Jesús Saurina

Credit Risk in Two Institutional Regimes: Spanish Commercial and Savings Banks

Although credit risk is an important factor that financial institutions must cope with, the determinants of bank problem loans have been little studied. Using panel data, we compare the determinants of problem loans of Spanish commercial and savings banks in the period 1985–1997, taking into account both macroeconomic and individual bank level variables. The GDP growth rate, firms, and family indebtedness, rapid past credit or branch expansion, inefficiency, portfolio composition, size, net interest margin, capital ratio, and market power are variables that explain credit risk. However, there are significant differences between commercial and savings banks, which confirm the relevance of the institutional form in the management of credit risk. Our findings raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators, the advantages of bank mergers from different regions, and the role of banking competition and ownership in determining credit risk.

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long-term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.

Are capital buffers pro-cyclical?: Evidence from Spanish panel data

In this paper, we analyse the relationship between the Spanish business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and savings banks. We build an incomplete panel of Spanish institutions from 1986 to 2000 –thus covering a complete business cycle– and estimate an equation for the behaviour of capital buffers that includes an indicator of the business cycle. Our findings are fairly robust and quite unequivocal. After controlling for other potential determinants of the surplus capital we find a robustly significant negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffers. From a quantitative standpoint, an increase of 1 percentage point in GDP growth might reduce capital buffers by 17%. This relationship is, moreover, asymmetric, being closer during upturns. Accordingly, there is a case for taking into account the so-called pro-cyclicality problem in the final design of Basel II. Pillar 2 seems to be the right place to address the issue.

How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?

A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say about the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?

We identify the impact of short-term interest rates on credit risk-taking by analyzing a comprehensive credit register from Spain, a country where for the last twenty years monetary policy was mostly decided abroad. Discrete choice, within borrower comparison and duration analyses show that lower overnight rates prior to loan origination lead banks to lend more to borrowers with a worse credit history and to grant more loans with a higher per period probability of default. Lower overnight rates during the life of the loan reduce this probability. Bank, borrower and market characteristics determine the impact of overnight rates on credit risk-taking.

Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments

To study the impact of macroprudential policy on credit supply cycles and real effects, we analyze dynamic provisioning. Introduced in Spain in 2000, revised four times, and tested in its countercyclicality during the crisis, it affected banks differentially. We find that dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in bad times, supports firm performance. A 1 percentage point increase in capital buffers extends credit to firms by 9 percentage points, increasing firm employment (6 percentage points) and survival (1 percentage point). Moreover, there are important compositional effects in credit supply related to risk and regulatory arbitrage by nonregulated and regulated but less affected banks.

Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in Spanish banks

Abstract This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory changes in the market power of Spanish banks. It also analyses the response of banks, in terms of risk-taking behaviour, as a result of a reduction in economic profits. We find that liberalisation measures have increased competition and eroded banks’ market power. We observe that banks with lower charter values tend to have lower equity–assets ratios (lower solvency) and to experience higher credit risk. The last evidence is new in the literature and calls for strengthening regulatory concerns about credit risk management by banks in situations of increased competition.

Mitigating the Pro-Cyclicality of Basel II

Policy discussions on the recent financial crisis feature widespread calls to address the pro-cyclicaleffects of regulation. The main concern is that the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation (Basel II) may amplify business cycle fluctuations. This paper compares the leading alternative procedures that have been proposed to mitigate this problem. We estimate a model of the probabilities of default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987 2008, and use the estimated PDs to compute the corresponding series of Basel II capital requirements per unit of loans. These requirements move significantly along the business cycle, ranging from 7.6% (in 2006) to 11.9% (in 1993). The comparison of the different procedures is based on the criterion of minimizing the root mean square deviations of each adjusted series with respect to the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the original series. The results show that the best procedures are either to smooth the input of the Basel II formula by using through the cycle PDs or to smooth the output with a multiplier based on GDP growth. Our discussion concludes that the latter is better in terms of simplicity, transparency, and consistency with banks� risk pricing and risk management systems. For the portfolio of Spanish commercial and industrial loans and a 45% loss given default (LGD), the multiplier would amount to a 6.5% surcharge for each standard deviation in GDP growth. The surcharge would be significantly higher with cyclically-varying LGDs.

Earnings and Capital Management in Alternative Loan Loss Provision Regulatory Regimes

The paper sets an accounting and behavioral framework from which we derive a reduced form equation to test income smoothing and capital management practices through loan loss provisions (PLL) by Spanish banks. Spain offers a unique environment to perform those tests because there are very detailed rules to set aside loan loss provisions and they are not counted as regulatory capital. Using panel data econometric techniques, we find evidence of income smoothing through PLL but not of capital management. The paper draws some lessons for accounting rule setters and banking regulators regarding the current changes in the accounting framework (introduction of IFRS/IAS in Europe) as well as the new capital framework (Basel II). In particular, a very detailed set of rules to set aside loan loss provisions does not prevent managers from decreasing earnings volatility, similarly to what happens in a more principles oriented accounting framework.

The Impact of Basel II on Lending to Small- and Medium-Sized Firms: A Regulatory Policy Assessment Based on Spanish Credit Register Data

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact on bank credit exposures to small- and medium-sized Spanish firms of the current proposal for reform of the 1988 Capital Accord using information from the Spanish Credit Register. Capital requirements for exposures to those firms, according to the various revisions of the proposed capital reform (from the January 2001 consultative document to the April 2003 one), are calculated to analyze whether the existing pattern of bank financing of small- and medium-sized firms might be altered. Finally, the incentives for individual banks to adopt the advanced internal ratings-based approach proposed by Basel II are evaluated.