Jeff E. Biddle

Sleep and the Allocation of Time

Using aggregated data for 12 countries, a cross section of microeconomic data, and a panel of households, we demonstrate that increases in time in the labor market reduce sleep. Our theory of the demand for sleep differs from standard models of time use by assuming that sleep affects wages by affecting labor market productivity. Estimates of a system of demand equations demonstrate that higher wage rates reduce sleep time among men but increase their waking nonmarket time by an equal amount. Among women the wage effect on sleep is negative but very small.

Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination: Lawyers' Looks and Lucre

We propose models with an ascriptive characteristic generating earnings differentials and causing sectoral sorting, allowing us to distinguish among sources producing such differentials. We use longitudinal data on a large sample of graduates from one law school and measure beauty by rating matriculation photographs. (1) Betterlooking attorneys who graduated in the 1970s earned more than others after 5 years of practice, an effect that grew with experience. (2) Attorneys in the private sector are better‐looking than those in the public sector, differences that rise with age. These results support theories of dynamic sorting and customer behavior.

A companion to the history of economic thought

ion of every human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences. (Mill, 1967a,

Choice among Wage-Hours Packages: An Empirical Investigation of Male Labor Supply

This article specifies and estimates an empirical model of male labor supply based on an implicit market model of wage-hours determination. We discuss how moving from a standard labor supply model to an implicit market model affects model specification and choice of estimation technique. We find that average hourly earnings are not independent of hours worked and that OLS estimates of the wage-hours relationship are biased. We also show that a labor supply model that assumes wages to be independent of hours worked produces a positively biased estimate of the effect of the wage on labor supply.

Private Sector Scientists and Engineers and the Transition to Management

The authors present and empirically test a self-selection/job matching model of a common transition in the careers of scientists and engineers-the move from technical to managerial jobs. Technical and managerial ability are assumed to be positively but not perfectly correlated, so that technical job performance provides information about both technical and managerial ability upon which to base the decision to become a manager. NSF panel data provides evidence that managerial and technical productivity are positively correlated, and that information received while on the job does influence the workers selection of a managerial or a technical career path.

Wage Discrimination Over the Business Cycle

Using CPS data from 1979–2009 we examine how cyclical downturns and industry-specific demand shocks affect wage differentials between white non-Hispanic men and women, Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites, and African-Americans and non-Hispanic whites. Women’s relative earnings are harmed by negative shocks; the wage disadvantage of African-Americans drops with negative shocks, while the impact on Hispanics’ wages is unclear. A theory of job search suggests two opposite-signed mechanisms that affect these wage differentials. It suggests greater absolute effects among job-movers, which is verified using the longitudinal component of the CPS.Jel codesJ7, E3

Do high claim-denial rates discourage claiming? Evidence from workers compensation insurance

If individuals decide whether to file an insurance claim based in part on the expected value of the benefits they will receive, then changes in the probability that a claim will be denied by the insurer will influence the probability that a claim is filed. Increasing claim-denial rates to reduce claim rates and cut costs would be a questionable strategy for an insurance company that marketed policies to the individuals who will file claims. But in the workers compensation insurance market, insurers sell policies to employers, while it is workers who file claims that may be denied. This article examines evidence from a period in the state of Oregon during which workers whose employers were covered by different workers compensation carriers faced different claim-denial rates at the same point in time, and during which the states largest carrier changed its claim-denial rate dramatically over time. Using this evidence, the author finds that higher denial rates were associated with lower rates of claim filing. F urthermore, this relationship was strong and significant for claims arising from back injuries but insignificant for claims arising from traumatic injuries. Possible reasons for this latter finding are explored. INTRODUCTION Insurance carriers do not accept all the claims made by those they insure. Some claims are denied, whether because the insurer believes that the insured party misunderstood the terms of the coverage, or because the insurer suspects exaggeration of losses or some other intentional fraud on the part of the insured. Standard economic reasoning suggests that in deciding whether to file a claim, the insured individual takes into account this possibility of denial, along with any costs in terms of time and trouble imposed on him or her by the screening process through which the insurer makes the denial decision. Thus, an increase in the probability that all or part of a claim will be denied, or in the delays and requirements imposed on the claimant while that decision is reached, lowers the number of claims filed, Of course, an insurance company competing in a private market would likely be wary of a strategy designed to reduce the number of claims filed by increasing denial rates and/or the rigorousness of claims- screening procedures, as such behavior would potentially lead to a loss of customers to other carriers. Designers and administrators of social insurance programs such as Unemployment Insurance or Social Security Disability Insurance are in a different position, as they do not need to solicit customers for their insurance in a competitive marketplace. When faced with rising costs or concerns with moral hazard on the part of potential recipients, they can raise denial rates by tightening eligibility requirements or enforcing eligibility requirements more stringently, subject only to political pressures from potential recipients and those who represent them. Such increases lower program costs directly by lowering the number of filed claims that are paid. But, as Parsons (1991) has pointed out, an increase in claim-denial rates also acts as a self-screening mechanism, discouraging some potential recipients from even attempting to file a claim. Parsons offers empirical evidence of the claim discouraging effect of rising denial rates in the Social Security Disability Insurance program, as do Helpern and Hausman (1986 ) and Gruber and Kubik (1997). Likewise, Blank and Card (1991) show that the proportion of eligible unemployed workers filing for Unemployment Insurance benefits is lower, other things equal, in states that disqualify a greater percentage of those who actually do file claims. This study looks at another social insurance program, workers compensation insurance, for evidence that claiming is discouraged by higher claim-denial rates. The author examines data on workers compensation claims from the state of Oregon, covering a period during which, because of changes in state law and policy changes by the states largest workers compensation insurer, there was considerable variation in claim-denial rates experienced by claimants over time, and by different groups of claimants at the same point in time. …

The Introduction of the Cobb-Douglas Regression and Its Adoption by Agricultural Economists

The first part of this essay reviews Paul Douglass twenty-year research program of using the Cobb-Douglas function to statistically estimate relationships between inputs and outputs. Emphasis is placed on the evolution of Douglass own conceptualization of the program, and also the variety of views that arose among economists as to the significance of Douglass results and, more generally, the potential value of the type of work he was doing. The second part examines the work of a group of agricultural economists who successfully established the Cobb-Douglas regression as a research tool in their field. They saw the regression as a way to address long-standing questions specific to agricultural economics. As a result, their defense and development of the method, as well as the criticisms they attracted from their colleagues, while drawing on the earlier literature surrounding Douglass work, had noticeably different emphases and helped establish the Cobb-Douglas regression as a general purpose empirical tool for economists.

Making Consumers Comfortable: The Early Decades of Air Conditioning in the United States

During the air conditioner industrys first four decades, most installations were “commercial comfort” air conditioning systems, purchased by retailers to increase demand for their products. Air conditioning spread unevenly through the commercial sector and across the country. Using data from a variety of sources, I offer a quantitative account of this diffusion, viewed through an interpretive framework that emphasizes differences across geographic markets and industries in the costs and benefits to retailers of installing air conditioning. Correlates of early adoption of commercial air conditioning include electricity rates and consumer income and education levels.

Air Conditioning, Migration, and Climate-Related Wage and Rent Differentials

This paper explores whether the spread of air conditioning in the United States from 1960 to 1990 affected quality of life in warmer areas enough to influence decisions about where to live, or to change North-South wage and rent differentials. Using measures designed to identify climates in which air conditioning would have made the biggest difference, I found little evidence that the flow of elderly migrants to MSAs with such climates increased over the period. Following Roback (1982), I analyzed data on MSA wages, rents, and climates from 1960 to 1990, and find that the implicit price of these hot summer climates did not change significantly from 1960 to 1980, then became significantly negative in 1990. This contrary to what one would expect if air conditioning made hot summers more bearable. I presented evidence that hot summers are an inferior good, which would explain part of the negative movement in the implicit price of a hot summer, and evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal person migrating from colder to hotter MSAs dislikes summer heat more than does the average resident of a hot MSA, which would also exert downward pressure on the implicit price of a hot summer.