the past, and a concern for tempering responses until more is known.

The Rise of Hedging and Regionalism: An Explanation and Evaluation of President Obama's China Policy

Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, there have been many ups and downs in U.S. relations with China. Each presidential administration—whether Democrat or Republican—has pursued a policy of “engagement.” Although this term, or policy frame, has meant many things, it represents for them a broad umbrella concept that includes a range of policy options mixing cooperative and competitive approaches. The Obama administration has been no exception. This paper explains the Obama administrations engagement policy by evaluating its two central elements: (1) the bilateral relationship with China itself and (2) the rise of a pan-Asian regional policy that undergirds its rebalance to Asia. In this analysis, the Obama administrations approach encompasses both cooperative and hedging strategies, thus demonstrating more continuity than change in its approach to China. It concludes by noting that, despite the growing competition in the U.S.–China relationship, strategic rivalry is not a preordained policy outcome. Rather, the common future for both states rests on leadership and smart policy choices, not fate.

Explaining Change in the Carter Administration's China Policy: Foreign Policy Adviser Manipulation of the Policy Agenda

The formal recognition of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979 shifted the balance in the American, Soviet, and Chinese triangular relationship and stirred up domestic opposition from the Taiwan lobby. From a foreign policy agenda that emphasized ddtente with the Soviet Union, the Carter administration developed a strategic military relationship with the Chinese to counter a shared perception of the Soviet threat. This shift in President Carters thinking was a dramatic change from a president who initially sought deep cuts in nuclear weapons with the Soviets. This change raises important questions about the making of Americas China policy, namely, how and why did this tilt toward China occur? As the United States conducted its sensitive negotiations with China, both strategic and domestic considerations influenced how negotiations proceeded. There were tradeoffs at the international level because as the United States pursued normalization the Soviet Union could be alienated. At the domestic level, given the shared nature of American power between the president and Congress, any change in policy toward China faced challenges from members of Congress and other domestic critics that could jeopardize the presidents policy initiatives. This meant that the Carter administration engaged in a two-level game to balance Chinese expectations/demands with the constraints posed by the domestic polit