Jens Ringsmose

NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War, the debates about NATO burden-sharing have changed considerably, yet descriptions of the basic burden-sharing dynamics have changed little since the Cold War era. This article shows that burden-sharing disputes remain a basic alliance problem, but they have changed fundamentally since 1989. The most salient burden-sharing disputes are worse today, illustrated most profoundly by experiences in Afghanistan. This article contrasts the major disparities between in alliance contributions during the Cold War and today. Working within the framework of collective goods theory, the article shows that NATOs ability to project military power is best accounted for by traditional security functions that the alliance still serves. Because of disputes and uncertainty over its strategic roles, and the tendency for many members to still perceive it as a vehicle for ‘keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’, collective action problems related to out-of-area operations remain serious, but can be assuaged through careful management.

Shaping public attitudes towards the deployment of military power: NATO, Afghanistan and the use of strategic narratives

Abstract This article seeks to explain variations in public support for the deployment of military troops to Afghanistan by means of the strategic narratives employed by national governments. Focusing on the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, we argue that strong narratives about the why-what-and-how of overseas military missions increase the likelihood of popular support, while weak story lines are likely to result in a souring public opinion environment. Contrary to most current studies of public opinion and the support for international missions, we thus emphasise the role played by political leaders in shaping public attitudes towards the projection of military power. Surely, politicians are affected by polls and the wishes of public opinion – but popular attitudes are far from immune from political elites’ attempts to rationalise the use of military force via strategic narratives.

In Denmark, Afghanistan is Worth Dying For: How Public Support for the War was Maintained in the Face of Mounting Casualties and Elusive Success

Much to their own surprise, successive Danish governments have succeeded in maintaining the highest level of public support among the nations contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, while suffering the highest number of fatalities per capita. We explain this puzzle in a parsimonious fashion manner using a novel analytical framework derived from elite-competition theory, the event-driven school and the literature on strategic narratives. The Danish government initially built strong political and popular support by making a case for war that resonated with broadly shared pre-existing interests and values (national defence and support for democracy and human/women’s rights), and role conceptions (supporting NATO and US-led military operations as a responsible member of international society). Succeeding governments subsequently maintained a high level of political consensus on Afghanistan through a process of continuous consultation and consensus-building. The political elites supporting the mission then sustained the high level of public support by defining success in ways that did not involve ‘winning’ but focused instead on the attainment of realistic short-term, tactical objectives such as police training and building of schools, and by speaking with one voice to the media. This effectively reduced the Danish media to a conveyor belt passively transmitting the positive views of the political parties supporting the Afghanistan operation and the officers and soldiers carrying it out.

The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

ABSTRACT With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come.

Drone warfare and morality in riskless war

In this article, we examine the more or less instinctive uneasiness felt towards the use of armed drones by many scholars, policy-makers and military personnel. How is it, we ask, that many people – including members of the armed forces – acknowledge that armed drones offer an expedient and legally defensible solution to pressing security challenges and yet feel uncomfortable about them? The articles main argument is that much of the criticism of drone warfare is associated with an underlying ethically conditioned discomfort with so-called “riskless warfare”. The very feature that makes drones so attractive to policy-makers and military commanders – their risk free deployment – is, paradoxically, also one of the primary causes why many feel fundamentally uncomfortable with them. To make this argument, we build on the works of Martin van Creveld and Paul W. Kahn. While van Creveld argues that war should first and foremost be perceived of as a social activity governed more by the soldiers conducting the war than by the rationalty of states, Kahn identifies a ‘paradox of riskless warfare’ because our pursuit of asymmetry undermines reciprocity and thereby also the moral justification for killing the opponents combatants.

Victim of its own success: How NATO’s difficulties are caused by the absence of a unifying existential threat

NATO is neither in deep trouble nor destined to fall apart. The ‘NATO-in-crisis perspective’, which has gained currency in recent years, correctly identifies three centrifugal forces that threaten to undermine the Alliance: strategic divergence, a declining ability to act militarily and fading public support. These problems are partly of NATO’s own making because they stem from the creation of a generally benign security environment devoid of clear and present existential threats. While the absence of a clear, unifying existential threat has made it impossible for the Alliance to agree on a common core purpose, this does not mean that NATO will fall apart. Three centripetal forces that will continue to keep it together trumps the three centrifugal forces identified by the NATO-in-crisis perspective: converging national security interests, a strong sense of community and US leadership.

Now for the Hard Part: NATO’s Strategic Adaptation to Russia

The Alliance’s success in adapting its deterrence posture has brought into focus a range of more complex challenges.

Cyber-bombing ISIS: why disclose what is better kept secret?

ABSTRACT It has become a conventional wisdom in strategic studies that the development and use of cyber weapons should be kept secret, as the effectiveness of these tools is dependent on opponents being unaware of a particular cyber weapon’s characteristics. Why, then, has the US military repeatedly publicized its cyber operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq? Why reveal what is supposedly better conducted in the dark? In this essay, we provide four answers to this puzzle. We argue that the Pentagon aims to (1) legitimize major investments in the cyber domain to a domestic audience, (2) undermine the enemy’s trust in his own IT-infrastructure, and command and control systems, (3) signal “cyber strength” to third parties, and (4) establish norms regarding how to use cyber weapons in accordance with International Humanitarian Law.

Can NATO's new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?

This Policy Brief is an extended version of an article that first published in the journal Atlantisch Perspeetief (39:6) under the headline ”NATO’s new spearhead force: Credible deterrence?”

Size and Reputation: Why the USA has valued its “special relationships” with Denmark and the UK differently since 9/11

Denmark appears far more successful in managing its ‘special’ relationship with the USA than the UK since 9/11. By doing exactly the same as the UK, but on a much smaller scale and at much lower cost in terms of blood, treasure and domestic controversy, Denmark has succeeded in generating more American public gratitude than the UK. While London has been accused of losing Basra and Musa Qaleh, Copenhagen has been showered with praise and top-posts in NATO. This article explains why demonstrating how the differences in size and reputation gave rise to different expectations of the special relationship both in Washington and at home. Britain disappointed Washington by failing to make a difference in stabilising Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas Denmark by merely engaging in combat and taking casualties far exceeded Washington’s expectations. Likewise, the failure to significantly influence decision-making in Washington was a source of great frustration in London but a non-issue in Copenhagen, which never expected it in the first place.