Jonathan Colman

The London Ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce During the Wilson-Johnson Years, 1964–68

Using recently released sources, this article offers a fresh perspective on the London ambassadorship of David K. E. Bruce in the years of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, 1964–68. Bruces running of the US Embassy is examined, as are his views of the Anglo-American relationship. Further attention is given to his diplomatic management of the Anglo-American relationship in the context of the difficult personal relations between Wilson and Johnson and with regard to policy differences over the Vietnam War and Britains position as a world power. It is argued that while Bruce did help to ease some of the personal strains between Wilson and Johnson, he was generally less significant to the White House than has previously been asserted. It is also contended that his vision of Britain joining the EEC, yet retaining extensive military commitments beyond Europe was not viable.

The US Embassy and British film policy, 1947-48: A 'lesser but highly explosive question?

In August 1947 the British Treasury imposed a substantial tax on film imports, to conserve dollars for the purchase of essential goods from abroad. In response, the American film industry stopped exporting its product to Britain, and the US Embassy began lobbying vigorously against the tax. American diplomats wanted to promote free trade and feared that the US film industry might disseminate propaganda against European Recovery Programme aid planned for Britain. The tax was repealed in March 1948 partly due to Embassy protests, but the British authorities rejected the concerns of US diplomats over the subsequent quota system because of the seemingly greater importance of bolstering the indigenous film industry. This article examines the controversy over British film Policy 1947–1948 and offers fresh insights into the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and diplomatic representation in an era of growing US economic and cultural dominance. Among other things, it notes that what appears to be on the surface a relatively minor issue can have much broader implications.

The 1950 ‘Ambassador's agreement’ on USAF bases in the UK and British fears of US atomic unilateralism

Abstract The article explores the 1950 ‘Ambassadors Agreement’ (named after US Ambassador Lewis Douglas) about establishing long-term US air bases in the UK. During the discussions British representatives expressed resentment of American pressure and were concerned about the expense that developing the bases for American purposes might entail. There were even fears that Washington might use the airfields to launch an atomic bomb attack on the USSR without regard to the views of the UK government. The British consented to providing the bases because they wanted to enmesh the US further in UK and Western European defence. For their part American negotiators had wanted to further US atomic strategy without delay. Although the agreement imposed no restriction on the use of the airfields, some US officials believed that in a crisis the UK government might try to prevent them being used for atomic bombing missions.

Portrait of an Institution: The US Embassy in London, 1945-53

The US Embassy in London has long played a leading institutional role in the Anglo-American relationship, but few historians have examined that role. Th is article covers the early Cold War era of 1945-1953 — a formative period in the Anglo-American relationship — and considers issues such as the Embassy’s organization, the range of work in which it participated and the contributions of the successive ambassadors. Prominent policy issues during this period included the European Recovery Plan and the Berlin Crisis. It is contended that the Embassy reached the peak of its peacetime importance under US Ambassador Lewis Douglas from 1947-1950, and that its most important role was in policy liaison. Th is liaison function stemmed from the need to coordinate British and US policies in the developing Cold War, and helped to lay the foundations for the long-term ‘special relationship’. The article provides fresh insights into Anglo-American diplomatic bonds in a formative period.

The ‘Bowl of Jelly’: The us Department of State during the Kennedy and Johnson Years, 1961-1968

This article explores efforts to reform the us State Department under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, with the intention of making the Department better able to lead and coordinate the sprawling foreign policy apparatus. When Kennedy soon gave up on what he described as the ‘bowl of jelly’, the reform effort was left to his successor Johnson. Under Johnson, there were attempts to boost the State Department’s internal efficiency and its ability to support counterinsurgency efforts. Yet there was a justified perception by the end of 1968 that the State Department was unredeemed managerially and in terms of its standing in the foreign policy nexus. The reasons for the lack of progress include sporadic presidential engagement, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s limited aptitude for managerial affairs.

Communication: “What Now for Britain?”The State Department's Intelligence Assessment of the “Special Relationship,” 7 February 1968

The period 1967–1968 was a difficult one for the Anglo–American relationship, as a result of developments such as British defense cuts “East of Suez.” In the run-up to a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in February 1968, the State Departments Intelligence and Research Bureau provided a lively and detailed evaluation of American bonds with Britain. The analysis maintained that the relationship was based on deeply established cooperation in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, and that despite recent problems Britain would remain of unparalleled importance as an American ally. The immediate impact of the memorandum in the White House of Lyndon B. Johnson was quite limited, but among other things the document helps to explain the ready blossoming of close high-level Anglo–American bonds during, for example, the Falklands War of 1982. The most important sections of the memorandum are reproduced, and a brief analysis is provided to put the issues in context.

The ‘Most Distinguished Envoy of Peace’: Averell Harriman and the Vietnam War in the Johnson Years

From 1965 to 1969 the eminent diplomat Averell Harriman was at the forefront of US efforts to achieve a negotiated peace in Vietnam, pursuing numerous initiatives with vigour. He grew frustrated and embittered at how, in his view, President Johnson and his advisers were responsible for missing a number of opportunities for peace. However, recent research indicates that Communist attitudes were at least as much a sticking point. Harriman was also keen to enlist Soviet assistance, but it has become clear that Moscow was ambivalent towards engaging wholeheartedly with the peace effort. The article provides a fresh perspective on Harrimans attempts to bring peace in Vietnam, not least through the use of recent research in Communist archives.

Ambassador to Sixties London: The Diaries of David Bruce, 1961–1969

Raj Roy and John W. Young (eds.) Ambassador to Sixties London: The Diaries of David Bruce, 1961–1969. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing, 2010. David K.E. Bruce was an affable and urbane ind...

Lost Crusader? Chester Cooper and the Vietnam War, 1963-68

Chester Cooper was the noted author of The Lost Crusade: The United States in Vietnam (1970), but his role as a Vietnam policymaker has been unduly overlooked. Working for the CIA and for the National Security Council under Kennedy and Johnson, he grew disenchanted with American policy and sought to inhibit the US military role in Vietnam. He then joined the State Department to seek a negotiated peace. In exploring Coopers involvement in the Vietnam War, the article fills a gap in the literature and addresses questions of military strategy, decision-making, the prospects of a negotiated peace, and internal dissent.

Patrick Dean, 1965–69

In April 1965, when presenting his credentials at the White House the new British Ambassador, Patrick Dean, was not granted the customary exclusive audience. Instead Lyndon Johnson received him alongside the Ambassadors for Chile and Denmark. Johnson spent no time alone with Dean, yet that same day the journalists Scotty Reston and Alistair Cooke secured a three-hour interview with the President.1 It has been suggested that after this apparent snub the Ambassador made little further impression on the administration. Raj Roy, for example, has argued that Dean had very little ‘cachet’ in the White House, while the British Cabinet minister Tony Benn wrote that the relationship between Dean and the White House was ‘almost nonexistent in the latter part of LBJ’s presidency because Britain was deep in economic difficulties, our attitude to the Vietnam War had made us unpopular there… and generally speaking it was the final phase of the burial of the “special relationship”’.2 Dean’s role in Washington has been difficult for historians to investigate not least because, as one writer has noted, he ‘wrote no memoirs, gave few interviews and… left no private papers for others to consult. Because he did not have [a] temperamental personality… he did not provoke many recollections from former colleagues’.3