Jean Porter

Openness and Constraint: Moral Reflection as Tradition-Guided Inquiry in Alasdair MacIntyre's Recent Works

I ask the reader to start by supposing that someone (himself perhaps) is faced with a serious moral problem.... I wish to draw attention to two features which any such serious problem will have, the combination of which seems to confront us, as philosophers, with a paradox, or even an antinomy. The first is that a man who is faced with such a problem knows that it is his own problem, and that nobody can answer it for him.... Against this conviction, which every adult has, that he is free to form his own opinions about moral questions, we have to set another characteristic of these questions which seems to contradict it. This is, that

A tradition of civility: the natural law as a tradition of moral inquiry

We are accustomed to think of the natural law as being more or less equivalent to a universal morality, whether this is seen as grounded in nature in some general sense, or more specifically in the deliverances of practical reason. There is another way of approaching the natural law, however, according to which it is identified with a specific moral tradition which cannot be adequately understood apart from some account of its historical development and social location. This paper defends the latter approach. It proceeds by way of an examination of one phase in the development of the natural law tradition, namely, its formulation as a systematic moral theology in the early scholastic period. Scholastic reflection on the natural law follows the pattern of a tradition-based form of moral reasoning, and even though the scholastics did not understand their moral reflections specifically in those terms, their concept of the natural law is congruent with a modern understanding of it as a tradition of inquiry.

The search for a global ethic

The author examines in section two of Notes on Moral Theology some of the principal issues that have emerged in recent discussions of the prospect for attaining a common morality in the context of global pluralism. Special attention is given to recent debates about human rights in international contexts. The second part of this article examines recent work undertaken by Hans Kung on this topic.

Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics

This article reassesses Peter Abelards account of moral intention, or, better, consent, in light of recent work on his own thought and on the twelfth-century background of that thought. The author argues (1) that Abelards focus on consent as the determining factor for morality does not rule out, but, on the contrary, presupposes objective criteria for moral judgment and (2) that Abelards real innovation does not lie in his doctrine of consent as the sole source of merit or guilt, but, rather, in his exploration of the ways in which this doctrine affects our understanding of the objective criteria for moral judgment. In particular, Abelard is led by his doctrine of consent to a thoroughgoing reassessment of the moral significance of the passions, which, in turn, leads him to reject the view that actions should be evaluated in terms of the praiseworthy or vicious character of the passions they express.

Making Common Cause with Men and Women of Our Age: A Thomist Perspective

This paper argues that Aquinas and other scholastic theologians offer unexpected resources for a moral theology that is fully engaged with today’s pluralistic societies. In order to do so, it is necessary to bring Aquinas into a conversation with these diverse perspectives, rather than treating his thought as a closed system, and to extend his insights through original, constructive analysis.

Comments on Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Justice: Rights and Wrongs:

Wolterstorff ’s Justice: Rights and Wrongs is a bold and welcome theological defense of human rights, carrying radical implications for moral and legal philosophy. However, Wolterstorff’s concept of the scope of human rights is too comprehensive and thereby paradoxically weakens the force of the human rights claims he rightly champions. Rights claims are not coterminous with obligations generally but represent very distinctive claims, notably the power of individuals to demand specific kinds of forbearance or treatment from specifiable others; Tierney has identified such claims as the ‘subjective natural rights’ uncovered by late medieval thinkers. Our obligations towards one another incorporate a wide and heterogeneous variety of considerations, which do not lend themselves to any kind of neat, formulaic summary but which are specified only in the process of forming practical judgements in concrete cases.

Moral Mistakes, Virtue and Sin: The Case of Othello

The view that one’s moral status is dependent on the stance of the will alone is an attractive view, deeply entrenched in Christian ethics. Yet it cannot account for pervasive intuitions about some kinds of moral mistakes, in particular those which arise at the point of choice. An agent’s moral beliefs are connected to his or her moral personality in a way that beliefs about matters of fact are not. This does not mean that a moral mistake never excuses the agent from subjective guilt, but it does mean that we cannot assume that this is always the case. This paper attempts to develop these suggestions through reflection on Othello, whose eponymous hero acts out of a combination of factual and moral errors which are intertwined with his character in revealing ways.

Chastity as a virtue

Aquinass analysis of chastity as a part of temperance points the way towards a positive virtue ethic of sexuality, even though he himself did not develop his analysis in this direction. This alternative illustrates that ‘the tradition’, that is to say, the moral heritage in terms of which Christians define themselves through affirmation or rejection, is more complex than we sometimes assume, including diverse approaches to difficult topics even within one author. Even more importantly, considered on its own merits a broadly Thomistic, virtue-oriented approach offers an attractive sexual ethic which implies that ideals of restraint and consideration for others have substantive content, without tying these ideals to specific norms in a reductive or overly inflexible way.

Focus Introduction: Taking the Measure of Jonathan Edwards for Contemporary Religious Ethics

The Journal of Religious Ethics marks the tercentenary of Edwardss birth with the following collection of essays. In keeping with the overall mission of the journal, this tribute takes the form of historical and constructive reflection, in which diverse perspectives on Edwardss work and diverse forms of engagement with it supplement and correct one another. Our hope is that these essays will serve both to generate interest in Edwardss work among those who are unfamiliar with him, and to advance the discussion of central issues in theological and religious ethics. In this introductory essay, we will offer some reflections on Edwardss general significance for contemporary ethics, followed by a closer examination of his main texts and a brief summary of the essays collected here.

Divine Commands, Natural Law, and the Authority of God

Does morality depend ultimately on the rationally compelling force of natural law, or on God’s authoritative commands? These are not exclusive alternatives, of course, but they represent two widely influential ways of understanding the moral order seen in relation to divine wisdom, goodness, and power. Each alternative underscores some elements of theistic belief while deemphasizing others. Theories of the natural law emphasize the intrinsic goodness of the natural order to the potential detriment of divine freedom, whereas divine command theories underscore God’s sovereign freedom but at the risk of implying that the moral order is arbitrary and God’s will is, at best, opaque. It might seem that these alternatives are not only distinct but fundamentally at odds, but we may well ask whether this is necessarily the case. Natural law and divine command theories of ethics have persisted because each seems to preserve some key elements of theistic belief, and for that reason, theists have a stake in holding on to each perspective if possible.