Jerker Widén

Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The Case of Somali Piracy

The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.

Naval Diplomacy : A Theoretical Approach

This article considers theoretical aspects of the non-belligerent and political use of naval forces, commonly described as naval diplomacy. It presents four arguments. Firstly, it criticises the often used term “gunboat diplomacy” for being too narrow, emotionally charged, and burdened by colonialism. Secondly, the theories on naval diplomacy are criticised for being better suited for doctrinal purposes than for analytical purposes. Thirdly, criticism is levelled against the term “naval presence,” which is deemed insufficient as a focal point in a theory of naval diplomacy. Fourthly, elements of a workable theory of naval diplomacy are presented, including the political aim, naval means, diplomatic method, and geopolitical context. In conclusion, warships and navies are described as symbols of national sovereignty and power, and for having, not only a defence value, but also a symbolic, supportive, and coercive value.

Religion or Reason? Exploring Alternative Ways to Measure the Quality of Doctrine

ABSTRACT In this article, we address the often ignored issue of quality standards for doctrine. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature on military doctrine, since much of previous research has focused on outlining the effects of doctrine or the causes of particular doctrinal content, rather than how we should measure its quality. The predominant way of understanding quality of doctrine is based on the rationalist understanding of doctrine as a force multiplier. However, rationalist aims do not necessarily tell us anything about the contents of doctrine. Hence, a doctrine can be seemingly of high quality, but ultimately impede or lead armed forces astray. Rather than focusing on the utilitarian side of doctrine, we suggest that doctrine should mainly be understood as articles of faith or a belief system. And thus the quality of doctrine becomes inextricably linked to military norms and military identity. Writing doctrine thus becomes part of ritual, rather than reason.

Contemporary Military Theory : The dynamics of war

1. Military Theory: An Introduction 2. What is War? 3. What is Strategy? 4. What is Operational Art? 5. The Principles of War 6. Theories of Joint Operations 7. Theories of Land Operations 8. Theories of Sea Operations 9. Theories of Air Operations 10. The Dynamics of War: Some Conclusions

Theorist of Maritime Strategy : Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought

Theorist of Maritime Strategy : Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought

Adopting a Recipe for Success: Modern Armed Forces and the Institutionalization of the Principles of War

The prevailing explanation of the institutionalization of the principles of war is misleading. Although the introduction of the principles into Western doctrine coincided with total war and the need to train unprecedented numbers of soldiers and junior officers in tactics, the fact that the principles disappeared from doctrines immediately prior to and during the Second World War suggests that they were not institutionalized to meet an increased need to educate the military. Instead, we test two other explanations: one drawing on the principles’ military effectiveness and one drawing upon the principles’ explanatory power. We find that neither one of these hypotheses stand. Instead, we conclude by elaborating on how the institutionalization of the principles of war can be made understandable using non-rationalist frameworks, in particular the growth of a particular kind of identity of staff officers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. According to this framework, the two world wars interrupted—rather than promoted—the institutionalization of the principles, since the wars with their large death tolls and mass recruitment increased the difficulties of creating a separate and unique identity for the burgeoning corps of staff officers.

Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War

Abstract This article deals with the specific views of the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922) on the theoretical study of war, i.e. his theory on theory. What were Corbetts main ideas and how do they compare with those of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini? To what extent are Corbetts ideas original? The conclusions reached are that, first, the intellectual kinship between Corbett and Clausewitz is especially pronounced in this aspect of military theory. Second, the intellectual affinity between Corbetts and Jominis views on the theoretical study of war is indeed negligible. Finally, it is argued that Corbett presents only one original idea regarding the theoretical study of war and that this idea is problematic.

Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives, prospects and challenges

Abstract Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.

The New US Maritime Strategy : Implications for the Baltic Sea region

The new US maritime strategy has received praise from many corners of the world. As a manual it is well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a challenging global security environment in the years ahead. The strategy emphasises maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national interests, and where allies require reassurance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen argue that the document fails, to some extent, to address Russias increasingly challenging conduct and its implications for Northeast Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

Cultivating Regional Maritime Security : Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea

Cultivating Regional Maritime Security : Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea