Jessica Chen Weiss

Powerful patriots : nationalist protest in China's foreign relations

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Nationalist Protest and Authoritarian Diplomacy Chapter 3 Anti-American Protest and U.S.-China Crisis Diplomacy Chapter 4 The 1985 Anti-Japan Protests and Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1980s Chapter 5 Protests Repressed: Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1990s Chapter 6 The 2005 Anti-Japan Protests and Sino-Japanese Relations in the 2000s Chapter 7 Protests Restrained: Repairing Sino-Japanese Relations (2006-2010) and the 2010 Trawler Collision Chapter 8 The 2012 Anti-Japan Protests and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Purchase Chapter 9 Conclusion

Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China

How can authoritarian states credibly signal their intentions in international crises? Nationalist, antiforeign protests are one mechanism by which authoritarian leaders can visibly demonstrate their domestic vulnerability. Because protests in authoritarian states are risky and costly to repress, the decision to allow or stifle popular mobilization is informative. The threat of instability demonstrates resolve, and the cost of concession increases the credibility of a tough stance. The danger of instability and escalation increases foreign incentives to make concessions and preserve the status quo. This logic helps explain the pattern of authoritarian tolerance and repression toward nationalist protest. A case study of two U.S.-China crises shows how Chinas management of anti-American protests affected U.S. beliefs about Chinese resolve.

Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes.

Will China Test Trump? Lessons from Past Campaigns and Elections

China was in the crosshairs of both U.S. presidential candidates this election season. Republican candidate Donald J. Trump pledged to put an end to Chinese trade policies that “rape” the U.S. economy, while Democratic candidate Hillary R. Clinton criticized China’s record on human rights and island-building activities in the South China Sea. Trump and Clinton both pledged to label China a currency manipulator, file more trade cases against China, and impose tariffs on Chinese imports. As Chinese state media lamented, “China-bashing” is an “easy political card for U.S. political candidates to play.” Although promises to adopt tougher positions on China are a recurring feature of U.S. presidential campaigns, Donald J. Trump’s unconventional candidacy and ascent to the White House have introduced enormous uncertainty in the trajectory of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Both American and Chinese analysts have wondered what Trump’s election will entail for U.S. democratic norms and institutions. An open letter by hundreds of political scientists stated that Trump’s “unprecedented” remarks during the campaign had “questioned and attacked the core institutions and norms that make democracy work,” including freedom of the press, the validity of the election process, and the loyalty of citizens based on their religion and ethnicity. Chinese state media seized the opportunity to discredit Western-style democracy as a “sham.” Setting aside Chinese expressions of “delight” and schadenfreude in America’s “fading political and social institutions,” how will the election affect Chinese policy toward the new administration?

External Influence on Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation of US Pressure and the Chinese RMB

Trade imbalances have often led to accusations of “currency manipulation�? and efforts to remedy the purported effects of exchange rate misalignment. This paper investigates the impact of US pressure on China to revalue the RMB. Using vector autoregression (VAR) to analyze an original dataset of US statements and actions between 2005 and 2012, we examine the over-time dynamics between US pressure and the nominal RMB/USD exchange rate. A case study of mounting US pressure in advance of the 2010 midterm election illustrates China’s responsiveness in timing adjustments in the RMB to defuse the risk of an international confrontation. Our findings indicate that external political pressures can influence national exchange rate policies under certain conditions.

Campaign Rhetoric and Chinese Reactions to New Leaders

How does campaign rhetoric shape foreign perceptions and reactions to the election of new leaders? This article highlights two primary factors guiding Chinese beliefs and behavior toward new leaders in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. First is the degree of consistency between campaign rhetoric and other indicators of a candidate’s likely policy toward China; second is the degree of change from the policies of the past administration. We observe a wait-and-see pattern of Chinese behavior toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric was inconsistent with other indicators of likely China policy; a proactive pattern of Chinese behavior toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with indicators of change in a hawkish or dovish direction; and a status quo orientation toward leaders whose campaign rhetoric is consistent with continuity in China policy. Our findings push back against common characterizations of how China and other authoritarian states react to democratic leadership transitions. In no case did China appear to probe or test the resolve of newly elected leaders. Far from dismissing campaign remarks outright or mistaking them for policy, we found Chinese observers to be highly attentive and sophisticated interpreters of election rhetoric.

Campaign Rhetoric and the Surprising Stability of Leadership Transitions in the Asia-Pacific

Conventional wisdom holds that leadership transitions are periods of heightened uncertainty as foreign actors seek to probe the resolve of new and untested leaders. However, a careful examination of leadership transitions in the Asia-Pacific reveals a striking pattern of stability. What explains the absence of diplomatic and military conflict following the election or installation of new leaders? Campaign rhetoric, whether hawkish or dovish, is a more credible signal of policy in the aftermath of leadership turnover than typically acknowledged. Examining China’s relations with thirteen new administrations in the United States, Japan and Taiwan, we find that China uses campaign rhetoric to calibrate its policies toward new leaders. Rather than probing new leaders, China’s engagement and restraint helps account for the remarkable absence of conflict in the aftermath of democratic turnover, even though crises with China have taken place during the majority of these leaders’ time in office.