Jeffrey Diebold

The Impact of Medicare Part D on Self-Employment:

We explore the relationship between access to affordable health insurance and self-employment using exogenous variation from the introduction of Medicare Part D that reduced the out-of-pocket cost of prescription drugs and improved health outcomes in a difference-in-differences model using the American Community Survey. We find that our treatment group of individuals aged 65–69 were 0.5 percentage points (or 5%) more likely to be self-employed in relation to a control group aged 60–64.

The Effects of Medicare Part D on Health Outcomes of Newly Covered Medicare Beneficiaries

Objectives To estimate the impact of Medicare Part D on cost-related prescription nonadherence and health outcomes among the newly covered medicare beneficiaries. Method Difference-in-differences analyses of data from a balanced panel of Medicare beneficiaries observed in each wave of the Health and Retirement Study from 2000 to 2010 were carried out. The differences in the pre- and post-Part D changes in these outcomes are calculated for previously uncovered Part D enrollees and a comparison group of previously covered Medicare beneficiaries. Results The results from this analysis indicate that Part D reduced cost-related nonadherence rates among the newly covered by 7 percentage points and that this decline was sustained through 2010. Part D was also associated with a 5 percentage points increase in the likelihood that a newly covered enrollee reported to be in good or better health and a 4-percentage point decline in the likelihood of being diagnosed with high blood pressure. These improvements were also sustained through 2010 but were only evident among those newly covered beneficiaries who remained enrolled in a Part D plan through 2010. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Part D improved the blood pressure of newly covered, hypertensive beneficiaries. Discussion Part D has had a sustained impact on cost-related nonadherence rates and the health status of newly covered beneficiaries. However, the change in health status is conditional on remaining enrolled in a Part D plan over time.

Early claiming of higher-earning husbands, the survivor benefit, and the incidence of poverty among recent widows

Social Security provides survivor benefits to lower-earning spouses of deceased workers entitled to a retirement benefit. The value of the survivor benefit depends on a number of factors including the deceased workers claim age. We use the Health and Retirement Study and a discrete time hazard model to analyze how the claim age of married men influences the likelihood that their spouse will enter poverty in widowhood. We find that delayed claiming is associated with reduction in a widows poverty risk. The magnitude of this relationship varies significantly with the claim age, Social Security dependence, and survivor benefit dependence.

SWEAT THE SMALL STUFF: STRATEGIC SELECTION OF PENSION POLICIES USED TO DEFER REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS

The administrators of state†sponsored defined benefit public pension plans have considerable discretion to determine the accounting and actuarial parameters used to calculate the normal cost contributions and amortization payments that, together, comprise the sponsoring states annual required contribution amount. Using longitudinal data from the Public Pension Database and a fixed effects approach, we find evidence that suggests plan administrators decisions about cost and amortization methods are influenced by the normal cost and amortization payments, respectively. When these costs increase, administrators tend to use less prudent methods that defer, or keep low, the pension contributions required from the state while, simultaneously, and perversely, improving the appearance of the plans funded status and the states funding discipline. (JEL H75)

Turnover at the Top: Investigating Performance-Turnover Sensitivity among Nonprofit Organizations

ABSTRACT Research has confirmed private firm performance as a predictor of executive turnover, but whether this relationship holds in other organizational contexts—especially those operating without a profit-distribution requirement—is not known. For nonprofit organizations, performance monitoring and governance largely occur behind closed doors under the leadership of a volunteer board of directors. Nonprofits are commonly criticized as inefficient, even ineffective, and the accountability of boards and executives for organizational performance has not been sufficiently investigated. This article engages a unique dataset of 998 U.S.-based nonprofits serving missions related to the arts, health, and human services, and uses a multiple-spell discrete-time hazard model to evaluate nonprofit financial performance and the likelihood of executive turnover. The findings provide preliminary support that tenure in the executive office is sensitive to nonprofit financial performance, and in doing so, they raise new insights about the accountability of nonprofit executives.

Annuities, Credits and Deductions: An Experimental Test of the Relative Strength of Economic Incentives

Does the type of tax incentive matter in terms of encouraging behavior? Social policies often use tax incentives to encourage behavior, but little research has been conducted on how the structure or type of tax incentive might influence behavior. Using experimental methods, we test the effects of incentives structured as tax deductions and credits with respect to the policy problem of how best to encourage people to purchase annuities at retirement. We hypothesize that tax credits may be more effective than tax deductions at increasing the rate at which individuals would engage in socially desirable behavior, because credits appear to have immediate value. Adult subjects played a financial decision-making game in which they were offered different incentives to purchase annuities. We found that incentives in the form of tax credits not only encouraged more annuity purchases relative to actuarially equivalent deductions, but also relative to deductions that were greater in value than the credit-based tax incentives.