Peter Hays Gries

China's “New Thinking” on Japan

Following the publication of Ma Lichengs provocative article “New thinking on relations with Japan,” 2003 China witnessed a remarkable public debate on Japan policy. Academics tangled with internet nationalists, and heavy pressure was put on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take a tough line on Japan. The crushing defeat of the “new thinking” and a spate of anti-Japanese protests on the Chinese street and in Chinese cyberspace portends trouble in East Asia.

The Perception of the Other in International Relations: Evidence for the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity

In an international relations context, the mutual images held by actors affect their mutual expectations about the Others behavior and guide the interpretation of the Others actions. Here it is argued that the effect of these images is moderated by the degree of entitativity of the Other-that is, the extent to which it is perceived as a real entity. Two studies tested this hypothesis by manipulating the entitativity of the European Union (EU) among U.S. citizens whose images of the EU varied along the enemy/ally dimension. Results of these studies yielded converging evidence in support of the hypothesized moderating effect of entitativity. Specifically, entitativity showed a polarizing effect on the relationship between the image of the EU and judgments of harmfulness of actions carried out by the EU.

Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity

What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign inter- nationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nation- alist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.

The Olympic Effect on American Attitudes towards China: beyond personality, ideology, and media exposure

This paper explores the impact that increased exposure to China during the two and a half weeks of the Beijing Olympics had on American attitudes towards China. A large N longitudinal survey revealed a significant increase in negative attitudes towards China from the beginning to the end of August 2008. Statistical analysis revealed no dominant explanation for this change, however. Instead, personality (openness), ideology (social dominance orientation and right wing authoritarianism), and media exposure each had a small impact on changing attitudes. Further research (including a follow-up experiment manipulating the valence of media coverage of China) suggested both the possibility of an ‘efficiency effect’, whereby Chinas very success in both hosting and competing in the Olympics generated increased American anxiety about China, and a ‘cheating effect’, whereby stories about underage Chinese gymnasts and deception (e.g. lip synching while another child actually sang during the Opening Ceremonies) diffused broadly through social networks, uniformly and negatively impacting American attitudes towards China.

Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013

Abstract 2012–2013 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-Japanese sentiment in Mainland China, followed by a toughening of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Diaoyu Islands policy. Did popular nationalism influence the PRC’s military escalation? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts a definitive answer to this question beyond our reach. However, this article utilizes qualitative and quantitative analyses of anti-Japanese discourse and deeds in both cyberspace and on the streets of urban China to argue that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of China’s Japan policy. The demands of nationalist legitimation appear to pressure the elite to respond to popular nationalism. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force, therefore, the popular pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than China’s leaders can manage.

Hollywood in China: How American Popular Culture Shapes Chinese Views of the "beautiful Imperialist"-An Experimental Analysis

While most mainland Chinese today have extremely few direct contacts with either America or Americans, their indirect contacts with both, via globalized American popular culture, are increasing rapidly. Do daily parasocial contacts with American celebrities shape Chinese views of America? Based on two experimental studies, this paper argues that even indirect, subconscious exposure to American celebrities via popular magazine covers shapes Chinese views of America. However, the impact of that exposure depends upon both the specific nature of the bicultural exposure and the psychological predispositions of the Chinese involved. Not all Chinese are alike, and their personality differences shape whether they experience American popular culture as enriching or threatening, leading to integrative and exclusionary reactions, respectively.

National narcissism: Internal dimensions and international correlates

In studies conducted in the United States and China, we explored the impact of national narcissism, grandiosity, and entitlement, demonstrating that: (a) national narcissism was distinct from both individual narcissism and collective self-esteem (patriotism); (b) national entitlement and national grandiosity constituted two distinct dimensions of national narcissism; and (c) national narcissism, national grandiosity, and national entitlement, but not individual narcissism, were uniquely predictive of political attitudes, foreign policy preferences, and purchase intentions. Together, these findings provided convergent evidence for the utility of national narcissism and its two internal dimensions, national entitlement and national grandiosity.

Taiwanese Views of China and the World: Party Identification, Ethnicity, and Cross–Strait Relations

This article presents results from a nationally representative survey conducted in Taiwan in November 2011 that explores Taiwanese attitudes toward China and the world. It demonstrates that while ‘blue’ (KMT) and ‘green’ (DPP) supporters maintained different attitudes towards China, few Taiwanese supported reunification. Taiwanese attitudes towards other countries, the sources of Taiwanese party identification, and policy implications for cross–Strait relations are also explored. Ma Ying-jeou’s reelection on 14 January 2012 was immediately and widely heralded as an endorsement of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) ‘pro-China’ policies. Bloomberg claimed in the opening lines of its election story that ‘President Ma Ying-jeou was elected to a second four-year term as Taiwan’s president, giving him a renewed mandate to press for closer ties with China’. The article was even entitled, ‘Ma Wins Second Term as Taiwan Voters Back His Push for Closer China Ties’.1 Taiwan’s China Post declared in a commentary that ‘Now that President Ma Ying-jeou has been reelected, Taiwan must try to conclude a peace accord with the People’s Republic of China’.2 Beijing eagerly agreed. Xinhua declared that ‘Cross–Strait Policies Help Ma’, and a spokesperson for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office asserted that ‘a majority of Taiwan compatriots . . . 1 Michael Forsythe, Yu-Huay Sun, and Andrea Wong, ‘Ma Wins Second Term as Taiwan Voters Back His Push for Closer China Ties’, Bloomberg, 15 January 2012, italics added (accessed 15 January 2012). 2 ‘Ma Must Forge PRC Peace Accord’, The China Post, 16 January 2012 (accessed 22 January 2012).

Contentious Histories and the Perception of Threat: China, the United States, and the Korean War— An Experimental Analysis

Chinese and Korean protests over “revisionist” Japanese histories of World War II are well known. The impact of contested Chinese and US histories of the Korean War on US-China relations today has received less attention. More broadly, there has been little research seeking to systematically explore just how history textbook controversies matter for international relations. This article experimentally manipulates the impact of nation (US/China), of source (in-group/out-group textbooks), and of valence (positive/negative historical narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotions, collective self-esteem, and threat perception in present-day US-China relations. A 2 × 2 × 2 design exposed randomized groups of Chinese and US university students to fictional high school history textbook accounts of the Korean War. Findings reveal significant effects of nation, source, and valence and suggest that the “historical relevance” of a shared past to national identities in the present has a dramatic impact on how historical controversies affect threat perception.

Red China and the "yellow peril": How ideology divides Americans over China

Based on a 2011 national survey, I argue that while US conservatives feel somewhat cooler toward the East Asian democracies than US liberals do, they feel much cooler toward China. Greater average conservative than liberal prejudice lingers, cooling attitudes toward the “Yellow Peril” of all Asian countries, but communism is a larger source of ideological differences over China. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals toward both communist countries in general and “Red China” in particular. I conclude by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing ideological sorting, these ideological differences over China on Main Street may come to play a greater role in the making of US China policy.