Peter Viggo Jakobsen

Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP

There is almost universal agreement that the European security and defence policy (ESDP) has been driven and determined by the great powers (the UK, France and Germany). I challenge this view by arguing that the Nordic countries have had a significant, and at times even decisive, influence upon the civilian ESDP. They put civilian crisis management on the ESDP agenda and successfully kept it there in the face of strong opposition led by France; they have played central roles with respect to proposing and designing its concepts and institutions; and they have consistently made disproportionate mission contributions in terms of both personnel and treasure. I identify three factors that have blinded researchers to the Nordic role and explain the Nordic influence with four explanatory factors derived from the emerging literature on the European Union (EU) and small states. I thus rely on existing theory to make an empirical contribution to the field.

Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice

List of Figures and Tables Preface List of Acronyms Introduction Evaluation of the State of the Art Constructing a Theoretical Framework The Gulf Conflict, 1990-91 The Yugoslav Wars, 1991-95 Restoring Democracy in Haiti, 1991-94 Conclusions Bibliography Index

The Transformation of United Nations Peace Operations in the 1990s Adding Globalization to the Conventional `End of the Cold War Explanation'

The conventional `end of the Cold War explanation of the transformation of UN peace operations in the 1990s fails to specify the causal links between the independent variable (the end of the Cold War) and the observed variation in the dependent variable (the dramatic changes in the number and nature of peace operations). A missing link is the acceleration in the globalization of the market economy, democracy and human rights that has been triggered by the Western victory in the Cold War. Three developments link this acceleration to the transformation of UN peace operations: (1) the introduction of economic and political conditionality in Western development and assistance programmes served to generate a demand for peace operations by contributing to state collapse and the outbreak of armed conflicts in the Third World, (2) the change in norms that made it possible to launch peace operations in support of human rights and democracy served to increase the supply of peace operations aimed at promoting these goals, and (3) the intense media coverage of human rights violations and atrocities generated intervention pressures that also had the effect of increasing the supply of peace operations aimed at promoting democracy and humanitarian objectives.

The emerging consensus on grey area peace operations doctrine: Will it last and enhance operational effectiveness?

The emerging doctrinal consensus on grey area operations doctrine will have a lasting impact on doctrinal thinking as it is theoretically sound and has been validated in practice and embraced by the UN and non‐NATO states. It will also enhance operational effectiveness on Western‐led operations, but the operational improvements will be relatively limited in scope unless the Western powers: (1) accept public security tasks as a military responsibility in the early stages of grey area operations and adjust training and the composition of grey area contingents accordingly; (2) devise ways to accomplish grey area missions with fewer personnel, thus overcoming the current ‘overkill’ tendency in force planning which helps to undermine political will in the West; and (3) do more to enable non‐Western states to meet the doctrinal requirements for success. This is all easier said than done, but essential in order to realize the full potential has for operational improvements.

The JWST near-infrared spectrograph NIRSpec: status

The Near-Infrared Spectrograph NIRSpec is one of the four instruments of the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). NIRSpec will cover the 0.6-5.0 micron range and will be capable of obtaining spectra of more than 100 objects simultaneously in its multi-object spectroscopy (MOS) mode. It also features a set of slits and an aperture for high contrast spectroscopy of individual sources, as well as an integral-field unit (IFU) for 3D spectroscopy. We will first show how these capabilities are linked to the four main JWST scientific themes. We will then give an overview of the NIRpec modes and spectral configurations with an emphasis on the layout of the field of view and of the spectra. Last, we will provide an update on the status of the instrument.

A model-based approach to the spatial and spectral calibration of NIRSpec onboard JWST

Context. The NIRSpec instrument for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) can be operated in multiobject spectroscopy (MOS), long-slit, and integral field unit (IFU) mode with spectral resolutions from 100 to 2700. Its MOS mode uses about a quarter of a million individually addressable minislits for object selection, covering a field of view of ~9 arcmin 2 . Aims. The pipeline used to extract wavelength-calibrated spectra from NIRSpec detector images relies heavily on a model of NIRSpec optical geometry. We demonstrate how dedicated calibration data from a small subset of NIRSpec modes and apertures can be used to optimize this parametric model to the necessary levels of fidelity. Methods. Following an iterative procedure, the initial fiducial values of the model parameters are manually adjusted and then automatically optimized, so that the model predicted location of the images and spectral lines from the fixed slits, the IFU, and a small subset of the MOS apertures matches their measured location in the main optical planes of the instrument. Results. The NIRSpec parametric model is able to reproduce the spatial and spectral position of the input spectra with high fidelity. The intrinsic accuracy (1-sigma, rms) of the model, as measured from the extracted calibration spectra, is better than 1/10 of a pixel along the spatial direction and better than 1/20 of a resolution element in the spectral direction for all of the grating-based spectral modes. This is fully consistent with the corresponding allocation in the spatial and spectral calibration budgets of NIRSpec.

The Nordic peacekeeping model: Rise, fall, resurgence?

The Nordic peacekeeping model rose as a result of: selection criteria that limited the number of troop contributors to a select group of small and middle-sized states; common as well as national interests that made support for UN peacekeeping the logical policy; and the low-cost/high pay-off nature of the enterprise. Its fall in the 1990s was caused by the vast increase in the number of troop contributors, a strong reluctance to use force beyond self-defence and the growing involvement of the EU and NATO. A Nordic resurgence would have to be based on civilian contributions, but the will to establish such cooperation is unlikely to be mobilized in the near term.

The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected

Abstract This article takes issue with the prevailing view that the ESDP capacity building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field. It argues that civilian capacity building is harder than military capacity building, demonstrates that the European Unions (EUs) civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed and that the capacity goals set for 2008 are unattainable. Yet another major EU expectations–capability gap has been created and there is now a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EUs reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management.Abstract This article takes issue with the prevailing view that the ESDP capacity building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field. It argues that civilian capacity building is harder than military capacity building, demonstrates that the European Unions (EUs) civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed and that the capacity goals set for 2008 are unattainable. Yet another major EU expectations–capability gap has been created and there is now a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EUs reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management.

Reinterpreting western use of coercion in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Assurances and carrots were crucial

This article demonstrates that assurances and carrots accompanied credible threats every time Western coercion succeeded in Bosnia. This finding is hardly surprising as it merely confirms earlier research on coercive diplomacy, but it is nevertheless important because the crucial role played by assurances and carrots has been completely ignored in most analyses to date. It also has important policy implications at a time when Western, and particularly American, policy‐makers tend to ignore this fact at their peril. US policy towards Iraq and Western policy towards Yugoslavia have been based almost exclusively on the stick in recent years, and its lack of success is therefore not surprising. If Western policy‐makers had learned the right lessons from Bosnia, they would have known that strategies coupling credible threats with credible assurances and carrots would have been more likely to succeed.

Evaluation of the State of the Art

This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to define the concept of coercive diplomacy and distinguish it from other threat-based and related strategies. This is necessary due to the terminological confusion which characterizes the writings on this topic. Even highly competent scholars confuse coercive diplomacy with deterrence. As Alexander L. George points out, many scholars describe the American strategy that preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 as deterrence.1 Similarly, Janice Gross Stein and Richard Ned Lebow regard the American air strikes against Libya in 1986 as deterrence,2 Stein views the American reflagging policy in the Gulf in 1987–8 as extended deterrence, 3 Hansjuergen Koschwitz argues that the threats of force issued to convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait constitute deterrence and Christoph Bertram refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs in February 1994 and its bombing campaign in the autumn of 1995 as deterrence.4 In all these examples, the strategies employed are coercive diplomacy.5