Maria Paola Paladino

Dimensions of "uniquely" and "non-uniquely" human emotions

Emotion scientists often distinguish those emotions that are encountered universally, even among animals ( “primary emotions”), from those experienced by human beings ( “secondary emotions”). No attempt, however, has ever been made to capture the lay conception about this distinction and to find the criteria on which the distinction is based. The first study presented in this paper was conducted in three countries involving four languages, so as to allow for cross‐cultural comparisons. Results showed a remarkable convergence. People from all samples not only differentiated between “uniquely human” and “non‐uniquely human” emotions on a continuum, but they did so on the same basis as the one used by emotion scientists to distinguish between “primary” and “secondary” emotions. Study 2 focused on the implicit use of such a distinction. When confronted with a human (animal) context, participants reacted faster to secondary (vs primary) emotions. The implications of the human uniqueness of some emotions within the social and interpersonal contexts are discussed.

Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries.

In a study that builds on recent cognitive neuroscience research on body perception and social psychology research on social relations, we tested the hypothesis that synchronous multisensory stimulation leads to self-other merging. We brushed the cheek of each study participant as he or she watched a stranger’s cheek being brushed in the same way, either in synchrony or in asynchrony. We found that this multisensory procedure had an effect on participants’ body perception as well as social perception. Study participants exposed to synchronous stimulation showed more merging of self and the other than participants exposed to asynchronous stimulation. The degree of self-other merging was determined by measuring participants’ body sensations and their perception of face resemblance, as well as participants’ judgment of the inner state of the other, closeness felt toward the other, and conformity behavior. The results of this study show how multisensory integration can affect social perception and create a sense of self-other similarity.

Differential Association of Uniquely and Non Uniquely Human Emotions with the Ingroup and the Outgroup

According to Leyens et al.’s (2000) theory, intergroup discrimination involves a differential appraisal of the ingroup’s and the outgroup’s uniquely human characteristics. Four experiments investigated how emotions that are considered uniquely (i.e. secondary emotions) and non uniquely (i.e. primary emotions) human (Demoulin et al., 2001a) are differentially associated with the ingroup and the outgroup. Using the Implicit Association Task (IAT) we found a stronger association of ingroup names with uniquely human emotions and of outgroup names with non uniquely human emotions, than the reverse. Whereas Study 2 used negative emotions, all other experiments used positive emotions. In Study 3, two IAT indices were collected: an emotional index and a standard evaluative one. While the outgroup was constituted by North African names in the first three studies, Study 4 staged French-speaking Belgians (i.e. the ingroup) versus Dutch-speaking Belgians (i.e. the outgroup). The results are discussed within the framework of psychological essentialism, according to which uniquely human characteristics form the essence of the ingroup.

On the Immediate Consequences of Intergroup Categorization: Activation of Approach and Avoidance Motor Behavior Toward Ingroup and Outgroup Members

The present research argues that intergroup categorization has immediate behavioral consequences. Specifically, intergroup categorization is hypothesized to prepare the organism to respond differently to ingroup and outgroup members so that approach-like motor movements should be faster toward ingroup- versus outgroup-related stimuli. In contrast, avoidance-like behavior should be facilitated when reacting to outgroup versus ingroup members. Studies 1 and 2 test the basic hypothesis in relation to ethnic, national, age, and political categorization. Study 3 uses a minimal group paradigm to test the hypothesis in relation to newly formed groups. Across these experiments, participants were generally faster in performing approach-like motor movements toward ingroup members or avoidance behaviors toward outgroup members. The evolutionary function and the cognitive underpinnings of this state of “physical readiness” to approach ingroup and avoid outgroup members are discussed.

The role of in‐group identification in infra‐humanization

People tend to infra-humanize by attributing more human essence to their in-group than to out-groups. In the present article, we focus on the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to operationalize the human essence. We propose that, in order to infra-humanize, people need to be categorized in meaningful groups. In addition, we argue that what differentiates meaningful from nonmeaningful groups is that the people essentialize, perceiving members of the group as sharing an underlying, common essence. Also, we hypothesize that participants will identify more with their in-group in the case of meaningful groups. Three types of groups were created to manipulate the meaningfulness of the categorization. Participants were either randomly assigned to a group or they chose their group as a function of their preferences for a colour or the type of career they wished to pursue. As expected, infra-humanization occurred only where the categorizations criterion was meaningful. In addition, in-group identification, but not essentialism, mediated the impact of the categorization criteria on the tendency to infra-humanize. Data also showed that infra-humanization is different from classic in-group favouritism. This is because in-group favouritism, but not infra-humanization, was observed in the situation where group membership was based on random assignment. In other words, for infra-humanization to occur mere categorization is not enough; meaningfulness is also needed. For in-group favouritism to arise, the knowledge of being part of a group is a sufficient prerequisite. The discussion focuses on conditions for reducing infra-humanization and on the relationship between in-group favouritism and out-group derogation.

The uniquely human content of stereotypes

The uniquely human content of stereotypes was measured in nine different inter-group comparisons that varied in terms of competence and warmth. Results indicated that the infrahumanization bias understood as people s tendency to see in-group relative to out-group stereotypes as more human occurred in almost all inter-group situations. Secondly, mainly out-groups that lack both warmth and competence were clearly infrahumanized as a result of a denial of out-group humanity. Finally, results suggested that among the different out-groups it was especially those high in competence, low in warmth that were seen as most uniquely human. As such, the current work extends previous research on infrahumanization to stereotypes, shows that group typology moderates the infrahumanization bias and demonstrates the affinity between the uniquely human and the competence dimension.

Emotional prejudice can lead to infra-humanisation

Groups are social constructions with differences. People spontaneously attempt to explain differences between groups. Stereotypes often play this explanatory role. Specifically, group members tend to attribute different essences to social categories. Given widespread ethnocentrism, it is not surprising that individuals reserve “the human essence” for their ingroup, while other groups are attributed a lesser humanity. This phenomenon is called infra‐humanisation and happens outside peoples awareness. Secondary emotions (e.g., love, hope, contempt, resentment) are considered uniquely human emotions in contrast to primary emotions (e.g., joy, surprise, fear, anger) that are shared with animals. The research programme summarised in this chapter demonstrates through various paradigms that members of groups not only attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups, but are also reluctant to associate these emotions with outgroups. Moreover, people behave less cooperatively with an outgroup member who expresses himself with secondary emotions than with an ingroup member who uses the same terms. Interestingly, infra‐humanisation occurs for both high‐ and low‐status groups, even in the absence of conflict between groups.

We are human, they are not: Driving forces behind outgroup dehumanisation and the humanisation of the ingroup

Mostly invigorated by infrahumanisation theory, our knowledge on processes of dehumanisation in intergroup relations has grown considerably in the last decade. Building on these earlier endeavours, the present chapter reviews some recent empirical extensions that highlight the importance of differentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation because they are often moderated by specific variables. The role of these separate processes is discussed as a function of the main structural elements that define intergroup behaviour; that is, the defining boundaries of the groups, the relation between the groups at hand, and the ideologies of its members. Finally, the role of the different senses of humanness is discussed, suggesting that the folk conception of humanness differs between cultures.

Ours is human: On the pervasiveness of infra-humanization in intergroup relations

Both at a conceptual and an empirical level, infra-humanization has been put on par with the relative greater attribution of uniquely human emotions to the in-group, assuming that a groups humanity is exclusively a matter of having uniquely human characteristics. In the present research we suggest that people also adopt another strategy to infra-humanize the out-group by considering those aspects that characterize and differentiate the in-group from the out-group as more uniquely human. In three studies, characteristics presented as typical of the in-group and the out-group were judged on a not uniquely human-uniquely human dimension. In addition to humanity, in Study 3 participants judged in-group and out-group characteristics also on an evaluative dimension. Consistent with the hypothesis, participants judged in-group characteristics as more human than those of the out-group, independent of their valence. The implications of these results for infra-humanization theory are discussed.

Self-other bodily merging in the context of synchronous but arbitrary-related multisensory inputs

A debated issue in the multisensory literature concerns the relative contribution of bottom-up sensory components versus top-down cognitive elaborations in contributing to the rise and persistency of bodily illusion. Previous studies, for instance, have shown that simultaneity of sensory inputs and plausibility of the stimulated object play an important role in the rubber hand phenomenon, whereas violation of tactile expectancy does not disrupt the illusory feeling to own a fake hand. The present research examined this issue in the context of the “enfacement” phenomenon (i.e., self-other face-perception modification), using entirely arbitrary and non-ecological pairs of visual and tactile events. Visual and tactile stimulation was matched in terms of spatial location, but not linked by any previously learned associations, making temporal synchrony a critical binding factor. Participants received electro-tactile stimulations on their cheek, while they watched the face of a stranger illuminated on the cheek with a dot of white light. Synchronous (vs. asynchronous) stimulations yielded the enfacement effect. In addition, the stranger stimulated in synchrony was judged as more similar, physically and in terms of personality, and as closer to the self. These findings suggest that synchronous multisensory stimulation on the face can produce both perceptual and social binding, even in the absence of any previously learned associations between the stimulations.