Jeffrey A. Fine

Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior

This paper examines the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches by focusing specifically on congressional influences on the behavior of federal judges. We argue that Congress may constrain individual judicial behavior by passing statutes containing detailed language. To test this thesis we borrow from the bureaucratic politics literature to introduce and test a new measure of statutory constraint. Using data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals we find that appellate court behavior is constrained significantly by statutory language, although this constraint is asymmetric across ideology. We discover substantial differences between Democratic and Republican appointees both in terms of statutory constraint and ideological voting. The data indicate judges appointed by Democratic presidents are constrained by statutory language in criminal cases. Similarly, Republican appointees are constrained by statutes in civil rights cases. Yet, neither Democrats nor Republicans are constrained in economic cases.

Substantive Religious Representation in the U.S. Senate Voting Alignment with the Family Research Council

Studies of representation are widespread in the congressional literature, with recent work focusing on both descriptive and substantive representation of various minority groups. The authors focus on religious representation in Congress, examining the extent to which senators’ own religious affiliation and the relative size of their religious constituencies affect substantive representation of Religious Right interests. The authors find that Christian senators (evangelical Protestants, conservative Catholics, and Mormons alike) provide better representation of the Religious Right, as do senators from states with larger Christian constituencies. The findings demonstrate that substantive representation is the product of characteristics of both the representatives and the represented.