Steven B. Redd

Can We Generalize from Student Experiments to the Real World in Political Science, Military Affairs, and International Relations?

The authors conducted an experiment with a group of military officers and replicated it with a group of students at a public university in the United States. The experimental scenario dealt with a decision problem in the area of counterterrorism. The authors found that while more than one-third of students recommended doing nothing, the overwhelming majority of military officers (more than 90 percent) recommended doing something. Also, military officers exhibited less maximizing and more satisfacing decision making than students. The results show that relying on experiments with students “playing” the role of real-world national security policy makers may bias the results. The two groups are, in fact, very different. Based on student samples, it is possible to accept propositions that would not be found with samples of elite decision makers and reject propositions that may be right. However, it is possible that students can be assigned to experiments where they represent the “public” and not elites.

The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making: An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform

Previous studies of political decision making have used only “static” choice sets, where alternatives are “fixed” and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the effect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a two-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based “process tracer” in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic).

The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making

The influence of advisers on foreign policy processes and choice and on how decision strategies affect foreign policy outcomes are examined. Using the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making and process-tracing techniques in an experimental setting, the effects of the presence of advisers on strategy selection and choice and the influence of strategy selection on choice in a foreign policy scenario are tested. The findings show that decision makers are highly sensitive to and cognizant of the political ramifications of their decisions. Specifically, political information and advice influenced information processing and foreign policy choices. The findings have significant implications for the study of foreign policy decision making and the understanding of real-world foreign policy decisions.

Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in Foreign Policy Decision Making An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory

The bureaucratic politics model and the poliheuristic theory are used to examine how political advice presented in various contexts influences choice. Organizational advisers who offer endogenous political advice are compared with situations in which the decision maker is offered advice by a separate, or exogenous, political adviser. Results show that decision makers are influenced by political evaluations in a noncompensatory manner, even when this advice is endogenously presented, and that political evaluations (and foreign policy choices) can be affected by the presence of multiple bureaucratic advisers. These findings have significant implications for how information is presented in advisory group settings.

The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Experimental Evidence

Although the poliheuristic theory of decision making has been in existence for only a short while, it has already made significant strides toward becoming a respected theory in the field of foreign policy analysis. (See Geva et al. 1996c; Mintz and Geva 1994; Mintz et al. 1997.)1 The poliheuristic theory attempts to bridge the gap between cognitive/psychological (see Stein and Welch 1 997) and rational choice (see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990,1992;Morrow 1 997) approaches to the study of foreign policy decision making (Mintz 1997).2 Since 1994, studies incorporating the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making have been presented at numerous conferences, including the American Political Science Association (APSA), International Studies Association (ISA), and Peace Science Society (International) meetings, and have appeared in the American Political Science Review and several edited books (DeRouen 2001; Geva and Mintz 1997; Mintz et al. 1997; Redd 2000).

Energy Security Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Simulating a Comparative Bureaucratic Politics Approach

For those who must import oil to maintain their economies and quality of life, any disruption in the delivery of imported oil is a highly threatening prospect. How would U.S. policymakers react to such a threat in the contemporary era? We examine the potential policymaking roles and impacts of bureaucratic actors operating at the intersection of energy and security issues. To do so, we explore a comparative approach using an original simulation that envisions an energy supply “crisis” in the United States due to events in a hypothetical state somewhat inspired by Hugo Chavezs Venezuela. The simulation is run at three very different universities in three different courses, yet the results are surprisingly similar. Despite the obvious security implications of an oil shortage during a time of war, we find more engaged roles for those representing nonmilitary bureaucracies, a greater reliance on diplomatic and economic tools to respond to the crisis, less reliance on military policy instruments than might have been the case in the past, and a concern for tempering responses until more is known.

International Norms in Ethno-Territorial Disputes: Legitimacy and Efficacy in Outsiders’ Views of Independence and Irredentism

Abstract Ethno-national territorial disputes typically involve conflicting homeland claims between states and minority ethnic groups. Where such minority ethnic groups have cross-border ethnic kin who themselves constitute a dominant or influential ethnic group in a neighbouring state, separatist goals may take the form of either irredentism or independence. We conjecture that external sympathy for irredentism and independence may vary significantly, and that this variation may be an important influence in situations where secessionist groups and ethnic kin states have a choice between the two goals. Using a bargaining framework that controls for variation in relative power, status quo conditions and minority-side leadership preferences, we present experimental evidence indicating that external audiences are likely to support more confrontational policies in pursuit of independence than in pursuit of irredentism. Our evidence also indicates that independence attracts greater support largely because outsiders perceive it as a more legitimate goal; and that practical efficacy is not important in stimulating sympathy for either independence or irredentism. These results also support a broader argument in the literature on international norms – that such norms receive support not only because they may justify pre-existing goals or interests, but also because they are perceived as having greater legitimacy per se.