Jeroen Vaes

The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups

If people favor their ingroup, are especially concerned with their own group, and attribute different essences to different groups, it follows that their essence must be superior to the essence of other groups. Intelligence, language, and certain emotions are all considered to be distinctive elements of human nature or essence. The role of inteligence and language in discrimination, prejudice, and racism has already been largely investigated, and this article focuses on attributed emotions. Specifically, we investigate the idea that secondary emotions are typically human characteristics, and as such, they should be especially associated with and attributed to the ingroup. Seondary emotions may even be denied to outgroups. These differential associations and attributions of specifically human emotions to ingroups versus outgroups should affect intergroup relations. Results from several initial experiments are summarized that support our reasoning. This emotional approach to prejudice and racism is contrasted with more classic, cognitive perspectives.

Economic inequality is linked to biased self-perception

People’s self-perception biases often lead them to see themselves as better than the average person (a phenomenon known as self-enhancement). This bias varies across cultures, and variations are typically explained using cultural variables, such as individualism versus collectivism. We propose that socioeconomic differences among societies—specifically, relative levels of economic inequality—play an important but unrecognized role in how people evaluate themselves. Evidence for self-enhancement was found in 15 diverse nations, but the magnitude of the bias varied. Greater self-enhancement was found in societies with more income inequality, and income inequality predicted cross-cultural differences in self-enhancement better than did individualism/collectivism. These results indicate that macrosocial differences in the distribution of economic goods are linked to microsocial processes of perceiving the self.

The Cognitive Representation of Self-Stereotyping

The present work looks at the self-stereotyping process and reveals its underlying cognitive structure. When this process occurs, it is necessarily the result of an overlap between the representation of the ingroup and that of the self. Two studies measured this overlap and showed that it was higher on stereotype-relevant than on stereotype-irrelevant traits, it involved both positive and negative stereotypical traits, and it implied a deduction-to-the-self process of ingroup stereotypical dimensions. Moreover, the status of one’s social group was found to be a key variable in this process, showing that self-stereotyping is limited to low-status group members. Indeed, results of Study 2 showed that the overlap between the self and the ingroup for high-status group members was the result of an induction-to-the-ingroup process of personal characteristics. Implications for research on people’s self-construal are discussed.

The uniquely human content of stereotypes

The uniquely human content of stereotypes was measured in nine different inter-group comparisons that varied in terms of competence and warmth. Results indicated that the infrahumanization bias understood as people s tendency to see in-group relative to out-group stereotypes as more human occurred in almost all inter-group situations. Secondly, mainly out-groups that lack both warmth and competence were clearly infrahumanized as a result of a denial of out-group humanity. Finally, results suggested that among the different out-groups it was especially those high in competence, low in warmth that were seen as most uniquely human. As such, the current work extends previous research on infrahumanization to stereotypes, shows that group typology moderates the infrahumanization bias and demonstrates the affinity between the uniquely human and the competence dimension.

Emotional prejudice can lead to infra-humanisation

Groups are social constructions with differences. People spontaneously attempt to explain differences between groups. Stereotypes often play this explanatory role. Specifically, group members tend to attribute different essences to social categories. Given widespread ethnocentrism, it is not surprising that individuals reserve “the human essence” for their ingroup, while other groups are attributed a lesser humanity. This phenomenon is called infra‐humanisation and happens outside peoples awareness. Secondary emotions (e.g., love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions in contrast to primary emotions (e.g., joy, surprise, fear, anger) that are shared with animals. The research programme summarised in this chapter demonstrates through various paradigms that members of groups not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are also reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively with an outgroup member who expresses himself with secondary emotions than with an ingroup member who uses the same terms. Interestingly, infra‐humanisation occurs for both high‐ and low‐status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups.

We are human, they are not: Driving forces behind outgroup dehumanisation and the humanisation of the ingroup

Mostly invigorated by infrahumanisation theory, our knowledge on processes of dehumanisation in intergroup relations has grown considerably in the last decade. Building on these earlier endeavours, the present chapter reviews some recent empirical extensions that highlight the importance of differentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation because they are often moderated by specific variables. The role of these separate processes is discussed as a function of the main structural elements that define intergroup behaviour; that is, the defining boundaries of the groups, the relation between the groups at hand, and the ideologies of its members. Finally, the role of the different senses of humanness is discussed, suggesting that the folk conception of humanness differs between cultures.

We are people: ingroup humanization as an existential defense.

Prior research has shown the importance of humanness in shaping ones social identity, but no research has examined why this is the case. The present article reveals that humanizing the ingroup serves a terror management function. In 3 studies, Italian (Studies 1 and 2) and American (Study 3) participants humanized their own group more when their mortality was salient. In Study 3, humanizing the ingroup also functioned to reduce the accessibility of death thoughts. Together, these studies provide clear support for terror management theory as an explanatory framework for ingroup humanization.

Defensive dehumanization in the medical practice: A cross‐sectional study from a health care worker's perspective

Health care workers are often required to consider the emotions of their patients making their work susceptible for burnout. Extending recent developments in work on dehumanization, the present study tested whether or not considering a patients suffering in terms of uniquely human compared to more basic emotions, would be linked with burnout especially for those health care workers that frequently encounter emotional demands through their contact with suffering patients. Professional health care workers were presented with the fictitious case of a terminal patient and asked to infer her emotional state in terms of uniquely human or basic, primary emotions. As expected, humanizing a patients suffering positively predicted symptoms of burnout especially for those participants that had higher levels of direct contact with patients.

Of mice and men, and objectified women: A terror management account of infrahumanization

This article offers terror management theory (TMT) as a conceptual lens through which the process of infrahumanization can be viewed. TMT suggests that people are threatened by the awareness of their mortal, animal nature, and that by emphasizing their symbolic, cultural—and hence, uniquely human—existence, they can help quell this threat. The article reviews empirical evidence demonstrating that reminders of mortality increase efforts to see the self and in-groups as more uniquely human. In addition, it is posited that, as an ironic consequence of defensive efforts to rid the self and certain others of any connection to animal nature, people are sometimes stripped of their human nature. The study presents evidence that the objectification, and self-objectification, of women can be viewed from this perspective and concludes that both emphasizing people’s uniquely human qualities and viewing them as objectified symbols can be understood as serving a terror management function.

Ours is human: On the pervasiveness of infra-humanization in intergroup relations

Both at a conceptual and an empirical level, infra-humanization has been put on par with the relative greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to the in-group, assuming that a groups humanity is exclusively a matter of having uniquely human characteristics. In the present research we suggest that people also adopt another strategy to infra-humanize the out-group by considering those aspects that characterize and differentiate the in-group from the out-group as more uniquely human. In three studies, characteristics presented as typical of the in-group and the out-group were judged on a not uniquely human-uniquely human dimension. In addition to humanity, in Study 3 participants judged in-group and out-group characteristics also on an evaluative dimension. Consistent with the hypothesis, participants judged in-group characteristics as more human than those of the out-group, independent of their valence. The implications of these results for infra-humanization theory are discussed.