Jessica Wortman

Stability and change in the Big Five personality domains: evidence from a longitudinal study of Australians.

Longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample of Australians were used to evaluate mean-level differences and rank-order stability in personality traits assessed twice over a 4-year time span (n = 13,134). Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness declined over the life span, whereas Agreeableness increased among young cohorts, was stable among middle-aged cohorts, and declined among the oldest old. Cross-sectional analyses suggested an increase in Conscientiousness throughout the life span, though longitudinal analyses suggested a slight decline in late life. There was an inverted U-shaped pattern for rank-order stability, with peak stability occurring in middle age. For three of the Big Five domains (Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), age-related differences appeared to be somewhat more pronounced before age 30 than after age 30.

Trait Means and Desirabilities as Artifactual and Real Sources of Differential Stability of Personality Traits

Using data from 3 personality trait inventories and 7 samples, we show that trait items that have means near the scale midpoint and that vary more in their perceived desirability (e.g., items related to dominance, creativity, traditionalism, and organization) tend to be more stable over time, whereas items with means near the scale maximum or minimum and that vary less in their perceived desirability (e.g., items related to agreeableness, intellect, and reliability) tend to be less stable. Our findings indicate that items with means near the scale maximum or minimum have lower stabilities primarily due to having lower measurement dependability (i.e., short-term stabilities unlikely to reflect true change). However, items varying more in their desirability are more stable even after accounting for measurement dependability, consistent with the view that trait stability is facilitated in part by individuals actively working to develop in the direction they find desirable.

The Effects of Disgust on Moral Judgments: Testing Moderators

There is evidence that inducing feelings of disgust increases the severity of moral judgments, but the size of this association has been questioned by a recent meta-analysis. Based on prior research and theory, we tested whether the effects of disgust on moral judgments might be moderated by sensitivity to bodily states (Studies 1 and 2) and the accessibility of mood (Study 2) in two large samples (total N = 1,412). We did not find that disgust directly increased the severity of moral judgments nor did we find evidence that these moderators influenced the effect of disgust. Thus, the current studies do not support large effects for induced disgust and for two presumed moderators of these effects.

The Effect of Mood on Judgments of Subjective Well-Being: Nine Tests of the Judgment Model

Life satisfaction judgments are thought to represent an overall evaluation of the quality of a person’s life as a whole. Thus, they should reflect relatively important and stable characteristics of that person’s life. Previous highly cited research has suggested that transient factors, such as the mood that a person experiences at the time that well-being judgments are made, can influence these judgments. However, most existing studies used small sample sizes, and few replications have been attempted. Nine direct and conceptual replications of past studies testing the effects of mood on life satisfaction judgments were conducted using sample sizes that were considerably larger than previous studies (Ns = 202, 200, 269, 118, 320, 401, 285, 129, 122). Most of the 9 studies resulted in nonsignificant effects on life satisfaction and happiness judgments, and those that were significant were substantially smaller than effects found in previous research.

Spousal similarity in life satisfaction before and after divorce.

Previous research has explored possible origins of individual differences in subjective well-being, focusing largely on stable, internal characteristics of traits as predictors of life satisfaction (Diener & Lucas, 1999). Although past work has demonstrated that life satisfaction is largely stable over the life span, other evidence has also demonstrated the lasting impact of life events. In this study, we use married couples as a test of the impact of life circumstances on life satisfaction, focusing on similarity in life satisfaction before and after divorce. If life satisfaction is impacted by shared life circumstances, married couples (who share life circumstances) should show greater similarity in life satisfaction before divorce than after. We tested this possibility using a dyadic latent-state-trait model that examined cross-spouse similarity in the stable and changing components of life satisfaction. Using a nationally representative panel study from Germany (Wagner, Frick & Schupp, 2007), we showed that similarity declined substantially following divorce. This suggests that life satisfaction is related to shared life circumstances.

Commentary and rejoinder on Lynott et al. (2014)

We respond to Williams’(2014) comments on our three failures to replicate of Study 2 from Williams and Bargh (2008). We clarify our conclusions on this topic, making clear that although the results of our studies cast doubt on the specific effect reported in Williams and Bargh (i.e., that instant hot and cold packs influence choice of reward for self or friend), a more complete understanding of the embodiment hypothesis in question requires consideration of relevant conceptual replications. Accordingly, we consider the strength of the evidence in the conceptual replications that Williams identifies and find that small samples appear to be the norm. We conclude that in order for researchers to move forward, future studies must take seriously issues of power, researcher degrees of freedom, and file drawer problems. Doing so will ensure that future studies are more informative tests of this hypothesis.